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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Problems and Purposes of the Study-
Advancement of transportation facilities has drawn 
closer the physical distance of human beings. Their 
spiritual separation is nevertheless great. As governments 
and/or vested interests oa both sides of the "iron curtain* 
practice in various degrees control and manipulation of 
information (cf. 17, PP. 34-41; 387, pp. 3-12 and 117-118), 
a majority of people are living in ignorance, suspicion, 
prejudice and fear. According to the results of a national 
survey conducted by the University of Michigan Survey 
Research Center in May and June, 1964, 28^ of American 
people are not aware that the Chinese mainland is ruled by 
a communist government (445, p. 5). Of those who know that 
the Chinese mainland is controlled by a communist govern­
ment only 60^ know of the existence of the Nationalist 
government (445, pp. 10-11). Fewer know the characteristics 
of each government. The lack of international understanding 
in other countries is perhaps worse. 
The U.S. government and private institutes have 
sponsored studies on various aspects of Communist China. 
However there is a lack of serious study of one of its most 
important aspects: development and economic significance of 
rural reorganization. In this study, reorganization in 
rural China includes the processes of land redistribution. 
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mutual aid movement, oooperativization, collectivization, 
and communization. They have had profound and extensive 
impacts on China proper as well as on the whole world, 
which will be elaborated in the next chapter. A historian 
may remark that the study of history will lose a lot if the 
Chinese history is ignored. Similarly, it can be contended 
that the science of economic development will suffer if the 
experiences of Communist Chinese in developing their 
agriculture and modernizing rural areas are not adequately 
studied and evaluated. 
This study attempts to fill this gap. First, it 
hopes to provide "factual" information about institutional 
changes undergone in rural China. Secondly, it describes 
the characteristics of various institutions and investi­
gates the underlying reasons for their development and 
decline. Thirdly, it reconstructs the process of the 
communization and furnishes economic interpretation of the 
rural people's communes and the "great leap forward" and 
"walking on two legs" movements in terms of concepts used 
by the western economists. Finally, it seeks to shed 
light on the process of agricultural development in other 
countries by analyzing the effects of institutional change 
on farm output and rural modernization in China. 
The study focuses on the development and economic 
significance of the rural people's communes. Are the rural 
communes and related economic policies rational in the 
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economic sense? Is the communization the dominant factor 
responsible for abrupt increase of farm output in its early 
phase and sharp decline during the period from late 1959 to 
early 1962? 
Be Methods Used in the Study 
The aforementioned objectives cannot be achieved by a 
single approach. The analytical methods used in this study 
are therefore historical, quantitative and theoretical. The 
historical approach is necessary to see the origin of ideas 
said perspective of social movements and thus to grasp their 
significance. Theoretical inference and elaboration is 
made on the basis of available information and documents 
concerning rural reorganization. However, the collection and 
arrangement of these materials in a systematic and intelli­
gible way needs the guidance of a theoretical framework 
constructed by development scientists. For example, the 
"end-means" relation betweeen the "great leap forward" and 
the commune system is the main criterion used in this study 
to establish two phases of the commune development. 
In the era of the "Cold War" conclusions on China's 
rural reorganization have profound implications. Students 
on the communist systems and policies certainly vary widely in 
their opinions. The present writer does not presume expertise 
in this field. So many things have interacted to influence 
the thinking of the writer that a strictly objective study of 
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this subject is difficult to achieve. However the writer has 
tried to avoid dogmatic statements, capitalist, socialist or 
others. In reading this thesis, the reader is urged to put 
aside his preconceptions. 
Technically, there is a paucity of accurate and system­
atic statistics on institutional changes, and agricultural 
production, due to a poor statistical staff and administra­
tion in rural areas, changes in the coverage of statistical 
reporting, and control and manipulation of data (151; 153; 
154; l6l; 446), The quality of statistics deteriorated in 
1958 when rural statistical services were under the control 
of the party and local cadres resorted to statistical 
inflation to demonstrate a "great leap" in production (153» 
pp. 91-97 and 111-121), The Director of the State 
Statistical Bureau stated explicitly in 1959: "Statistical 
work should take as its major task the reporting of 
achievements and triumphs." (153, p. 121). 
However, it must be noted that the quality of Communist 
China's agricultural statistics during 1950-1957 was perhaps 
comparable to that in other underdeveloped countries. Still, 
it is not unique in Communist China to witness the prevalence 
of "statisticulatlon" and "growthmanship," which means 
manipulation of data to show that countries with economic 
systems they favor have a high rate of economic growth and 
that unfriendly nations have a poor or less impressive 
growth (131; 67, pp. 12-13), 
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All these difficulties should not discourage responsible 
scientists from attempting serious investigation. Efforts are 
thus made in this study to collect and piece together the 
communist official materials which are relevant to the subject. 
When there are several versions of official data on the same 
matter, the final figures are used. Hopefully, this patching 
work will throw light on the background against which the 
communist regime has formulated and executed its series of 
drastic rural programs and the consequences thereof. This 
approach might lead the writer, no matter how cautious he is, 
to wrong inferences. But there is no alternative. 
The writer is in no position to revise the data 
published by the Communist government. It appears to him 
that any attempt to estimate the crop production of 
Communist Chipa from outside the mainland, one way or 
another, has to rely on information provided by the regime. 
There is no evidence to support the case that private 
estimates made outside the Chinese mainland will obtain more 
accurate information concerning economic activities than 
those prepared and published inside. 
Regional data are used on many occasions when they are 
relevant or when no national data are available. Based on 
the fragmentary information and recent controversies about 
the effects of the commune system on farm output, crude 
economic models are also developed in this study. These 
analytical frameworks, in the writer's belief, are useful 
6 
in comprehending the nature of the agricultural development 
problem and in resolving controversies, at least, at the 
theoretical level. The models can also guide the collection 
of data and facilitate future studies in the same and related 
fields. No attempt is made in this study to develop elegant 
mathematical models. 
C. General Framework of the Thesis 
This thesis reviews institutional changes in rural China 
from the viewpoint of agricultural and economic development. 
It does not necessarily imply that economic development 
should be given top priority. Analyses of forces contri­
buting to the initiation, proliferation and readjustment of 
the commune system, and evaluation of the effects of 
communization on agricultural development and rural moderni­
zation constitute the heart of the thesis. 
In order to see communization in perspective, it is 
necessary to describe and examine rural reorganizations 
undertaken before the advent of the commune. Chapter III 
describes briefly conditions in China before the communist 
takeover which signaled the coming of the ensuing upheavals 
in the social system. The following four chapters discuss in 
order land redistribution, mutual aid teams, agricultural 
producers* cooperatives and collective farms. Short comments 
are made on each type of rural insitutions. These comments 
will be understood more fully after chapters X and XIII have 
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been read. The reader will also gain insight into the commime 
system if its characteristics are compared with those of the 
preceding rural organizations. Chapter VIII serves this 
purpose. 
No significant social system has been crystallized in an 
instant. In Chapter IX, the origins of the goal of the 
"great ^eap" in production and the strategy for accomplishing 
this goal are discussed. The development process of the rural 
commune is also reconstructed in Chapter IX. Chapter X 
deliberates on advantages and disadvantages of the commune 
system from the point of view of its effects on the party 
leadership, labor utilization, capital accumulation, incen­
tives, and rural modernization. The pace of communization 
under specific economic conditions is also considered. The 
hypotheses seeming to underly the policies of the "great leap 
forwai-d," "capitalization on the structural duality," and the 
commune movement are elaborated in Chapter XIII. The data 
available, however, are inadequate to permit the testing of 
these hypotheses. 
The economic stagnation between late 1959 and early 
1962 which ensued from the shortcomings in the communization 
demanded readjustments in policy goals, strategy and the 
commune itself. Chapter XI and Chapter XII respectively deal 
with these readjustment processes and economic conditions 
after 1958. 
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II. SIGNIFICANCE OP THE STUDY 
Owing to the peculiar environments of China before the 
Communist takeover, the Chinese Communist leadership has 
persistently considered the realization of China's political 
and economic independence and strengthening of China's defense 
capacity and international prestige as the primary goals of 
its national policies (171» p. 297; 80, p. 328; 18, pp. 459-
46o). Accordingly, rapid industrialization has been given 
the top priority in its development programs. These peculiar 
national features will be briefed in the next chapter. Whether 
or not a nation should aspire to international prestige, and 
at what cost, is beyond the scope of economic analysis. How­
ever, it is the task of economic science to evaluate whether 
the pre-set national goals can be accomplished with certain 
strategies, under existing conditions. As scarce capital, 
material and human, has been allocated to heavy industry. 
Communist China, at least before I96O, relied for her agricul­
tural development mainly on institutional changes. The effects 
of various rural organizations on farm output will be discussed 
more thoroughly in the following chapters. This chapter 
sketches the significance of institutional changes to the over­
all economic performance in China and international politics, 
A. Institutional Change and Agricultural Development 
In contrast to the experiences of the United States 
as well as the Soviet Union, rural reorganization in China 
9 
had led the way to the technical reform of its agriculture. 
It is the conviction of the Communist leadership that in the 
early period of national development, institutional changes 
will make up for scarcity of capital and promote agricul­
tural development. Within less than ten years after the 
communist seizure of power, the Chinese peasants thus went 
through drastic changes in their economic institutions. 
The speed of change was even faster than that anticipated by 
Mao Tse-tung in 19^9» 
When the rural people's commune, the most radical rural 
organization, was finally introduced in the summer of-1956 
and quickly spread across the country, the world was shocked. 
The late Secretary of State, John Poster Dulles, charged 
that Communist China had created "a vast slave state", lAiich 
had "degraded the dignity of the human individual" (109, 
p. 119; Cf. 129, p. 54). Leaders of Soviet Russia attacked 
the system as "old fashioned" and "reactionary". The Sino-
Soviet dispute, which was formally sparked by Khrushchev's 
denounciation of Stalin in February 1956, was therefore 
aggravated (380, pp. 167-70 and 220-23; 130, pp. 225-27). 
The American Socialist, Paul M. Sweezy, and Leo Huberman, 
however, hailed this new system as "the boldest attempt yet 
made to put into practice the ideas and ideals of the great 
socialist thinkers of the past and wished the adventure 
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"all success" (129, p. 4). TIa8 Organskis argue that the 
commune system and modernized government apparatus in 
Communist China will speed its economic development (204, 
pp. 28-29). 
According to the Chinese Communists, the people's 
commune would facilitate a "great leap forward" in socialist 
construction, and lay down the foundation for a gradual 
transition from collective ownership to ownership by the 
whole people in rural areas, and finally transform the 
socialist society into a communist one. The Chinese 
Communists made these claims because the commune system in 
its early stage had integrated all social, economic and 
political activities in each area and eliminated the pri­
vate ownership of means of production (see Chapter VIII). 
But the Chinese peasants had to interact in a completely 
different pattern under the revolutionary system. Has this 
new system and concurrent economic policies helped 
Communist China accomplish its proclaimed goals? This poses 
a great challenge to students on Communist China and 
economic development. 
We examine first the agricultural growth of Communist 
China before I960, During the First Five Year Plan, 1953-
57, output of food grains in mainland China increased at 
the rate of 3«7^ each year while the overall agricultural 
production increased 4,5^ annually (Tables 45 and 46). 
Both of these growth rates were substantially higher than 
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the growth rate of the Chinese population. According to the 
1953 census, the population on mainland China was 582,6 
million in 1953» with a birth rate of 3«7/^ and a death rate 
of 1,7% (439, pp. 66-76; cf. 117, pp. 87-97). Different 
estimates which were based on several local reports and 
surveys during the 1951-5^ period show an average birth rate 
of 41.6 and a death rate of 21.0 per thousand (436, p. 56; 
439, pp. 66-76). Farm output increased at a much faster 
rate in 1958-1959, the first two years of the communization. 
On the average, the growth rate during 1953-1959 was 8.8# 
per year for food grains and 9,2% for all agricultural 
production (Tables 45 and 46). It must be noted that 
China ended its long period of international wac and civil 
strife in 1949 and that its statistical system in 1949-
1951 was dubious. The growth rates of its farm output in 
1950 and 1951 were therefore not comparable to those in the 
following years. 
Liu-Yeh's estimates of China's agricultural production 
show that the average annual rate of agricultural growth was 
1.7# for the 1953-1957 period and 3,0% for 1953-1959 (162, 
p. 490; 161, p. 66). It should be noted that Liu-Yeh*s 
estimates of crop production during 1952-1957 were based on 
specific assumptions about the magnitude of the Chinese 
population and per capita intake of food grains in this 
period (162, p. 491; 161, pp. 52-54). As there are no 
reasonably accurate data on these matters, these estimates 
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can hardly be considered satisfactory. Nevertheless, both 
official statistics and private estimates indicate that 
during 1953-19591 Chinese agricultural output increased at 
a rate higher than that of the population growth. 
An interesting fact especially relevant to this study 
must be pointed out. According to the official data, the 
years of relatively high rates of increase in crop produc­
tion generally coincided with the high-tide of new rural 
reorganization, for example, the year of 1952 for land 
redistribution and mutual aid movement, 1955 and 1956 for 
cooperativization and collectivization, and 1958 for 
communization (cf. Table 44). But crop production 
during the period of 196O-I962 dropped sharply below the 
1957 level (Table 40). There are of course many factors 
affecting changes in farm output. Are institutional 
changes the main factor responsible for changes in farm 
output? Still, China's agricultural production accounts 
for a large proportion of her gross national output (cf. 
Table 46) and her population accounts for one-fourth of 
the world population. Changes in China's rural organization 
and agricultural production certainly will profoundly 
affect the performance of the whole economy. 
B. The Chinese Model 
Partly due to the fact that prior to i960 agricultural 
output increased at a greater rate than did population. 
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Chinese industry developed at a high rate. The average 
suinual rate of industrial growth was 18.3# for the 1953-
1957 period and 28.2# for the 1953-1959 period (Table 46). 
For the corresponding periods, heavy industry increased at 
the rate of 25.4# and 39.0# respectively (Table 37). Some 
1 
economists in the United States have discounted the 
industrial growth claimed by the Chinese Communists. For the 
1953-1959 period, Liu-Yeh*s estimate of China's industrial 
production (including factories and handicraft) shows an 
average annual rate of growth of 16.2# as compared with 
Chao's estimate of 18.0# (Table 49). These estimated rates 
of industrial growth are still very high, by any standard. 
Special attention should be paid to the fact that during the 
1952-1959 period, output of pig iron and steel increased 
about tenfold, coal more than fivefold, electric power almost 
sixfold, petroleum more than eightfold and cement fourfold 
(Table 39). These growth rates are much higher than that 
achieved by the Soviet Union during its first two Five Year 
Plans and by India during the 1951-1959 period (24, pp. 292-
293; 167» pp. 286 and 296; Table 42). This leads some 
economists such as Li Choh-ming to suspect that around 1957 
Communist China might have completed its stage of "take-off", 
which, according to Rostow's speculation, started in 1952 
(152; 374, p. 38). In the fall of 1956 the Communist Chinese 
were aspiring to transform their backward agricultural 
country into an advanced industrialized nation within ten 
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years (232; 150, p. 5). 
However the growth rate of China's industry varied 
widely year by year due to changes in the growth rate of 
agriculture, technical change and socialist transformation 
in the industrial sector, and changes in the allocation of 
capital funds and labor force among different sectors. 
Because it is the dominant sector, change in the growth rate 
of agriculture will greatly affect that of industry, foreign 
trade, national income and government revenue in the same 
year and the following year, as implied in Table 1, If 
reasonably accurate data about these variables were avail­
able over a longer period, their causal relations, e.g., in 
form of recursive model, could be established. 
High rates of growth in both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors promoted increases in national income. 
The official data show that during 1952-1959» China's 
national income increased at an average rate of 15.3# per 
year. Private estimates of China's national income (162, 
p. 490) and gross national product (122, pp. XXII-XXIII, 12-
13 and 132-33; 16?, pp. 287-89) resulted in lower rates of 
growth as compared with the official data. There is no 
strong evidence to support the relative accuracy of private 
estimates over official sources. But the estimated rates 
of growth are still very high. This trend of growth is in 
striking contrast to the economic performance prior to 
1937, the year the Japanese invaded China (Table 51). 
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Table 1. Increase rates of agriculture 
(percentage) 
and other sectors 
Agricultural 
production 
Industrial 
production 
Foreign 
trade 
National 
income 
State 
revenue 
1950 17.7 36.4 
a 18.6 
1951 9.4 37.8 17.0 98.8* 
1952 15.3 30.3 22.3 35.5 
1953 3.1 30.2 14.0 23.9 
1954 3.3 16.3 5.7 20.5 
1955 7.7 5.6 6.5 3.7 
1956 4.9 28.2 2.5 14.0 5.7 
1957 3.5 11.4 -3.9 4.6 7.9 
1958. 25.0 66.2 28.3 34.0 34.9 
1959 16.7 39.3 8.8 21.6 29.4 
i960 —7*8 
—— — 
•Source: Tables 46 and 49; 40, p. 21; 156; 16, p. 170. 
" indicates "data not available," 
^Due to the Korean War. 
There are many factors which influence the ability of a 
country to influence the thoughts and activities of other 
countries. It is indeed difficult to formulate a mathemati­
cal function with appropriate variables and empirically 
estimate the coefficients which would enable social 
scientists to predict changes in the power status of a 
country. The Organskie contend that the size of a nation's 
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population, the level of its economic development, and the 
skill and administrative efficiency of its government are 
major determinants of its national power. If a single 
variable is to be used to decide the competitive position 
of various nations, the aggregate national income, they 
suggest,will be a good indicator (204, pp. 5» 27-29 and 33; 
81). The reasons for their choice of national income as 
the best single index are not convincing. However, it 
appears that national income can reflect the three major 
determinants mentioned above. Hardt, Stolzenbach and Kohn 
also consider the magnitude and growth rate of national 
income as well as industrial output as the vital factors 
which will determine the supremacy of a country and its 
allies in the "Cold War" struggle (113). " 
If national income is accepted as a good index of 
international power, it may be argued that the Chinese 
Communists had, to a large extent, fulfilled their goal of 
elevating China's national power and international prestige 
during their ten years in power. As shown in Table 2, the 
relative position of China's national income in the world 
community increased from the seventh during the 1936-1949 
period to fifth during the 1952-1954 period and finally to 
the third in 1958. Communist China suffered from 
agricultural failure and over-all economic stagnation from 
late 1959 to mid-1962. However, it may still have ranked 
third in national income during the early I960's as there 
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Table 2, Ten largest countries in terms of their aggregate 
national income, 1936-1961* 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
Country 1936 1949 1952-1954 1958 
3.5(10)t 
7.7®(7) 
11.3-
12.0 (4) 
25.6 (2) 
10.3f(6) 
6.91(8) 
4.2 (9) 
21.8 (3) 
64.7 (1) 
10.3 (5) 
1961 
Canada 
China 
(Mainland) 
Prance 
Germany 
India 
Italy 
Japan 
United 
Kingdom 
U.S.A. . 
U.S.S.H.J 
12.9^(8 
13.9&(7 
22.7 (5 
18.0®(6 
25.48(4 
10.4 (9 
8.0(10 
38.3 (3 
216.2 (1 
38.8 (2 
19.4,(8) 
29.5^(5) 
25.7,(8) 
60.7*(3) 
31.7^(4 43.4 (5) 
25.0®(6) 42.3®(6) 
22.3 (7) 26.5 (7) 
14.7(10) 21.5(10) 
16.5 (9) 23.2 (9) 
39.5 (3) 51.7 (4) 
298.5 (1) 364.7 (1) 
7179 (2) 135.5 (2) 
27.6.(9) 
75.0^(3) 
47.2 (6) 
59.56(5) 
29.8h(8) 
27.4(10) 
38.0 (7) 
60.4 (4) 
424.5 (1) 
176.6 (2) 
^Unless specified, data in this table are from: 437» pp. 
6l suid 126; 440, pp. 406-409 and 4l5-4l8; 438, pp. 3-9; 
44l, pp. 295-309 and 314-317- National income here equals 
to the net national product at factor cost, according to 
United Nations Statistical Office, 
bThe numbers in parentheses indicate the rank of national 
incomes of these countries in order of their magnitude. 
CTable 51; 32, p. 91. 
^Table 50, with foreign exchange rate in 1952j; U.S. 
$1.00=2.343 yuan and adjusted to current prices by impli­
cit price deflators; for the U.S. GNP (422, pp. 52-53). 
National income for I96I refers to 1959. 
®Befers to West Germany, including the Saar but excluding 
West Berlin. 
fRefers to 1942. 
SRefers to 1948. 
^Refers to I960, 
iRefers to 1938. 
^Refers to net material product only. Foreign exchange 
rate for new rubles: U.S. $1.00=0.90 rubles and adjusted 
to current prices by implicit price deflators for the U.S. 
GNP (422, pp. 52-53). 
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was a wide gap between China's national income in 1959 and 
that of the fourth country, the United Kingdom in 1961. 
There are many misgivings on the validity of making 
international comparison of national income. It is generally 
known that definitions of national income, structures of 
national income accounts and monetary units differ consider­
ably among countries, especially between communist and non-
communist countries. There are also quality discrepencies 
existing In the statistical systems of various countries. 
The absolute level and relative position of a country's 
national income in a certain year might not be useful in 
determining its power status. Were India and China more 
influential than Japan in 1936 as implied in Table 2? Was 
Prance more powerful than the Soviet Union before World 
Was II? Pew people really can answer these questions. 
To mark the relative power position of a, country by 
the foregoing three determinants or national income alone 
will be meaningful only when the majority of population in 
that country live above the "subsistence level.* The power 
status of a country may be ranked relatively high because of 
its huge population and also its high aggregate national 
income, such as China and India. But if the majority of 
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people in that country cannot keep body and soul together, 
the magnitude of population and national Income can hardly 
be interpreted as a sign of power and prestige. 
Communist China's recent economic growth has been 
achieved virtually without foreign aid in monetary terms 
(380, p. 182; 423, pp. 119 and 127-128). The experiences of 
Communist China in its efforts to achieve economic develop­
ment have thus attracted wide attention among underdeveloped 
countries (426, pp. 61O-I6). This attention has been 
magnified by effective "trade and aid" programs of Communist 
China (cf. 382). For example. Communist China won the good­
will of the Ceylonese by signing a trade pact with terms 
relatively favorable to Ceylon and guaranteeing a floor price 
to the Ceylonese rubber which was higher than world market 
prices (317, pp. 190-91). Communist China at its present 
stage of economic development also has greater needs for raw 
materials produced in other underdeveloped areas. Besides, 
most underdeveloped countries, like China prior to the 
Communist takeover, have suffered from prolonged poverty, 
social instability, and foreign control, and their aspira­
tions and impatience to be rich and respectable have often 
met with frustrations. They are thus vulicrable to extremism, 
such as adoption of the communist type of government or 
unbalanced pattern of economic development. According to 
20 
Choh-ming Li, the sustained growth of Communist China in its 
early years caused India to shift its priority from agricul­
ture in its First Five-Year Plan to heavy industry in the 
Second, and then to introduce "cooperative farming" on the 
Chinese model (1^9, p. 36?)• However India shifted its 
emphasis back to agriculture in its Third plan, probably due 
to its agricultural failure during the Second. 
The Chinese Communist leadership continues to suggest 
that the experience of Communist China is a useful model for 
other underdeveloped countries striving to achieve political 
independence and rapid economic development. Students of 
Chinese affairs also have devoted increasing attention to 
the impact of Communist China and applicability of the 
"Chinese Model" to other underdeveloped countries (l64; 16?; 
212; 423, pp. 197-207; 163, pp. 222-273; 453). In 196O, 
Tao Chu, the First Secretary of Kwantung Communist Party, 
elaborated the so-called "Chinese Model", which encompassed 
Chinese experiences in social, political, ideological, as 
well as economic spheres (267). The economic aspects of the 
Chinese Model can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Economic development and rapid industrialization 
were financed fundamentally by domestic funds 
with the aim of self-sufficiency. Technical 
assistance from allied countries was stressed 
however. 
(2) Economic development has been achieved concurrently 
with political, social, cultural and technical 
revolutions. 
(3) The ownership of properties was transferred from 
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individuals to collectives and the state by 
continuous and gradual changes in the social 
system. 
(4) The central planning authorities controlled 
resource use, with priority given to heavy 
industry. 
(5) Socialist transformation and technological 
modernization in non-agricultural sectors 
were carried out at the same time. 
(6) In agriculture, collectivization preceded 
mode rni zation. 
(7) Various production possibilities have been 
applied simultaneously in farming, but more 
intensive and effective use of labor has 
been stressed. 
It appears that the Chinese economic model generally 
follows the pattern of the Soviet Union with modification 
to meet local conditions. 
C. Implications of Agriculture Failure 
and Population Pressure 
As observers outside mainland China were following the 
progress of the "great leap" with interest, it suddenly 
became evident that Communist China had encountered unpre­
cedented agricultural failures, from late 1959 until 
September, 1962. The impact of China's agricultural crisis 
on domestic and international spheres was no less profound 
that that of her successes*. As the Chinese Communists came 
to power mainly through the support of the peasants, a pro­
longed agricultural failure could shake the very base of 
the regime. Communist China might well be forced to reduce 
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its "aid and trade" programs and its influence in the world 
community would be greatly affected. 
During the period of agricultural crisis, farm output 
dropped sharpie below the 1957 level. Pood consumption \ 
declined. Industrial production, foreign trade and capital 
accumulation were all curtailed substantially. The entire 
economy was in a state of stagnation (Chapter XII). The 
situation inspired the reporter Alsop to assert that 
Communist China was caught in a "creeping starvation" in 
the countryside. He also asserted that the momentum of the 
countryside misery was dragging down all economic progress 
and resulting in administrational disorganization and 
demoralization (4, pp. 23-26). He further prophesied that 
if the "descending spiral" continued, the limits of 
endurable hardships of the governed would be reached. 
Consequently, one of three possibilities might take place: 
massive reduction of population because of hunger, revolu­
tion in the top leadership of the regime, or the breakdown 
of the entire Communist system through "spontaneous combus­
tion" or peasant revolt (4, pp. 33-37)* 
Alsop*s argument provoked comments and controversies 
(82; 387, pp. 6l4-17; 110, pp. 99-108). But there was no 
adequate basis to estimate the extent of food shortage in 
the countryside. He also failed to establish that 
agricultural failures can create forces to bring about a 
disintegration of the socio-economic system. The Soviet 
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government did not collapse despite a sharp drop in living 
standards in 1929-1930. Japan also survived the critical 
food shortage in the post-war year (1,435 calories of food 
intake daily) (82, p. 23), 
Although the agricultural crisis ended in 1962, popu­
lation pressure in Mainland China has not eased. In 1957, 
the United Nations* population studies classified China's 
population pattern in the category of "mortality very high 
but declining, hitherto constant fertility." (436, pp. 1 and 
11-12). A substantial increase in the Chinese population is 
therefore expected to occur in the near future. The United 
Nations also made ten different projections for the popula­
tion on Mainland China for three decades following the 1953 
census. The results, as shown in Table 52, indicate that 
the size of Chinese population will range from ?45 to 961 
millions in 1973 and from 800 to 1,287 millions in 1983 (cf. 
449, p. 121), The 1983 population figures are respectively 
37^ and 120# higher than the 1953 level. As basic 
population data for China are fragmentary and not highly 
reliable, the results of different projections seem equally 
plausible. Their accuracy will also depend largely upon 
changes in population policies, the economic environment 
and attitudes of the people. Nonetheless, population 
pressure in China, as in other underdeveloped countries 
(l45, pp. 28-29), persists. The critical question is 
whether China's food production in the future will keep up 
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with or even outstrip the population growth. 
According to estimates of Jung-Chao Liu, in 1972 
Communist China cannot maintain its 1957 level of per capita 
grain consumption (159» p. 931)• However his estimates are 
based on many assumptions which might not be valid (159, pp. 
930-31)» Special attention should be paid to the fact that 
the ratio between marginal grain yield and ammonium sulfate 
is crucial in his estimation of grain yield per hectare for 
China in 1972. He uses the ratio of 3.2:1, which is derived 
from the Williams-Couston production function. The Williams-
Couston function was developed from cross-section data from 
4o countries for 1956-1958, with fertilizer consumption as 
its only independent variable (159» p. 929). Other factors, 
such as water control programs, seed improvement, changes in 
machinery and production techniques, will certainly affect 
grain yield. Furthermore, Liu also shows that the experi­
mental data in China result in 4.8:1 ratio between marginal 
yield and ammonium sulfate. The 4.8 is 50% larger than 3.2. 
If the ratio of 4.8:1 is used instead to estimate grain yield 
per hectare in 1972 the result differs substantially. 
If Communist China fails to solve its food problems in 
the near future, the implications will be immense. To some 
writers, food deficiency will lead China to attempt to 
conquer neighboring Siberia and/or Southeast Asia. However, 
economic gains from conquering these areas might not be 
greater than the cost involved. The problem is too compli­
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cated to permit a simple analysis. This study is concerned 
mainly with Communist China's attempt to develop its agricul­
ture through a series of rural reorganizations. 
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III. SYNOPSIS OF NATIONAL CHABACTEHISTICS 
PRIOR TO THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER 
Ail the programs and campaigns initiated by the new 
regime since its founding in 19^9 are aimed at achieving 
rapid industrialization and raising national status in the 
international sphere. As a means to these ends, an agricul­
tural socialization more complete than any in history was 
attempted. In order to grasp the underlying forces which 
have led the regime to aspire to the above goals, to pursue 
a series of rural transformation, and finally to initiate the 
commune system, a brief historical background of China prior 
to 1949 is necessary. Later the problems of rural sociali­
zation per se will be considered. 
Historical heritage of the new regime can be classi­
fied rou^ly into the following categories.^ 
A. Economic 
1. General economic situation 
(a) Widespread poverty. Per capita income in 1933 
was as low as $12, according to Ou Pao-san (208, 
p. 5^7; 450, p. 62; 4lO, pp. 125-126) and food 
intake per capita per day, 2,130 calories (161, 
pp. 28-32 and 44-46; 98, p. 49; 145, p. 56). 
It must be noted that some characteristics in the 
following four categories overlap and are closely related. 
Statistical data given in this section cannot be inter­
preted strictly, but they are very suggestive of the 
popular image about China in the past. China suffered 
from the Japanese invasion during 1937-1945 and civil strife 
between the nationalists and communists during 1945-1949; 
therefore, data before 1936 would be more representative of 
conditions before the communist takeover. 
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(b) A predominantly agricultural economy. The farm 
sector accounted for 72.4# of the entire popula­
tion in 19^6 (or more than 80#, if Taiwan was 
excluded) (450, p. 21; 19, p. 372) and 6l# of the 
aggregate national income in 1933» 67.6# in 1936 
(208, p. 549 and 553; 207, p. 19) and 6o% in 
1931-36 (135, p. 40). 
(c) Negative investment in 4 out of 6 years during 
the period 1931 to 1936; the positive investment 
in the other two years was partly due to the 
large amount of foreign investment (208, pp. 552 
and 554; 207, pp. 173-74). 
(d) A low level of capital stocks and a low produc­
tive capacity. Half of the latter was in the 
agricultural sector (135, p. 34; cf. 26, cited 
in 32, p. 14). 
(e) An extreme shortage of social overhead capital 
such as modern means of transportation, communi­
cations, power supply, and banking and 
insurance facilities for promoting investment, 
(f) Tax and fiscal systems were unfavorable to 
economic development: a long period of expand­
ing military expenditures during the Sino-
Japanese War and the civil strife resulted in 
increasing budget deficits; 90# of government 
tax receipts were from indirect taxes (450, pp. 
38-40). 
(g) Narrow scope of monetary sector and high interest 
rates; the interest rate in 1936 was as hi^ as 
50-60# per six months in Shansi and other locali­
ties (106, pp. 284-85; 135, p. 7; 28, p. 136-141) 
and in some places even rose to 10# for 10 days 
(182, p. 53). 
(h) Light industry was the dominant sector in manu­
facturing. The output of cotton-textile products 
and processed foodstuffs accounted for 76# of 
industrial products in 1933. Seventy-two percent 
of raw materials came from the agricultural 
sector (158, p. 18; 84, p. 72, cited in 32, p. 9). 
(i) Uneconomic concentration of the few manufacturing 
facilities in Manchuria and coastal areas. Pour 
maritime cities, i.e., Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao 
and Canton, accounted for 70# of all the factories 
and 69# of the total employed workers in the 
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country, excluding Manchuria (135» P» 100; 158, 
p. 13; 450, p. 34). 
(3) Foreign capital dominated modem industry and 
mining. Foreign industrial investment in 1936 ac­
counted for 43.4# of the total in China, according 
to Russian economists (135, pp. l5-l6, 33-36 and 142; 
202, p. 19), and 73*8^1, according to other sources 
(230, cited in 32, p. 4; cf. 123, p. 24). 
(k) Concentration and control of large modem enter­
prises within several large families. Sixty-two 
percent of the total industrial capital in 1936 
was controlled by foreign enterprises and large 
families (135, p. l4; 202, p. I9). 
(1) Severe destruction of mineral based industries, 
factories, transportation and communication facil­
ities, and cities during the Sino-Japanese War and 
Civil (far between Koumintangs and the communists 
(158, pp. 75-77). 
(m) Virtually complete removal and destruction of heavy 
industrial equipment in Manchuria by Soviet 
Occupation troops immediately after World War II, 
the total loss amounting to more than U.S. $2 
billion (380, pp. 138-39; 387, p. 201; 450, p, 44). 
(n) A prolonged hyperinflation and chaos in the 
national economy since 1937. The wholesale price 
index in Shanghai had jumped from 100 in January-
June, 1937 to 95,552 in the third week of February, 
1949, and to 5,057, 889 in the third week of April, 
1949 (450, pp. 52-54). 
(o) Deterioration of terms of trade as more than 88^ of 
exports in pre-war China were in forms of primary 
commodities, in exchange for the import of capital 
goods (442, pp. 34, 53-55, 60, 63-65, and 84). 
(p) Exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, because of 
increasing needs to import consumer goods (117, pp. 
289-291) and acceleration of capital fli^t due to 
the Communist upheaval. 
2. Agricultural 
(a) Acute shortage of farm land. Farm land was trend­
ing downward and reached 2.97 mou^ (or O.I98 hectare) 
^One mou equals 1/6 acre or 1/15 hectare. 
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per capita in 1929-31 (165. pp. 468-69; 427, p. 12; 
^50, pp. 21-22; 135» p. 274). The cultivated area 
in 1934 amounted to only 7^ of the Chinese territory 
(135, p. 8) with arable uncultivated land approxi­
mating 11^ of all uncultivated Isutid (19, p. I69 
and 202). 
(b) Cultivated land was atomized into tiny and non­
contiguous parcels, with the mean and median size 
of farm in 1929-33, respectively, at 4,18 acres 
(1.67 hectares) and 3.31 acres (1.32 hectares) 
(428, p. 38; 19, PP. 268-69). 
(c) Unequal distribution of farm land among producers. 
According to the 1933 survey covering 6 provinces, 
landlords and rich peasants who accounted for 
9.9# of total peasant households, owned 63.8#! of 
farm land, with the rest possessed by the middle 
and poor peasants^ (434, p. 9; cf. 19, pp. 192-199; 
376, p. 232; and 450, pp. 118-123). 
(d) High land rents. Land rents were more than 50^ of 
crops in many cases, and up to 80^ occasionally 
during the 1927-1934 period (28, pp. 94-101; 29, 
pp. 30-43; 135, p. 7; 428, p. 66). 
(e) Prevalence of perpetual indebtedness among peasants 
and precarious land tenure, 
(f) Long periods of neglect in soil conservation and 
ineffectiveness of water controls. As a consequence 
deserts and wastelands had expanded and the bed of 
the Yellow River had raised above the level of the 
plains, 
(g) Labor intensive production coupled with a shortage of 
production capital and obsolete farming methods and 
plant varieties (19, p. l4), 
(h) Low crop yields per acre, especially in North China, 
The national average per acre during the 1929-1933 
period was 67 bushels for rice and I6 bushels for 
wheat (19, pp, 223-227). 
Ipictures of the land ownership in pre-war China given 
by different sources varied greatly, partly due to the 
definitions of "landlords", "rich peasants" and "owners". 
Mathematically, it is possible that the majority of Buck's 
land "owners" were small farmers who owned a tiny parcel of 
land without renting land from the big farmers. 
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(1) A substantial amount of visible and disguised un­
employment. More than 25^ of the rural labor force 
had zero productivity (205, p. 57; 19, PP. 294-95). 
(j) Farm income supplemented by home cottage industries, 
(19, pp. 296-299). 
B. Technological and Natual Resources 
1. Abundance of manpower. The population was 46l 
million in 19^7 accounting for about one-fourth of 
the world population, of which more than half were 
in the 15-49 age group (158, p. l44; I6I, p. 32). 
2. Dearth of management and technical personnel, and 
skilled laborers, and more than 80^ of the popula­
tion were illiterate. 
3. Small quantity of known and accessible mineral 
reserves, except antimony, tungsten and tin (135, 
pp. 98 and 140; 450, pp. 23-27). 
4. Climatic elements favorably to farming only in South 
China. Variations in rainfall and temperature have 
caused floods, droughts and frost damage (19, pp. 
112-125). 
C. Social and Cultural 
1. High frequency of natural calamities. Large-scale 
droughts and floods occurred on the average of 49 
times each century during the period from 206 B.C. 
to 1933 (30, cited in 450, p. 31; of. 223, P. 7). 
The 1931 floods affected over 100 million people 
south of San-hai kuan (135, p. 272; 34, p. 54). 
2. Cyclical pattern of population growth. Population 
change has followed a cyclical pattern of expanding 
during periods of peace, order, prosperity and 
declining due to abortion, infanticide and plagues 
during periods of hardship (30, p. 4). 
3. High birth and death rates in the pre-war period. 
Estimates made at various times in different local­
ities indicate birth fluctuated from 12.2 to 58,4 
per thousand and death rates from 13.O to 37.1 (436, 
pp. 55-56; 19, pp. 381-89; 450, p. 61). 
4. Poor hygiene and public health facilities. The 
health of many people had been impaired in the past 
from opium smoking. 
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5. Low esteem for "business enterprises, practical 
sciences and manual labor. 
6. Dearth of a vigorous innovating class, 
7. Strong nepotism and scarcity of the corporate form 
of enterprises. Landlords, moneylenders and the 
gentry ruled the rural areas. 
8. Fairly equal distribution of inheritances among sons. 
9. Preference for solid assets, e,g,, land, houses, gold, 
foreign currencies, and precious metals (208, p, 550; 
442, p. 125). 
D, Political 
1. Practically a dismembered country, as the result of 
endless conflicts among vested interests, civil 
wars, foreign invasions, and imposition of extra­
territorial rights on the part of great powers. 
2. Virtual non-existence of tariff protection for 
domestic industries, because of the unequal treaties 
and spheres of influence by foreign powers, 
3. Prevalence of strong national consciousness mingled 
with Marxism among intellectuals and in rural areas, 
partly due to communists* advocacy for land reform 
and to their anti-foreigner movement (138, p. 24; 
12, pp. 8-9 and 174-76), 
4. Widespread political fraud and corruption, adminis­
trative inefficiency, and military demoralization 
(12). 
5. Unrest and demonstrations among the student population. 
6. Weariness of war and longing for peace and unification. 
Prom this synopsis of China's national features, it is 
apparent that pre-communist China had characteristics of a 
backward country as outlined by Leibenstein and in some 
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aspects conditions were much worse than in other underdevel­
oped nations (146, pp. 40-4l; 182, pp. 42-43). 
National leaders have continuously warned that one day 
the Chinese mi^t be eliminated from this world. Many 
patriots had attempted to save the country by'peâceful and 
modemate reforms, but all failed. The Nationalist govern­
ment also failed in carrying out the basic principles for 
building China laid out by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 
Finally there emerged the Chinese Communists who 
seized all opportunities to capture the mainland. They then 
consciously and decisively uprooted all the traditional values 
and institutions. On the ruin, they planed to construct a 
new society in line with their revolutionary design. Thus 
came the end of the old order and the beginning of the new. 
The national policy of the new regime is naturally oriented 
towards remedying the major defects of the nation as 
envisaged by the Communist leaders; in the agricultural 
sector, they were poverty, backward technology, and inequity 
in the distribution of income. 
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IV. LAND REDISTRIBUTION, 1949-1952 
The causes of agricultural problems in pre-communist 
China were many, e.g., overpopulation, scarce capital, 
unproductive land, high rent and interest rates. The 
Chinese Communists, however, had consistently advocated 
that change in farm organization was the primary measure to 
solve these problems, or at least reduce their severity. 
Since its initiation in the 1920*s, the Chinese Communist 
Party had put forward and. in some cases, put into practice 
on a small scale, programs of agricultural cooperation and 
land reforms. The nation-wide implementation of these 
programs were carried out resolutely once the Communist 
Party had succeeded in conquering the Mainland. The most 
eyecatching movement immediately before and after the 
establishment of the new regime was land re-distribution. 
Why Was land re-distribution enforced so harshly at this 
moment? 
A. Purposes and Raison dètre 
The immediate tasks facing the new government were 
stabilization of socio-economic conditions and consolidation 
of the newly established power structure. The agricultural 
sector could help accomplish these tasks by providing 
adequate food to the starving and still growing population. 
The land re-distribution also permitted the Chinese Communist 
Party to fulfill its promise to eliminate "feudal 
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exploitation" and inequality in the distribution of wealth. 
Theoretically, increased supply of food grains could be 
achieved by the following measures: (1) extension of culti­
vated land through reclamation and water control programs; 
(2) grant of public loans and reduction of rent and inter­
est rates which would enable peasants to apply more farm 
machinery, fertilizers and insecticides; (3) consolidation 
of farm units and expansion of farm size to take advantage 
of economies of scale; and (4) promotion of technological 
innovation in the form of improved seeds and production 
methods. The communist leaders seemed to be well aware of 
these possibilities, as could be shown from the 1949 Common 
Program (25, p. 7). 
If tenant farmers lived adequate lives, a reduction of 
share rent might promote their investment, (cf. Il4, pp. 
595-602). In reality, all current output went into human 
stomachs. There were limited domestic working capital and 
means of production left in both private and public sectors. 
Little foreign capital was available, as the United States, 
the only country which had large amounts of capital for 
foreign investment at that time was hostile to the new regime. 
As a corollary, rent reduction would not lead to a correspond­
ing increase in the farmer's investment. The enlargement of 
farm size and appropriate organizational change in agricul­
ture might have been helpful in increasing farm output; the 
empirical data of I5,ll6 farms in 1929-1933 seemed to support 
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the case (19, p. 283). Nevertheless, so complete an agricul­
tural transformation could not be affected in so short a 
time and nor would there be a quick increase in farm output. 
As Mao learned from the experiences of the Soviet Union, "'it 
requires a very long time and careful work to attain the 
socialization of agriculture" (80, p. 328). It was diffi­
cult to mobilize the labor force for reclamation work and 
water conservation before the political power of the new^ 
regime was well consolidated, even though the large amount 
of unskilled labor was the major potential resource. Con­
sequently, the Chinese Communiststurned to measures which 
they conceived to be more helpful in accomplishing these 
immediate tasks. Their logical move was land re-distribu­
tion, which was expected by Mao in 1950 to be completed in 
three years (408, p. 135). 
Through land re-distribution the Chinese Communists 
hoped to simultaneously accomplish multiple ends. First the 
land reform movement recognized the needs of poor peasants 
and farm laborers in the countryside who had been hungry for 
land for years; this provided for the new regime a broad 
support and solid political power. Hopefully the abolishment 
of landlord-tenant relations by the land reform process would 
provide farmers incentives for greater and more productive 
efforts, A rapid restoration and development of farm 
production stimulated by the land reform could then pave the 
way for industrialization. Finally by abolishing the 
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landlord class, land reform also would do away with a group in 
strong opposition to agricultural socialization and thus 
facilitate the future coopérâtivization movement. 
The communist concept of land reform developed in bhina 
long before the Japanese invasion. According to statistical 
data accredited by the communist leaders, the poor peasants, 
farm laborers and the middle peasants made up 90^ of the 
farm population, which in turn constituted more than 80^ of 
the total population in the Chinese mainland (Table 3). To 
win the 90^ of the rural population has been the main concern 
of the Communist Party. In 1936 Mao Tse-tung pointed out the 
significance of the land problem in this regard: "Whoever 
wins the support of the peasants will win China; whoever 
solves the land question will win the peasants." (386, p. 14). 
It was decided on April 27» 1929» by the Chinese Communist 
Party that the solution to the Chinese land problem would be 
a confiscation of land belonging to landlords and distribu­
tion of the confiscated land to the poor peasants (376, pp. 
59 and 280; 434, p. 4). 
In his "The present Situation and our Tasks" of 
December, 1947, Mao maintained that the agrarian reform 
movement, i.e., confiscating the land of the landlords and 
distributing it to the peasants, in the old "liberated" 
areas of Northeast and North China had helped to consolidate 
these areas (80, pp. 322-23). Thus was the final victory 
of the Communist party in the Chinese Mainland in 1949 aided 
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Table 3« Class make-up of rural households (percentage distribution) 
1933 survey 
in 6 pro­
vinces 
Immediately 
before land 
reform, 
At the com­
pletion of 
land reform®-
1954b 
Total 100.0 100 100.0 100.0 
Landlords & other 
exploiters 3.5 4-5 2.6 2.5 
Rich peasants 6.4 5-6 3.6 2.3 
Middle peasants: 19.6 20 35.8 61.9 
Lower middle 
Upper middle 
Farm laborers and 
poor peasants 70.5 70 57.1 29.1 
0 
Cooperative members f 4.2 
Others 0.9 
*8ource: 25, p. 3^; 434, pp. 3-9, 15, 28 and 79. 
®Based on the survey of 14,334 households in 21 provinces. The p 
are exactly the same with that of survey on more than l6,000 hou 
data could be results of the same survey, except for their diffe 
However it is surprising to note that different coverage will ge 
^Based on the survey of 15,432 households from 23 provinces, 
GBased on the survey of 192,760 peasant households in cooperative 
^Based on the survey of 195,354 households in 564 cooperatives fr 
®"Blank" in this table and following ones indicates none or not r 
f... indicates negligible. 
I 
(percentage distribution) 
ily At the com-
,nd pletion of 
land reform®-
1954: December 
1954* 
Early 
1955 
Before the 
establish­
ment of 
advanced 
APC^ 
1956^ 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2.6 
3.6 
35.8 
2.5 
2.3 
61.9 
2.5 
2.1 
62.2 
3.5 
6.5 
70.0 
3.3 
2.7 
60.0 
38.9 
21.1 
3.4 
2.7 
59.0 
38.1 
20.9 
57.1 29.1 
4.2 
29.0 
4.2 
20.0 32.6 33.5 
0.9 1.4 1.4 
28 and 79. 
Ids in 21 provinces. The percentage distribution cited in these columns 
yey on more than 16,000 households in 25 provinces (394, p. 31). Both 
fey, except for their difference in coverage of areas and households, 
different coverage will get exactly the same result. 
Ids from 23 provinces. 
: households in cooperatives from 22 provinces and municipalities. 
)lds in 564 cooperatives from 20 provinces. 
les indicates none or not relevant. 
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by the land redistribution. The late Vice-President Chen 
Cheng of the Republic of China, in his report on the success 
of land reform in Taiwan, painfully admitted that "We are 
sincerely sorry for our failure to carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen*s 
land-to-the-tiller ideal while we were still on the mainland. 
Though that failure may be partly attributed to internal 
disturbances and foreign invasion, it was due mainly to the 
selfishness of a small minority of people, to their short­
sightedness and lack of courage." (2?, p. xiii). Considering 
the huge size of China and relatively superior military 
strength of the nationalist government, the Communist take­
over of mainland China with comparative ease certainly 
could be attributed largely to the appeal of land reform 
carried out in the North and advocated for other areas. 
To Communist leaders, land re-distribution was also 
implemented "in order to set free the rural productive forces, 
develop agricultural production and thus pave the way for New 
China's industrialization." (2, p. 1; 25, p. 6; 173» p. 238; 
80, p. 336). According to Marxist-Lennist doctrine, distri­
bution of means of production will affect production and 
production will in turn affect distribution of products (175» 
pp. 285-87 and 275). The concentration of property in a few 
hands will shackle the people from fully utilizing their 
productive forces and result in further concentration of 
property. Further, according to Marxist doctrine, abolish­
ment of the existing capital and feudal exploitation system 
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will Increase the work efforts and learning efforts of labor­
ers as they get what they produce. When in the agricultural 
sector the principle of "to each according to his labor* is 
put in effect by the policy of land-to-the tiller, the 
fanning peasants will be stimulated to appropriate more 
"products of nature." Communist doctrine also insists that 
the elimination and/or reduction of land rent along with 
land re-distribution will encourage peasants to channel into 
capital accumulation the meager surplus value which other­
wise will go into the "parasitic consumption" of landlords 
or be used for land speculation. Release and maximum use 
of productive forces in the rural areas will increase 
agricultural production, which then lays down the founda­
tion of industrialzation. Completion of industrialzation 
will facilitate technical transformation of farming, which, 
according to the Chinese Communists, is the real solution of 
the land problem in China. 
But the Chinese Communists foresaw that farm mechani­
zation could not be undertaken on a farm as small as 3*31 
acres. There was a need to expand farm size as well as to 
accumulate funds for financing mechanization. According to 
the Communist doctrine, the best means toward these ends in 
overpopulated and poverty-stricken area was through 
cooperativization. Cooperativization or socialist transfor­
mation of agriculture, according to the communist leaders, 
is a difficult problem; it requires a long period of 
4o 
educating the peasants (80, p. 328), The land re-distribution 
is a first step to win the confidence of the majority of rural 
population and to eliminate groups strongly opposed to 
agricultural socialization. This explains why the Chinese 
Communists did not immediately enforce a socialist transfor­
mation of land and other properties in the agricultural sector 
after they seized power in 1949. 
B. The Law and its Implementation 
The Chinese Communist Party began to put into effect 
land re-distribution in a small area in 192? and continued to 
do so whenever it took parts of the country from Nationalist 
troops (171, p. 292; 135, p. 8). In 19^0 Mao Tse-tung de­
clared in his. "on the new democracy" that "certain necessary 
measures" will be adopted to appropriate the land of big 
landlords and re-distribute it simong the poor and landless 
peasants. The main objective was to liquidate the feudal 
relations, that is, the payment and employment of land rents. 
The redistributed land however still would be privately 
owned. This program of land redistribution was directed, 
according to Mao, at realizing Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle 
of "equalization of land ownership" and "land to the tiller," 
and perhaps was consistent with the agrarian program of the 
Nationalist government instituted in 1948 (171, pp. 291-93; 
80, p. 310). Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle was said to be 
abstract. There was, according to the communists, no 
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concrete program to uproot existing feudal relations (434, 
pp. 2-2). The Nationalist government had little chance to 
implement its agrarian program before it took refuge in 
Taiwan in 1949. 
The certain "necessary measures" were specified by Mao 
in his "on coalition government" in 1945 and his address to 
the Party Central Committee in December, 194? as the 
"confiscation" of land owned by "feudallstlc exploiters" 
through "class struggles." (171, p. 297; 80, pp. 322-23). 
Immediately before tte founding of the new regime, the 
People's Political Consultative Council on September 29, 
1949» passed the Common Program, the provincial constitution 
of Communist China. It's article 27 stipulated that in 
areas where the agrarian reform had not yet been carried 
out, the peasant organizations would be set up to realize 
the policy of "land to the tiller" through the elimination 
of local despots, reduction of rents and interests, and 
distribution of land. Land ownership would be protected 
wherever the agrarian reform had been carried out. (25, p. 
6 ) .  
All the foregoing stipulations were embodied in the 
Agrarian Reform Law, adopted by the second session of the 
People's Political Conslultative Council on June 28, 1950, 
and promulgated on June 30. The law stipulated the 
confiscation of Md, draught animals, farm Implements 
and surplus grain of "landlords" and reactionary "rich 
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peasants", and their surplus houses in the countryside. It 
also demanded the requisition of the rural land belonging to 
ancestral shrines, temples, monasteries, churches, schools, 
and public bodies. (2, pp, 1-2 and 33)* The leased land of 
rich peasants would be requisitioned only when the portions 
of land rented out by them exceeded in size the land tilled 
by themselves and by their hired farmers (2, p. 3)* The 
land and other means of production thus confiscated would be 
equally distributed to poverty-stricken peasants, rural 
handicraftsmen, pedlars, original landlords and unemployed 
workers who returned to the countryside (2, pp, 2-7)• The 
basic principle, however, was land to the present tiller. 
In the Agrarian Reform Law and Decisions Concerning the 
Differentiation of class status landlords are legally 
defined as those who own land, but do not engage in labor, 
and who live on land rent, plus money lending and hiring of 
labor, A person who received income from some nonagricul­
tural occupation and who at the same time rented out 
agricultural land with its size exceeding the average land-
holding of the landlord families in the locality, was 
classified a landlord if the main source of his income was 
from land (2, pp. 18-20), A person was also classified as a 
landlord if he rented out land holdings three times as large 
as the size of land cultivated jointly by his family and hired 
farmers or twice if his landholdings were large (2, p. 21). 
Revolutionary army men, dependents of martyrs, workers, 
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staff members and pedlars who rented out land because of 
their inability to farm were not classified as landlords 
(2, p, 2 and 19-20). A rich peasant was one who engaged in 
labor himself and lived partly on exploitation of hired 
labor or on exploitation of peasants in form of land rent 
and loan interest, but was not a wager laborer at the same 
time (2, pp. 20-21 and 24-26). As the administrative unit, 
hsiang (township), was used as a basic unit for land 
redistribution (2, p. 4), a family which owned and rented 
out a certain quantity of land might be classified as a 
landlord in one hsiang and non-landlord in another due to 
the fact that the ratios of land to population differ in 
various administrative units. The dividing line between 
landlords and rich peasants was actually ambiguous and 
flexible. For the same reasons equality of land ownership 
could not be achieved for the whole nation even when 
agrarian reform law was put into effect. 
The legal organizations for land reform at the hsiang 
level were hsiang and village peasant meetings, peasant 
representative conferences and committees of peasants* 
associations elected at such conferences. In practice, the 
actual power to redistribute land was vested in peasants' 
associations at the hsiang level as the former two were not 
in session regularly (2, pp. 4 and 12). The peasants' 
associations were organized by farm laborers, poor peasants, 
middle peasants, rural handicraftsmen and revolutionary 
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intellectuals in the rural areas under the auspices of the 
party cadres, sent to the hslang by authorities at upper 
levels (2, p. 52). The peasant association was assisted by 
the communist youth leagues, women associations and children 
corps in the course of agrarian reform, which was conducted 
in the manner of mass trials (2, p. 13), Terror and violence 
were considered necessary and actually used to suppress 
"local despots" and "counter-revolutionaries." The violence 
and annihilation which accompanied Isuid reform ruled out 
the re-emergence of the landlord class. A "peaceful land re­
form" advocated by other, for example by the Chinese Nation­
alists, according to Mao, is incorrect and the result thus 
obtained cannot be consolidated (174, p. 29; 34, pp. 169-70; 
361, p. 27). The communist scheme of land reform deviated 
from the ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who stressed the enforcement 
of land redistribution on the principle of the cooperation 
among interests concerned and with an appropriate compensation 
to landowners. Dr. Sun refuted class struggle as a proper 
means to solve any economic problem in China. He also did 
not make clear whether private ownership would be main­
tained in the future after the land reform was completed. 
Excepting for the measures against the landlords and 
counter-revolutionaries, the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party had been cautious in reforming the 
agrarian system and constantly warned against indiscriminate 
killings, arrests and confiscation of land. The land reform 
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movement was to proceed in accordance with the general line 
laid down by Mao Tse-tung, that is, relying on the poor 
peasants and farm laborers, uniting with the middle peasants, 
and neutralizing the rich peasants in order to wipe out the 
feudal system (80, p. 323; 2, p. 79; 3^, p. l66). The 
redistributed land and properties were privately owned and 
the owners had the right to manage, buy, sell and rent them 
out freely (2, pp. 3 and 12). 
By June, 1950, agrarian reform was completed in North­
east and North China, an area inhabited by l60 million 
people. About of the total rural population in China 
was involved (408, p. 135; 34, pp. 5-6; 2, p. 6o). Liao 
Lu-yen, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Government 
, Administrative Council, claimed at the end of September, 
1952, that land distribution had been completed in an area 
inhabited by more than 90^ of the total rural population 
of the nation. More than 46 million hectares of plowland 
along with draught animals and farm implements were 
distributed to 300 million peasants who had little or no land. 
In other words, from 6o to 70% of the agricultural population 
were beneficiaries of agrarian reform (34, pp. l65 and 171; 
434, p. 7; 40, p. 27). By the spring of 1953 the land reform 
movement had spread throughout the nation with the exception 
of the remote areas inhabited by national minorities; of the 
total rural population, 98^ or 490 million people were affect­
ed (25, p. 36; 183, p. 25; 135, p. 11). This confirmed Mao's 
prediction in June 1950 that agrarian reform would be completed 
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in three years or a little longer. 
C. Effects and Defects 
Following the reform program cultivated land per capita 
of farm population in China^was 0.2 hectare (or 3.0 mou) in 
1953» almost comparable with 1929-31 (450, p. 22; cf. 135, 
p. 274). A sample survey in 1954 of more than l6,000 rural 
households indicated that the per capita land holdings of the 
farm population was 3*29 mou, slightly larger than the pre-
reform period (394, p. 31) • This Increased ratio of land to 
population could be attributed mainly to Ismd reclamation since 
the communist takeover. 
However, the landholdings of ex-landlord families 
declined sharply. Their per capita cultivated land was 3.05 
mou in 1954, smaller than the 5.03 mou owned by rich peasants 
and the 3.54 mou owned by middle peasants, but larger 
than the 2.68 mou owned by poor peasants^ (394, p. 31). The 
proportion of landlords, rich peasants as well as poor 
peasants in the total rural population, as shown in Table 3» 
all declined. That of middle peasants increased rapidly 
from 20^ in pre-reform period to 62^ in December, 1954, and 
finally to 70^ in early 1955. The increasing proportion of 
middle peasants before 1955 was chiefly due to the status 
promotion of poor peasants and farm laborers and to the 
^The communist stipulations concerning rural classes 
might have changed several times since the completion of land 
redistribution. There is, however, no document available. 
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demotion of landlords and rich peasants resulting from land 
redistribution. This process was enhanced by the mutual aid 
movement and land purchases among the former poor peasants 
during the 1953 and 1954 period. The mutual aid movement 
will be elaborated in the next chapter. According to a 1955 
survey of 14,334 peasant households, of 8,191 poor peasant 
and farm laborer households in 1952, 342 households became 
cooperative members in December 1954, 3»991 households 
middle peasants, and l4 households rich peasants (Table 4). 
Less than half remained in the same class. On the other 
hand, about half of the rich peasants dropped to the status of 
middle peasants by 1954. This movement was accompanied by 
purchasing and renting of farm land by the middle and poor 
peasants (434, p. 15; 394, p. 32). Poor peasants also 
received benefits from cancellation of pre-reform debts. 
Their financial conditions, therefore, improved. Many of 
them who were unable to meet daily expenses in the pre-
communist period (421, pp. 863-64) had a small surplus after 
the reform (394, p. 32). Some young men were motivated to 
remain in the rural areas instead of going to the cities 
(107, p. 3). 
Benefits from land reform differed among regions be­
cause of their differences in land-population ratios. The 
per capita landholdings after land redistribution were 
estimated to be about 7 mou in North Manchuria; 3 mou in 
South Manchuria, 2 to 3 mou in Honan, 1 to 2.5 mou in Hunan 
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Table 4. Input-output table ^or changing structure of farm popul 
peasant households) 
Total 
Former landlords 
Rich peasants 
Middle peasants 
Poor peasants and 
farm laborers 
Others 
At the completion of 
land reform in 1952 APC ^ Poc 
member pease 
family and f 
labor 
14,334 608 4,15 
375 3 
514 8 3 
5,128 255 20 
8,191 342 3,84 
126 6 
^Source; 434, p. 11, based on the sample survey of 14,33^ ho 
'ucture of farm population after the land reform (in number of 
December 195^ 
APC 
member 
family 
Poor 
peasants 
and farm 
laborers 
Middle 
peasants 
Rich 
peasants 
Former 
landlords 
608 4,150 8,908 305 363 
3 3 5 1 363 
8 30 252 224 
255 206 4,601 66 
342 3,844 3,991 14 
67 59 
survey of 14,33^ households in 21 provinces, conducted in 1955» 
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and Hopel, and 1.5 to 2 mou In East China (25» P« 37)» 
By 1952, land reform had some positive effects on 
agricultural production, thou^ the extent is unknown. 
(34, pp. 171 and 274). In 1949, the year the civil strife 
ended, the harvest was considered approximately normal (34, 
p. 16). The output of paddy rice in 1951 exceeded that of 
the pre-communist peak year. In 1952 the aggregate output 
of major food grains surpassed the pre-communist peak of 
more than 11^ (or 31*4 billion catties)^. The average growth 
rate was much higher than the natural growth rate of the 
population (see Table ^ 5). It occurred despite the fact 
that natural calamities had struck more than of the 
cultivated area (Table 5), and the new regime had to ship 
more than one million tons of grains from Northeast China and 
Szechwan to North China to relieve the calamity-stricken 
people (34, p. 55). In addition to land re-distribution, 
other government measures, for example, extensive repairs 
of war-torn irrigation systems, interest-free government 
loans, improved seeds and farm implements, and bumper-
harvest campaigns, might also have contributed to the rapid 
post-war restoration. 
Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of Communist leaders, 
land redistribution had its defects, at least for the future. 
The small size farm of 3 mou per capita farm population as 
compared with 284 mou in U.S.A. (25, p. 264) is less than 
^One catty equals 0.5 kg or 1/2,000 ton. 
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Table 5. Effects of natural calamities 
Calamity-affected area Total affect 
(10,000 mou) area as # c 
Total By flood^ By drought Cultivated 
area 
1949 12,787 12,787 8.7 
1950 7,683 7,065 618 5.1 
1951 5,663 2,214 3,449 3.6 
1952 6,659 2,766 3,893 4.1 
1953 8,000- 4,797 4.9-
9,000 5.5 
1954 17,447 16,958 489 10.6 
1955 10,810 4,609 6,201 6.5 
1956 22,993 16,487 13.7 
1957 22,000 8,502 10,000 13.1 
1958 22,995* 14.1 
1959 65,000 32,000 4o .6 
i960 90,000 60,000 53.6 
*Source: 71, pp. 85-86; 20, pp. A64-65; 412, d, 4; 193» 12 
240; 288; 263; 247; 157; Table l6. 
^It was 470 million mou according to 3l4, p. 434. 
^70# of areas affected by floods in 1940-57 were actually due 
Total affected 
area as % of 
Calamity-
do 
stricken population 
,000 persons) 
Cultivated 
area 
Sown 
area 
Total By flood By drought 
8.7 4,555 4,555 
5.1 3,384 3,205 179 
3.6 3,034 1,044 1,990 
4.1 3.1 2,760 1,071 1,689 
4.9- 3.7- 1,725 1,476 249 
5.5 4.2 
10.6 7.9 6,315 6,223 92 
6.5 4.8 2,475 1,333 1,142 
13.7 9.6 7,000 
13.1 9.3 7,000 
14.1 9.8 
40.6 30.0 
53.6 
p. 4; 193, p. 129; 196,'p. 281; 28?; 319, p. 15; 3^9, p. 18; 
434. 
were actually due to water-logging. 
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amenable for optimum utilization of agricultural mechaniza­
tion and scientific management. Individual farmers will 
always be at the mercy of weather and other uncertainies. 
There was uncertainty as to whether material incentives 
provided by land redistribution could outstrip the 
inefficiency of small-size farming, as argued by Raup (336, 
pp. 7-10). Furthermore, as the population increased, the 
individual right to sell, buy and lease the land could 
have resulted in a re-concentration of land among a 
relatively few holders, if there is inadequate check on it, 
a trend contrary to the communist objective. 
The argument that land reform, by eliminating the 
landlords, would facilitate future socialization might not 
be as convincing as it appears. If for a long time 
following land redistribution the disposition to have land 
remains infused into the mind of poor peasants, it is 
difficult to ask them to give up their land. But the new 
government could not disregard what they had advocated 
earlier and enforced instead cooperativization and collec­
tivization, soon after they came to power. The result of 
this move could mean national chaos and loss of popular 
support. Lsurid reform first and then a gradual collectiv­
ization was thus considered by the communist leaders as a 
necessary opportunity cost for power consolidation. But as 
political power became consolidated, the regime launched 
agricultural socialization on a major scale. 
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V. MUTUAL-AID TEAMS, 1950-1954 
After land reform, Chinese agriculture witnessed massive 
establishments of mutual-aid teams, agricultural producers* i 
cooperatives, advanced-stage agricultural producers* cooper­
atives and the communes. This chapter will describe and 
evaluate the mutual-aid movement. 
A. The Case for Mutual-aid Teams 
The history of mutual-aid and cooperation is as long as 
that of land reform. When the Communist troops during the 
period of 1930-34 were under heavy pressure from the Nation­
alist troops, they began to launch mutual-aid movements in 
the areas under their control. These were aimed, first of all, 
at increasing farm output through pooling and collective 
utilization of labor, draft cattle, farm implements and 
improved seeds. Mao maintained that the organization of 
labor was critical to the development of production under the 
circumstances (171» p. 129). It was also important to 
accomplish the cultivation and harvest in the shortest time so 
that the Communists could reap the fruits they sowed before 
the Nationalist troops arrived. Peasants were occasionally 
mobilized in emergencies to fight against floods and droughts 
and were organized to steal and pirate the crops in the 
areas under the Nationalist rule. Privately, farm laborers 
and poor peasants organized mutual aid teams which functioned 
as collective organs for selling their labor to rich peasants 
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and landlords. They also needed to band together for 
mutual protection against wild beasts and bandits when they 
worked in the fields (376, pp. 72-72, 79 and 301; 421, pp. 
106-110 and 143-14?). 
When the new regime was founded in 1949, the mutual aid 
groups and cooperatives were fostered along with land redis­
tribution, but not on the same scale. As soon as the land 
reform had been completed, the Communists placed their 
focus on the establishment of mutual aid teams. 
In the 1949 Common Program as well as in Decisions on 
Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agricultural Production of 
1953, guiding peasants to organize various forms of labor 
mutual-aid and production cooperatives was considered the 
central task of the regime in the areas where agrarian reform 
had been carried out (25, pp. 6-7; 183, pp. 2-3). The 
Soviet economists maintained that gradual socialist trans­
formation of agriculture, perhaps through this process, is 
a "natural law" for a country moving toward socialism (135, 
pp. 3-4). 
Reasons for the Chinese Communists to emphasize mutual-
aid teams after the completion of land reform are many. 
From the standpoint of increasing output, pooling and 
collective allocations of the scarce labor force, draft animals 
and farm implements, which have been scattered among 
individual peasants, facilitate a maiimum utilization of 
available resources and, at the same time, improve the 
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timeliness of farm operations, especially during busy 
seasons. Peasants can teach and leam from their teammates 
the improved methods of farming, either new or old, when 
they join the mutual aid teams. Furthermore, there is a 
great need to construct and repair dams and other irrigation 
installations, which will produce common benefits to many 
people. Collective arrangement of labor force in any form 
can help to achieve this purpose. 
Morally, the communist leaders, like many enlightened 
thinkers in the West, might feel that replacement of com­
petition among individuals by mutual understanding and 
cooperation is the sure way to change the obsolete ways of 
life and the traditional pattern of society, and that 
development of extremely rich and poor peasants would have 
to be avoided. As long as the peasants* individual 
economy remains, the mutual-aid teams are the helpful 
means for these purposes. They can orient farmers toward 
collective activities in production and develop management 
ability of party cadres, and thus pave the way for a smooth 
socialization of agriculture. Because farmers are 
realistic in their attitudes, the most powerful weapon to 
educate farmers in the spirit of collectivism is to prove the 
superiority of mutual-aid teams in production. The weight 
of developing mutual aid teams is therefore placed on 
their Quality instead of quantity. The Central Committee 
of CCF decided that participation of peasants in mutual aid 
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teams should be on the voluntary principle, with special 
emphasis on increasing output of teams at a low cost (183, 
p. 13). 
B. Forms and Characteristics 
Within mutual aid teams, peasants helped each other and 
exchanged their surplus factors of production for scarce 
ones for mutual benefits. Their activities involved: (1) 
labor in exchange for labor, (2) labor in exchange for the 
service of draft animals, (3) service of draft animals in 
exchange for that of draft animals, (4) service of draft 
animals in exchange for feed grains, (5) labor in exchange 
for service of draft animals and farm implements, (6) 
collective use of pooled labor, draft animals and farm 
implements, (7) collective purchase, maintenance and man-^ 
agement of group draft animals and farm implements, and (8) 
mutual assistance in subsidiary occupations in addition to 
farming. The exchange rates among different services varied 
in accordance with local conditions. 
The mutual-aid teams were of two kinds: seasonal and 
permanent. Peasants organized seasonal teams in busy 
seasons to help each other in planting, mowing, harvesting, 
and fighting against natural calamities. They dissolved the 
teams when specific tasks had been accomplished. This 
collective use of labor was considered by the Communist 
leaders as the embryo of socialism (183, p. 9)* The 
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properties were owned by individuals and products of farming 
activities belonged to land owners. Each team on the aver­
age was composed of 4 to 7 households during 1951-1955» as 
shown in Table 7. The Central Committee encouraged the 
development of seasonal mutual aid organizations in areas 
which the communist troops had just conquered and laid the 
foundation for permanent mutual aid teams. 
Permanent mutual-aid teams, composed of 6 to 10 house­
holds during the 1951-1955 period, were founded on a 
year-round basis. However, some teams were so large as to 
cover a whole vii%lage (376, p. 80). The teams usually 
combined farming with subsidiary occupations; there was to 
a certain extent a division of labor. Individuals owned 
their properties and means of production, but a small 
1 
amount of common property in the form of cattle and farm 
implements was controlled by the unified management of the 
collective body. The Communist leaders regarded the mutual 
aid teams as the beginning of socialist organization in 
rural areas (183, p. 10). Both seasonal and permanent 
teams were organized on a voluntary basis, perhaps with i 
some persuasion from the party cadres. Judging from their 
characteristics, the mutual aid teams are similar to the 
Toz, Society for the Joint Cultivation of land, experimented 
with in the Soviet Union in the late 20's and early 30's. 
C. Development and Defects 
Perhaps due to their advantages in promoting farm 
output, mutual-aid teams developed rapidly. The number of 
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mutual-aid. teams as shown in Tables 6 and 7 increased from 
2.7 million in 1950 to 9.9 million in 1954, with participat­
ing households increasing from 10.7^ of rural households to 
58.4)^ within the same period. The number of mutual-aid 
teams and participating households decreased in 1955» be­
cause of the upsurge of cooperativization. 
During the mutual aid movement, the output of food 
grains continued to increase, but at a lesser rate then 
during the period of land reform. Output of rice and 
coarse grains however was declining. Gross agricultural 
output just kept pace with the growth rate of population 
(see Tables 44, 45 and 46). The weather conditions might 
have had ill effects on the development of farm production, 
but the low rate of agricultural growth also indicates that 
advantages of mutual aid were not forceful enou^ to greatly 
reduce the influence of weather. 
Mutual aid teams had many flaws. They were organized 
mainly on the basis of emotion rather than economic calcu­
lation and the members usually were close friends and 
relatives before the teams were formed. If teams were set 
up on the economic basis, the poor suid weak peasants 
with no draft animals would be excluded from teams. If 
both rich and poor peasants were on the same teams, the 
former might take advantages of the latter. A mutually 
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Table 6. Development of collective enterprises in rural China* 
Unit 1949 1950 1951 1952 1( 
APCs:* One 19 130 3,644 15, 
Advanced APCs One 1 1 10 
Elementary APCs One 18 129 3,634 15, 
Mutual aid teams:®" 1,000 2,724 4,675 8,026 .7, 
Permanent 1,000 755 1,756 1, 
Seasonal 1,000 3,920 6,270 5, 
State farms : One 1,215 2,336 2, 
Those mechanized One 36 50 
Tractor stations One 
Credit cooperatives^ One 103 538 2,271 9, 
Share funds 10,000 
yuan 1, 
Supply and marketing 
coops One 39,436 32,788 30, 
Membership Million 
persons 26 46 138 
Handicraft coops 
and teams One 311 1,321 1,066 3,658 5, 
Membership 1,000 88.9 260.0 139.6 227.8 30 
^Source; 312, p. 472; 39, p. 9; l8l, p. 4?; 105, p. 96; 398, 
pp. 249-50; 25, p. 56; 177, pp. Ill and 113; 70, p. 
^•Refers to those participating in the distribution of autumn 
^Excludes those credit branches and unions associated with k. 
declined in 1956-57 mainly due to the combination of village 
collectivization. 
^Refers to the spring of 1958. 
I 
. China* 
952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
644 15,068 114,366 633,742 993,600 752,113 740,000° 
10 15 201 , 529 311,900 668,081 
634 15,053 114,165 633,213 681,700 84,032 
026 .7,450 9,931 7,147 
756 1,816 3,801 3,172 
270 5,634 6,130 3,975 
336 2,376 2,415 2,242 2,219 
50 59 97 106 166 
11 89 138 326 
271 9,418 124,068 159,363 102,558 88,368 
1,201 12,877 20,452 28,008 31,018 41,554 
788 30,445 30,576 
138 147 161 
558 5,778 41,619 64,591 99,322 100,000° 
7.8 301.5 1,139.0 1,874.6 
C\J ON 0
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0
 
ON 00 
96; 398, pp. 1-2; 132, p. 222; 233i 395, p. 13; 135, 
3; 70, p. 431. 
3f autumn harvest. 
3d with APCs and marketing coops. Number of credit coops 
5f villages and APCs in the course of agricultural 
1 
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Table 7. Households in organized farms*)& 
Unit 1950 1951 1952 1953 
Total rural households 1,000 105,536 109,375 113,683 116,3 
In APCs 1,000 0.2 1.6 59.0 274 
As ^  of total % 0.1 0 
- Households in each 
APC 1 11.5 12.4 16.2 18 
In advanced APCs 1,000 0.03 0.03 1?84 2. 
As ^  of total % 
Households in each 1 32 30 184.0 137 
In elementary APCs 1,000 0.187 1.588 57.189 272.7 
As $ of total % 0.1 0 
Households in each 1 ' 10.4 12.3 15.7 18 
In mutual aid teams 1,000 11,313 21,000 45,364 45,6 
As % of total % 10.7 19.2 39.9 39 
Households in each 1 4.2 4.5 5.6 6 
In permanent mutual aids 1,000 2,432 4,145 11,448 13,3: 
As % of total % 2.3 3.8 
1—1 o
 
I—1 
11 
Households in each 1 5.5 6.5 7 
In seasonal mutual aids 1,000 8,881 16,855 33,916 32,3< 
As % of total 8.4 15.4 29.8 27 
Households in each 1 4.3 5.4 5 
•^Source: 312, p. 472; 39» pp. 9-10; 105, p. 96; 181, p. 4?; 40, i 
233; 398, pp. 1-3; 395, p. 13; Tables 3 and 6, 
^Refer to those participating in the distribution of autumn harv< 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
109,375 113,683 116,325 117,331 119,201 121,523 122,557 
1.6 59.0 274.8 2,297 16,921 111,713 118,880 
0.1 0.2 2.0 14.2 91.9 97.0 
12.4 16.2 18.2 20.1 26.7 112.4 158.1 
0.03 1?84 2.06 12 40 76,874 114,360 
63.2 93.3 
30 184.0 137.3 59.7 75.6 246.5 171.2 
1.588 57.189 272.793 2,285 16,881 34,839 4,520 
0.1 0.2 1.9 14.2 28.7 3.7 
12.3 15.7 18.1 20.0 26.7 51.1 53.8 
21,000 45,364 45,637 68,478 60,389 
19.2 39.9 39.2 58.4 50.7 
4.5 5.6 6.1 6.9 8.4 
4,145 11,448 13,329 30,713 32,843 
3.8 
1—1 0
 
I—1 
11.4 26.2 27.6 
5.5 6.5 7.3 8.1 10.4 
16,855 33,916 32,308 37,765 27,546 
15.4 29.8 27.8 32.2 23.1 
4.3 5.4 5.7 6.2 6.9 
5, p. 96; 181, p. 47; 40, pp. 34-35; 135, pp. 249-50; 25, p. 56; 
; Tables 3 and 6. 
istribution of autumn harvest in respective years. 
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satisfactory rates of exchange among various productive 
factors also could not be established. The services and 
food provided by members for exchange might differ in 
quality, which could result in dissensions among members 
and dissolution of the teams. All the above mentioned 
practices defied the fundamental objective of mutual aid. 
Still, mutual aid teams were often under the bondage of 
traditional values and customs; they failed to employ any 
new production techniques, nor were they able to utilize the 
labor of women. Although they had a larger farm size and 
more capital than the individual farmer, they were not 
sufficiently large to develop a complex division of labor 
nor utilize a modern mechanization. There was also often a 
lack of sound statistical and accounting systems, and 
shortages of cadres for planning and management in the 
mutual aid teams. As a result, mutual aid teams had not 
been successful in reducing substantially the poverty in 
rural China. 
The measure to remedy the above mentioned flaws, 
according to Mao, is collectivization of the agricultural 
sector. The first step in bringing about 
collectivization, according to Lenin, is cooperativization 
(171, p. 151; 170, p. 19). At the end of 1953» one year 
after the completion of land reform, the Central Committee 
of CCP publicly announced that establishment of agricul­
tural producers* cooperatives should be promoted (22). 
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VI. ELEMENTARY AGHICULTUHAL PRODUCERS* 
COOPERATIVES, 1953-1956 
Some agricultural producers* cooperatives, sometimes 
called elementary APC*s, were organized as early as were the 
mutual aid teams. However, the cooperative movement was 
then smaller in its territorial scope and in the number of 
participating households. Cooperatives in rural China 
before APC was officially promoted were mainly supply and 
marketing types (Table 6). The elementary APC, like the 
mutual-aid team, was transitional and considered by the 
regime as a step toward complete agricultural socialization. 
The elementary APC evolved from the mutual-aid phase, but 
its elements of socialism are more distinct. A definite 
demarcation line between two forms can not be drawn, 
however. 
A. Characteristics and Advantages 
The APC can be characterized as semi-socialist in 
character. A person over l6 years of age could join the 
APC by contributing his land, draft animals, farm tools and 
his share of cooperative production expenses. Title to 
these items was retained by the individuals but their use was 
directed by a unified management of the collective body. The 
member could retain for private use a small plot of land not 
exceeding 5% of the average individual land-holding in the 
village (180, p. l4). The individuals were to join the co­
operative farm voluntarily for mutual benefit. The cooperatives 
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adhered during its organizational movement to the basic rule 
of relying on the poor and the middle peasants (21, pp. 20-22; 
180, p. 6; 183, p. 5). 
On the average, the elementary APC was three to four 
times as large as the mutual aid teams during the period 
1952-55« In 1955» 31 households were cultivating 555 mou 
of land as shown in Table 24. The households in an average 
cooperative increased to 51 in 1956 and to 54 in 1957 
(Table ?)• The cooperative management committee was in 
charge of planning and administration of the collective body. 
Under the management committee were production brigades or 
groups, depending upon the size of the cooperative, which 
served as the basic units for the organization of labor 
(180, pp. 30-31 and 4?). 
The output of the cooperative, after deducting produc­
tion expenses, agricultural taxes, reserve funds and welfare 
funds, was divided between (1) the dividends on land and 
property and (2) wages for labor (21, p. l6; 180, p. 15). 
Production expense, a sum equal to the annual expenditure 
on seeds, feed grains, fertilizers, insecticides and 
repairing of farm tools, was set aside to cover production 
in the next year (180, pp. 24 and 4l). 
The reserve funds were used for capital accumulation in 
the cooperative. The government regulations prescribed 
that the reserve funds of the elementary APC should, in 
general, not exceed 5% of its net income, which is the gross 
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revenue of the APC less all its expenditure on production 
(180, p. 42). The actual accumulation of reserve funds, as 
a percentage of the gross revenue, was 6,5% for the average 
elementary APC in Liaoning in 1954 and 5*2% for the average 
APC in the nation in 1955 (Table 8). This means that the 
reserve funds as a percentage of the cooperative's net 
income was exceeding the prescribed level. Those draft 
animals, farm tools, and tools for subsidiary occupations, 
land reclamation and irrigation projects which were bought 
With the cooperative reserve funds were the common property 
of the cooperative. The welfare fund was used exclusively 
for public welfare and relief for calamity-stricken members. 
The same table shows that the actual allocation of welfare 
funds also exceeded the prescribed standard which was 
one percent of the cooperatives net income (I80, p. 43). 
The dividends on each parcel of land were paid on the 
basis of the yield of that parcel in a normal year, but 
was only a small proportion of the yield. 
The remaining part of the cooperative income consti­
tuted the wage fund, which was distributed among the total 
labor days and rewards. A labor day^ was credited to a 
cooperative member when he accomplished a certain amount 
of work. The amount of accomplishment constituting a labor 
day is a function of the particular conditions under which 
^It must be noted that a labor day defined here is a 
unit of work point for wage payment. A labor day may not 
equal a work day which means simply working a day. 
Table 8. Income distribution in agricultural producers* cooperative 
Each household in 26,733 elemen- 202 advan-
2,451 elementary tary APCs ced APCs 
APCs, Liaoning 
1954 1955 1955 1955 
Yuan ^ Yuan % Yuan % Yuan % 
Gross revenue 475 100.0 504 100.0 12,885 100.0 89,728 100.0 
Production 
expenses 133 28.0 138 27.4 3,118 24.2 26,470 29.5 
Administrative 
cost 6 1.3 7 1.4 103 0.8 538 0.6 
State taxes 50 10.5 51 10.1 
Others 16 3.4 19 3.8 580 4.5 5,742 6.4 
Reserve funds 31 6.5 21 4.2 670 5.2 7,806 8.7 
Welfare funds 3 0.6 4 0.8 180 1.4 1,436 1.6 
Wages to 
members 181 38.1 213 42.3 47,735 53.2 
Dividends to 
land 55 11.6 51 10.1 
8,234 63.9 
Compensations 
to productive 
means 
Source; 4o6, pp. 31-32; 4o5, pp. 7-8; 105, p. 193; 434, pp. 72 
^The absolute figures in this table refer to the average housed 
^The average size of advanced APCs in Hupei is 257 households. 
ers* cooperatives*»^ 
202 advan- 15 advanced , 1059 advan- 228 advanced 
ced APCs APCs in Hupei ced APCs in APCs 
22 provinces 
1955 1956 1956 1957 
Yuan % Yuan % Yuan % Yuan % 
89,728 100.0 98,417 100.0 132,233 100.0 138,250 100.0 
26,470 29.5 15,796 16.05 27,769 
0
 
1—
1 CM 
39,263 28.4 
0
0
 
0.6 354 0.36 2,777 2.1 553 0.4 
7,243 7.36 12,033 9.1 13,134 9.5 
; 5,742 6.4 1,427 1,45 926 0.7 1,659 1.2 
! 7,806 8.7 3,189 3.24 3,967 3.0 7,742 5.6 
' 1,436 1.6 1,230 1.25 1,322 1.0 1,659 1.2 
47,735 
) 
53.2 68,528 69.63 83,439 63.1 73,549 53.2 
650 0.66 691 0.5 
193; 434, pp. 74-76; 391, p. 9. 
le average household in Liaoning and the average A.PC for others, 
257 households, a little larger than the national average. 
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the member worked. For example, the type of land, availa­
bility of farm tools and draft animals, and weather 
conditions were taken into accoxmt. Those who fulfilled 
and overfulfilled the production targets were granted 
rewards, (180, p. 34; I83, p. 16). The portion actually 
allocated to the cooperative members was 63.9^ of its gross 
revenue in 1955» which met the prescription of the govern­
ment directive in 1956. However, the cooperatives in 
Liaoning failed to meet this standard (Table 8), 
Voluntary participation, prescribed ceilings for 
reserve funds, and dividend payments were deemed necessary 
to win the support of the peasants whose political 
consciousness was not sufficiently developed. Payment of 
a dividend to land according to the yield of the land 
implied the existence of land rent, absolute and differ­
ential. Payment of wages in accordance with labor days 
or work points was a measure to motivate work effort and 
creative activity of peasants. All these practices, 
according to the cooperative regulations, were to be 
abolished when political consciousness of the peasants 
was raised and output of the APC increased considerably. 
The APCs were engaged mainly in farming, combined 
with some sideline occupations when conditions favored 
them. It corresponds to one form of Russian collective 
farm, artel, prevalent in the early 1930*8. 
Theoretically, the elementary APC was to expand 
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agricultural production and make available increasing amounts 
of marketable surplus and raw materials to industrial sector 
so as to help accomplish the socialist industrialization. 
With its comparatively larger scale than the mutual-aid team, 
the APC could under a single command allocate its available 
resources to raise output through some of the following 
activities in different seasons: promoting division of 
labor, rational use of all arable land, building up irriga­
tion works, collecting manure and other fertilizers, 
intensive cultivation, improving farm methods and tools, 
and afforestation. The APC*s could also promote coordina­
tion with credit and supply and marketing cooperatives. 
Small-scale technical reforms, such as double cropping, 
digging ditches and small canals, purchasing farm tools, 
were beyond the capacity of the individual peasants and 
mutual aid teams; building up of the APCs common funds and 
loans from the credit coops and the government made some of 
these projects more feasible. Still, the APC was not too 
big to be managed by the peasants and cadres with limited 
ability. 
The APC also facilitated socialist transformation of 
the agricultural sector. The principle of relying on a 
combination of the poor and middle class peasants and of 
prohibiting rich peasants and ex-landlords from participat­
ing in the APC*s before they were well consolidated helped 
to eliminate the "exploiting" class in rural areas. In 
6? 
order to promote the abolition of feudalism, the APC's were 
forbidden to hire laborers on a long-time basis. The 
increasing importance of common property and repeated cam­
paigns of indoctrination toward socialism and patriotism 
of APC members (180, pp. 45-^6) would further do away with 
the system of private property in rural areas. 
Finally, establishment of APC*s brough the agricultur­
al sector within the scope of the state plans»thus 
facilitating coordination between agricultural and 
industrial segments. The government also could secure 
adequate agricultural products throu^ agricultural taxes 
and food acquisition schemes, and distribute them to urban 
population or export them in exchange for machines. Such 
governmental activities would have been extremely difficult 
had the agricultural sector still consisted of numerous 
individual peasants. 
B. Development of the Elementary APC 
With these theoretical advantages and the desire of the 
Communist leaders to establish them, the APC*s developed 
rapidly during the 1953-56 period. There were only 18 
elementary APC's in 1950. The number increased in 1953 to 
more than 15,000, with 273 thousand households, about 0.2# 
of total rural households participating (Tables 6 and ?)• 
The number of elementary APC's and participating households 
continued to increase rapidly until the beginning of 1956 
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when the advanced APC took the dominant role. The report of 
Mao in July 31» 1955» The Question of Agricultural Coopera­
tion (170), gave further impetus to the spread of the APC's, 
both elementary and advanced, and the movement of combining 
the elementary APC*s into advanced ones. The advanced APC*s 
will be discussed in the next chapter. The elementary APC*s 
numbered 633 thousands in June, 1955, and 1,883 thousands in 
December, 1955» and the participating households accounted 
for lk»2% and 59«3^ of total rural households respectively. 
From the spring of 1956 onward both the number of elementary 
APC*s and their participating households declined gradually 
as the result of the development of the advanced of APC*s 
(Table 9). 
Development of the APC*s differed greatly among 
various provinces. In general the closer those provinces 
were to Peking, the Capital of Communist China, the faster 
were their pace of developing APC*s, as shown in Table 10. 
More than 90^ of rural households in Peking and Liaoning 
joined the APC*s at the end of 1955 while less than 4-9^ of 
provinces in South China, Southwest and Northwest had joined 
by the same date, 
C. Effects and Shortcomings of 
Coopérâtivization 
In addition to the theoretical advantages of APC*s and 
to the determination of the Communist Party to expand them, 
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Table 9» Upsurge in agricultural collectivization* 
Unit June 
1955 
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. 
Total 1,000 119,201 117,323 117,340 119,194 118,995 119,75 
rural 
households 
APCs 1,000 633.7 1,580 1,900 1,530 1,11 
participat­
ing house­
holds 1,000 16,921 38,130 49,400 75,450 95,553 104,19' 
As % of 
total 
households 14.2 32.5 42.1 63.3 80.3 87.' 
Advanced 
APCs 1,000 0.529 17 136 
Participat­
ing house­
holds 1,000 40 4,768 36,519 61,03 
As % of 
total 
households 4.0 30.7 51. 
Elementary 
633.2 APC 1,000 1,883 1,394 
Participat­
ing house­
holds 1,000 16,881 70,682 59,034 43,16 
As ^  of 
total 
households % 14.2 59.3 49.6 36. 
*Source: l8l cited in 105» PP. 177, 184-85 and 188; 434, pp. 
and 7; 412, p. 2. 
1956 End of 
Feb, March April May June Aug. Nov. Dec. 1957 
L9,759 120,000 120,101 120,756 120,512 121,223 122,356 
1,118 1,088 1,056 1,004 944 916 756 780 
34,190 106,680 108,451 110,130 110,510 112,6l6 117,829 
87.0 88.9 90.3 91.2 91.7 92.9 96 96.3 98.0 
288 334 540 
Si, 030 65,820 69,840 74,720 75,410 80,145 107,421 
51.0 54.8 58.2 61.9 62.6 66.1 83 87.8 96.0 
767 582 216 
4-3,160 40,860 38,611 35,420 35,100 32,471 10,407 
36.0 34.0 32.1 29.3 29.1 26.8 13 8.5 2.0 
, pp. i-ii; 4o4, pp. 12-13; 397, PP. 9-12; 389, p. 8; Tables 6 
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Table 10. Development of APC*s in different localities 
(at the end of 1955)* 
Percentage of rural households Provinces 
in APC's and Municipalities 
More than 90# 
80-89# 
70-79# 
60-69# 
50-59# 
Less than 49# 
Liaoning, Peking 
Shansi, Tientsin, Anhwei, 
Hopei, Shanghai, 
Heilungkiang 
Honan, Hupei, Kirin, Kansu 
Shantung, Inner Mongolia, 
Chekiang, Kiangsi, Pukien 
Kiangsu, Tsinghai, Szechwan 
Hunan, Kwangtung, Shensi, 
Kvrangsi, Kweichow, 
Sinkiarig, Yunnan 
*Source: iBl, p. 118 cited in 105, p. I88. 
Note: APC's here includes both elementary and advanced 
ones. 
the rapid development of APC's in China could be attributed 
to the ability of APC's to raise farm output and income for 
individual members, especially for poor ones. The statistical 
data in Table 11, cited originally from official sources, 
indicate that compared with individual farmers the APC's 
produced a higher yield per mou of all farm products except 
Jute and hemp. A survey of 29, 935 elementary APC's and 
202 advanced APC's taken in early 1956 showed that the per 
capita grain output for the members of both types of APC's 
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Table 11. Average yield per mou of agricultural products by fc 
Rice Wheat Soybeans Ginned 
cotton 
(1) National average®' 357 
I 
115 107 35 
(2) APC^ 388.9 12QjJ- 130.8 41.8 
(3) Individual 
farmer 352.9 112.1 109.9 33.2 
(4) (2) 
(3) 110.2 107.4 119.0 125.9 
^Source: Table 4?; l8l, p. 96 cited in 9» P. 1^7. 
^Unless output of the state farms would greatly affect the 
for the nation should be between those of APC and individ 
table, thus the accuracy and representativity of these da 
^Refers to 993,600 APCs in Table 6, 
icts by forms of management, 1955 (catties)* 
Ginned Ground Cured Jute & Rape- Sugar Sugar 
cotton nuts tobacco hemp seed cane beets 
35 172 157 295 55 5,300 • 1 
41.8 207.3 169.9 317.8 71.7 5,943.0 1,797 .4 
33.2 177.8 157.0 330.9 65.0 5,425.7 1,719 .4 
125.9 116.6 108.2 96.0 110.3 109.5 104 .5 
iffeet the national average of farm output, per mou yield 
id individual farmer. It is not so for some items in this 
i" these data are doubtful. 
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in 1955 was 808 and 966 catties respectively. For the 
nation as a whole in the same year output was 705 (405, 
pp. 6-8; 191, pp. 63-64). According to Mao, about 80^ of 
the APC's in June, 1955» had increased their output. Only 
10^ had experienced a decline in output (170, p. 28), 
The higher yield per mou in the APC's resulted in a 
higher Income from each mou of cultivated land. In 1954, 
the reported income from each mou of cultivated land was 
28.8 yuan for cooperative members, 27.7 yuan for rich 
peasants and 24.3 yuan for poor peasants (434, p. 22). 
In Liaoning, the average gross revenues in 1954-55 were 
713 yuan and 618 yuan respectively for a cooperative mem­
ber household and an individual farming household, (4o6, 
pp. 3I-32). The financial status of the cooperative 
members was second only to the rich peasants ( 3 9 4 ,  p. 3 2 ) .  
The ratio of marketed grains to the total grain 
output showed the same situation. In 1954 the ratio was 
30^ for the cooperative member, but 43.1^ for the rich 
peasants and 25.7^ for the average household (394, P. 33)• 
The well-to-do peasants who accounted for about 20^ 
of rural households were either opposed to the cooperative 
farming or wavering in the first half of 1955 (170, p. 19; 
434, pp. 28 and 36). Owing to the achievements of the APC's 
as mentioned above, some of them were said to have changed 
their attitude and joined the APC's. The pattern of 
village life during this period, however, seemed to remain 
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fundamentally the same as it was during the pre-communist 
period (104, pp. 8 and 18). 
For the nation as a whole, the growth rate of food grains 
during the 1953-1955 was only a little higher than that of 
population growth (Table 45). The same was true for the 
growth rate of gross agricultural output. In 1955» the 
agricultural output was only 70% higher than the 19^9 level 
while the industrial output in 1955 was 291.4^ over the 
1949 level (Table 46). The output of some farm products 
did not increase during this period. Reduction of some 
farm products resulted in under-utilization of the produc­
tive capacity of light industries which depend on these 
farm goods for the supply of raw materials. Owing to out­
put reduction of tobacco in 1953» the tobacco and match 
industries were said to be operating at 30^ of their 
capacity in 1954. In the same year, the oil and flour 
milling industries were reported operating at 50% of their 
capacity and the tanning industry at 60% (Table 44; 135» 
p. 84). In the first half of 1955» the cotton yam 
industry reportedly operated at 7$% of its capacity, cotton 
fabric and vegetable oil at 62^, flour-milling at 56%, and 
cigarettes and rice cleaning at 24^ (135» P» 223). The 
heavy impact of agricultural output on the light industry 
and the whole industrial sector was demonstrated by the 
fact that in 1955» 50.3^ of total industrial output (exclud­
ing handicraft industry) and 93«1^ of light industrial 
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output depended on agriculture for the supply of their raw 
materials. 
Various explanations have been advanced for the slacken­
ing rate of growth in farm production and other maladjustment 
which appeared in the economy in 1953-1955. One explanation 
is the investment policy pursued by the regime. During 
1953-1955, the investment in industry ranged from 36 to 46^ 
of total investment in the country while that in the agri­
cultural sector was less than 10^. Still, more than half of 
investment in agricultural sector was allocated to water 
conservation (4o, pp. 55-61 and 23). The capital formation 
in forms of chemical fertilizers, improved seeds and farm 
tools were negligible, considering the vast cultivated area 
of China. Cooperativization could not substitute for 
farm mechanization. In 1955 the fields cultivated with 
tractors, on the average, achieved wheat yields which were 
30^ higher than hand cultivated plots. In the case of 
cotton, the yield was 43^ higher (135, p. 270 and cf. 434, 
p. 45). Perhaps in response to this fact, the Central 
Committee in October, 1955, called for increasing the 
production of fertilizers, quick establishment of tractor 
plants and continuous research on design, assembly and 
repair of improved ty^s of farm tools and equipment for 
water conservation (21, p. 26). This proposal, however, 
failed to yield any immediate effect. 
Reduction of rice output in 1954, wheat output in 1955 
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and output of coarse grains in both 1954 and 1955 ($@l3le 
45) could be attributed partly to natural calamities. Areas 
affected by floods and droughts in 1954 and 1955 were 
larger than in previous years. The proportion of the calamity 
affected areas to the total area under cultivation, as shown 
in Table 5» was 10.6^ in 1954 and 6,5% in 1955. Data on the 
distribution of stricken areas by type of crops was not 
available in a form which would permit the analyses of the 
effect of natural disasters on the output of each crop. 
Structurally the elementary APC, according to Soviet 
economists, was still too small to accomplish a full division 
of labor (135» p. 226). Furthermore, private ownership of 
property in the elementary APC restricted the scope of 
over-all production planning and the unified use of avail­
able resources. Owners did not always agree with decisions 
of the cooperatives to expand irrigation facilities or 
plant trees on their land, nor did they always consent to 
sell their donkeys in exchange for horses to achieve 
greater efficiency. The self interest of the cooperative 
members resulted in conflicts between new and old members, 
between members with more land and members with less land, 
between different cooperatives, between the cooperative 
and its production teams and between the cooperatives and 
individual peasants. The land owners had little incentive 
for hard work as they could rely on their land for a 
living; the landless members also lost their motivation as 
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part of the fruit of their labor was taken away by those 
members who owned the land (25, p. 78). 
As could be expected, there was lack of management and 
technical personnel. The political cadres who guided the 
organization and management of the elementary ÂPC*s some­
times failed to draw up a rational production plan and to 
manage well. The production expenses in 1955 were on the 
average 24^ of the gross revenue of the cooperative (Table 
8), In the province of Liaoning, 3.8# of the elementary 
APC's spent 46 to 56# of their gross revenue for production 
expenses and 51# of the cooperatives spent more than 25# 
of their gross revenue. These ratios were higher than the 
standard set by Teng Tze-hui ^ the party member in charge of 
rural work. According to him the production expenses in 
general should be under 20# of the cooperative gross revenue 
(cf. 4o6, pp. 31-32). The reasons given by him for this 
standard were not clear. 
Some overzealous party cadres violated the principle 
of voluntariness and mutual benefit. There occurred, there­
fore, costly incidents such as physical attacks of the 
active elements and cadres in the APC's, slau^ter of live­
stock, destruction of farm crops, arson and assassinations 
(21, p. 27). From the viewpoint of the party leaders the 
most distressing aspect was the shift toward the right by 
some local cadres and the passive attitude of others (183, 
pp. 11-13; 170, p. 12). In 1953, 15,000 out of 53,000 
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cooperatives in the province of Chekiang were dissolved at 
one fell swoop, thus provoking a sharp warning from the 
Central Committee that a self-criticism campaign might be 
launched. (170, pp. 11-12). In the summer of 1955» Mao 
criticized the development of APC's as "tottering along like 
a woman with bound feet." (170, pp. 1-3). Cadres were 
urged to engage wholeheartedly in preparatory works for 
initiating new cooperatives and a "new upsurging" in the 
socialist movement through the process of criticism, summ­
ing up experiences, training and indoctrination (170, pp. 
1-2, 12-13, and 26-27). In response to Mao's criticism. 
Decisions on Agricultural Cooperation were adopted in 
October, 1955. The Communist Party committees in various 
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions were 
ordered to organize advanced APC's in the areas where the 
establishment of elementary APC*s had been completed, and 
political and economic conditions were ripe for developing 
advanced APC's (21, p. 30). 
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VII. ADVANCED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS* COOPERATIVES 
1956-1957 
Proliferation of the advanced APC, also commonly called 
the collective farm, was actually an extension of rural 
socialization Initiated as early as at the founding of 
Communist China. Many features of advanced APC*s are 
therefore similar to those of elementary APC*s. 
A. Characteristics 
Like the elementary APC, an advanced APC was establish­
ed on a voluntary and mutually beneficial basis, under the 
guidance of the communist party (179» pp. 5-6). There were 
no regulations on the members* consumption patterns. 
Former landlords, rich peasants and sometimes upper-middle 
peasants usually were not welcome to join the advanced APC 
in its early stage of collectivization, presumably before 
1956. However, many of them became members of collective 
farms. In 1956 when 96% of rural households were in 
advanced APC's, 6.1% of APC*s members were ex-landlords and 
rich peasants, and about 21% upper middle peasants (Table 
3). Many forces are conducive to this trend. The landlords 
and rich peasants as classes were abolished by land reform 
and cooperativization, and they were no longer a deterrent 
force to this movement. When the majority of farm laborers 
and poor peasants began participating in the APC's, the ex-
landlords and rich peasants with average land-holdings of 
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more them 7 mou could not find workers to farm the land (of, 
104, p. 36). Thus they had to depend upon their own manpower 
or Join in APC's. The party also disliked the existence of 
private farms outside APC*s as the former mi^t create 
adverse psychological effects on the members of APC's, The 
leadership sought to enroll the entire rural population in 
the APC*s once they were well established. Low tax rates 
and some credit privileges were thus granted to the APC's. 
After they were admitted to the collective farm following 
clearance of their qualifications, they were still exclud­
ed from holding executive positions for a certain period of 
time (179» pp. 7-8; 434, pp. 37 and 149-50). The policy 
was aimed at consolidating the alliance of poor and lower-
middle peasants, neutralizing upper-middle peasants, and 
remoulding rich peasants and former landlords. The final 
objective was to restrict the expansion of the upper middle 
class and prevent the emergence of rich peasants as a class. 
The chief difference between the advanced APC and the 
elementary APC lay in the ownejrship of land and other 
important means of production. The members of the advanced 
APC turned over their privately owned land, irrigation works 
(e.g., ponds and wells), large groves, timber-producing 
forests, sind major means of production (e.g., draught 
animals and large farm tools) to the collective ownership. In 
the advanced APC, no dividends were paid to former owners of 
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land, but some compensation was paid to owners of productive 
means. This compensation accounted for a negligible portion 
of the APC's revenue. However, it must be noted that in 1955 
many elementary APC*s also did not pay dividends to former 
owners of land. During the autumn of 1955» 7,500 APC's, both 
advanced and elementary types, had ceased to pay divi­
dends to former land owners in their distribution of harvest, 
though there existed only 529 advanced APC's in June, 1955 
(Table 9), At this time, 344 thousand APC's, about 54.2^ 
of total number of APC's in China, owned collectively all 
draught animals on the cooperative farms and 340 thousands 
of them owned collectively major agricultural implements. 
The APC's which simultaneously practiced collective owner­
ship of draught animals and major agricultural implement, 
and payment of no dividends to former land ownership numbered 
2,200 (400, p. 12). 
In order to reconcile personal interest of members, the 
advanced APC still allowed members to retain personal means 
of subsistence, small garden plots, scattered trees, poultry, 
domestic animals, small farm tools and tools for subsidiary 
family occupations. All members, except the weak and 
disabled, lived mainly on wages, which were to be paid on 
the principle of "to each according to his work" (179, pp. 
5, 10 and 12-13; 434, p. 97), This piece work system was 
used to provide incentive to peasants. After the spring 
and summer harvests, farm products were distributed to 
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members as advances on their annual wages, the exact amount 
of which was settled when all the year's harvest was in. 
Payments to members were on the average 63,^ of the coopera­
tive gross revenue in 1956, but only 53^ in 1957, according 
to a "model survey"^ of 228 advanced APC's (Table 8). 
A directive issued by the central government in 
September, 1957» suggested that in principle one advanced 
APC should be set up in the village inhabited by more than 
100 peasant households (313, P» 519). Actually, the house­
holds per advanced APC averaged 76 in 1955 and 24-6 in 1956, 
three to five times the size of the elementary APC (Table 7). 
The advanced APC in Kaihsienkung, Kiangsu, numbered 594 
households in early 1956 (108, p. 36). An advanced APC 
composed of about 600 households was considered too large 
by some communist leaders. The year of 1957 therefore 
witnessed a reduction in the size of some large collective 
farms. Immediately following this adjustment the advanced 
APC on the average comprised of 171 households, more than 
three times the size of the elementary type. Compared with 
the elementary APC, the advanced type could promote a 
greater division of labor, expansion of irrigation and re­
clamation works, mechanization and electrification of 
^In contrast to the sampling survey, the units in the 
model survey are chosen arbitrarily according to the desires 
of investigators. The results of the model survey therefore 
might not be representative of the universe. The data from 
the model survey are used here and will be used occasionally 
simply because there are no alternative figures available. 
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agriculture. The ability of both types of APC to buy 
tractors offers an interesting comparison. The unit price 
for a tractor was 4,336 yuan for the wheel"type Ferguson and 
36,000 yuan for the tracklaying type Stalin-80 (323, p. 4l). 
The reserve funds were only 670 yuan in the elementary APC 
in 1955 and 3»96? yuan in 1956, neither of which was sufficient 
to buy a single Ferguson. The reserve funds in an advanced APC 
in 1957 was 7,742 yuan, which would enable it to buy more than 
one Ferguson (Table 8). If common funds in APC, which 
include reserve funds, welfare funds, share funds, and out­
standing loans and investment from members, were considered, 
there was 2,084 yuan in the elementary APC in 1955 and 
66,895 yuan in the advanced type in 1957 (Table 24). The 
former could afford to buy only half of a Ferguson while 
the latter, 15 Fergusons or about 2 Stalin-80*s. 
The production plan of the advanced APC was drawn and 
implemented by the management committee in line with the 
state plan. Under the committee there were production 
brigades and production groups which served as the basic 
units of labor organization. In a big APC there might be 
an additional tier between the production brigade and the 
group. With the decreasing size of the collective farm in 
1957» there were only two tiers in the advanced APC: the 
management committee and production brigade. Nevertheless, 
establishment of the advanced APC*s brought the agricultural 
sector more ti^tly under central control. The management 
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committee coordinated farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fish­
ing, handicraft, transports and other subsidiary occupations 
which were operated on the collective farms. Since the autumn 
of 1956, some of the handicraft cooperatives had been combined 
in advanced APC's. They also provided cultural and welfare 
services to members. They have many characteristics similar to 
the artel, a type of kolkhoz implemented in the Soviet Union. 
One of the distinctive features of China's collectiviza­
tion is the proliferation of advanced APC's without the 
parallel development of modern machinery in the agricultural 
sector. It is Mao's concept that only during the third five-
year plan, that is, 1963-67, can the technical reform and 
social transformation advance side-by-side in rural China (170, 
p. 33)* The reason may be that industrial capacity at this 
stage was not sufficiently developed to meet the demands 
of agricultural modernization. The development of coopera­
tive and collective farms was aimed at reducing the degree of 
capital scarcity in agriculture and, at the same time, 
paving the way for its future modernization. 
The advanced APC was required to deliver public grain 
and sell its agricultural products to the state. Finan­
cially it was intended to be self-sufficient. 
B. Development of Advanced APC 
A cooperative or collective farm with the above 
characteristics certainly could not have been established 
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all over China during the early period of communist rule. 
There was in the entire nation only one advanced APC set up 
in the province of Shensi during the 1950-51 period, (Table 
6; 404, p. 11). In February, 1953» the Party decision 
suggested that at least a collective farm and/or state farm 
be tentatively initiated in each county where economic 
conditions were ripe for them, thus their experiences 
could provide examples for neighboring peasants (183, p. 21). 
The state farms were intended to demonstrate the advantages 
of mechanization and to train cadres in the management 
function, thus paving the way for the future mechanization 
of agriculture. The collectivization movement had moved 
very slowly until Mao himself called for its speed up in 
July, 1955. The Chinese countryside thus underwent a 
fundamental change. New advanced APC*s were established 
and the elementary APC*s were at the same time transformed 
into advanced ones. 
The number of advanced APC*s jumped from 1? thousands 
at the end of 1955 to 540 thousands at the end of 1956, with 
their participating households increased from 4,768 thou-
ssmds to 107,421 thousands, respectively, and 87*7# of 
total households in rural China. The peasant households 
which joined in elementary and advanced APC*s at the end of 
1956 accounted for 96.3# of rural households (Table 9)» and 
the communist government considered it as a decisive victory 
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for socialism. Table 12 shows that in 1956 the APC's and 
state farms collectively owned more than 70^ of big draught 
animals, such as oxen, water buffalo, horses, donkeys, and 
mules, but only about 8% of camels. It may be due to the fact 
that camels, were owned mainly by national minonities in 
remote areas where the collectivization has yet to start. 
In 1957» 98^ of peasant households were in APC*s of 
both types with 96^ in the advanced type (cf. 395, p. 13). An 
1.5 billion mou of cultivated land, about 90% of the totsuL 
cultivated area in the nation, were under collective owner­
ship of the APC at the first half of 1957 (1, p. 19). The 
peasant households participating in the advanced APC*s 
continued to increase till the end of 1957 when the 
collectivization movement was virtually accomplished. The 
progress of collectivization, thus, was 5 years in advance 
of the time table originally set by the Communist Party 
(25, p. 72; 389, p. 8; 170, p. 34). 
C. Economic Advantages 
It is improper to simply label the collectivization 
movement in China a success or failure. While the establish­
ment of advanced APC*s was rapid their operation once 
established was not always efficient in many aspects. The 
difficulties encountered will be discussed in a later sec­
tion. It is the purpose of this section to discuss economic 
benefits the APC*s brought through the increased use of the 
Table 12. Ownership of livestock. 1956* 
Total 
State farm and 
state livestock 
farms 
Collectively 
owned by APC 
Owned by 
APC 
members 
Others 
(including 
individual 
farmers) 
Oxen 100.0 0.2 72.8 12.8 14.2 
Water Buffalo 100.0 0.5 79.3 9.8 10.4 
Milk Cows 100.0 18.7 25.4 9.7 46.2 
Horses 100.0 1.7 68.9 11.2 18.2 
Donkeys 100.0 0.1 69.9 24.8 5.2 
Mules 100.0 1.2 75.0 10.6 13.2 
Camels 100.0 0.3 7.6 14.9 77.2 
Sheep 100.0 1.2 30.8 41.5 26.5 
Goats 100.0 0.4 39.2 43.4 17.0 
Pigs 100.0 0.6 16.3 73.1 10.0 
•Source: 407, P. 32, based on the survey conducted on July 1, 1956 In 24 
provinces and municipalities. 
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labor force, expansion of cultivated land, and promotion of 
farm output, income and public savings. 
1» Fuller use of the labor force 
Since the establishment of the advanced APC, the labor 
force was used increasingly to promote production and 
capital formation. In 1955» the average labor days for the 
able-bodied adult laborers were 95 in the elementary APC and 
128 in the advanced type. According to a survey of 228 APC's, 
the average labor days increased to l6l in 1957 (Table 13), 
A significant development was the increased use of 
women in the labor force. In 228 advanced APC*s in 1957» 
the proportion of labor days supplied by female laborers was 
28,3^ of the total. Female laborers accounted for 43.3# of 
the total labor force. In the pre-cooperativization period, 
women contributed negligibly to the labor force. The main 
reason was that the advanced APC, with its large and 
diversified operation, could allocate available labor more 
efficiently. The weak and the handicapped could be 
assigned to light work and auxiliary occupations. Revenue 
of subsidiary occupations as a percentage of total revenue 
of the advanced APC was 26»k% in 1957» as compared with 7,7% 
in the elementary APC in 1955 (405, pp. 7-8; 391, p, 12), In 
the slack season, the labor force could be used in irriga­
tion, reclamation, terracing suid collection of organic 
fertilizers. 
Table 13. Labor utilization in rural China* 
1955 1956 1957 1959 
Elementary Advanced 15 228 National Rural 
APC APC Advanced APCs average commîmes 
APCs in 
Hupei 
Labor days per worker Vk 
Male 133 173 - 204 249 (300)0 
Female 50 66 - 105 166 (250) 
Average 95 128 187 161 - 300 
Percentage of labor 
force; 
Male 55.0 - 56.7 - (55.0) 
Female 45.0 43.3 - (45.0) 
Total 100.0 - 100.0 
-
100.0 
Percentage of labor days 
contributed by* 
Male 76.5 - 71.7 - -
Female 23.5 - 28,3 - -
Total 100.0 "" 100.0 — 
*Source* 405, p. 6; 390, pp. 24-25; 391, p. 8; 350, p. 17; 205, P« 60. 
®Refer to work days per worker for the 1957 national average and for 1959* 
) indicates approximate figures. 
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Data concerning 15 advanced APC*s in Hupei show that 
3^ of total labor force was allocated to rural construction 
in 1956. It was 5.8# in 228 APC's in 1957 (Table 15). 
According to the Minister of Agriculture, Liao Lu-yien, APC's 
had contributed 20# of their total labor days to the construc­
tion program (412, p. 4). As the result, in the Huai-he 
River basin alone, the largest cotton and wheat growing area, 
the total volume of eathwork amounted to over 400 million 
cubic meters (135, p. 284). The irrigated area as the 
percentage of total cultivated area increased from 22.4# in 
1955 to 31# In 1957» which, in absolute terms, was an 
increase of 150 million mou, greatly surpassing the target 
set for 1957 in the First Pive-Year Plan (Table l6; 190, p. 
57). Accumulation of natural manure in 1956 was more than 
200 percent of that in the previous year in most provinces 
(190, p. 57). In the autumn and winter of 1957 peasants 
collected and delivered to the fields over 20 billion tons 
of manure, silt, excrements and other organic fertilizers to 
be used for the 1958 crop (135, p. 260). 
2. Expansion of cultivated land 
%e allocation of labor and land by a centralized manage­
ment in the advanced APC also helped expand cultivated and 
sown area. Prom 1953 to 1957, the cultivated area increased 
by more than 47 million mou, of which 19.8 million mou were 
reclaimed by APC*s of both types, as shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14. Area reclaimed, 1953-1957* 
Thousnad mou Percentage 
By APC's 19,800 41.6 
By immigrants 6,900 14.5 
By state farms & 
livestock farms 20,860 43.9 
Total 47,560 100.0 
*Source; 320, pp. 21-24. 
The area reclaimed by APC*s in 1953-57 equalled that 
reclaimed by the state farms, but reclamation by APC*s 
required less capital and involved less migration of the 
population to distant places. The reclamation works in the 
first Five Year Plan raised the cultivation index, the ratio 
between the cultivated area and total territory of China, 
from less than 11,1^ in 1953 to 11.4^ in 1957. The cultiva­
tion index for different regions are shown in Table 17. In 
addition to the reclamation of wasteland, a unified planning 
of land use by the management committee could expand the 
cultivated area by curtailing land for housing, roads, and 
graveyards. As shown in Table 17, land readjustment 
and reclamation in 5 APC's increased the cultivated 
land by about 3,000 mou, 29^ of the original cultivated 
area. Improved allocation of land and labor among different 
91 
Table 15. Allocation of labor force (in percentage) 
* 
1 APC in 15 advanced 228 advanced Rural com 
Hui-tung APCs in "APCs National Natio 
Hsien, Hupei Average Avera 
Anhwei 
Spri 
1955 1956 1957 1959 196 
Fanning 
Labor days 
per mou 
Livestock 
feeding 
Orchard, tea, 
& forest 
Other sub­
sidiary 
occupations 
Basic con­
struction 
Industry and 
transportation 
Welfare activities 
Administration 
Corvee 
Labor support 
outside the 
unit 
71 
(15) 
20 
• 9 
• 83 
10 
77.7 
(16) 
4.1 
1.8 
6.3 
5.8 
2.7 
1.5 
50.0 55. 
( 2 0 )  
• 15.0 
25.0 20. (  
2.5 2.: 
7.5 7.: 
Total 100 100 100.0 100.0 
^Source; 405, D. 8; 351, p. 4; 264 cited in 390, td. 24; 291 cited 
133, p. 12. 
tage) * 
iTanced Rural communes 
National National Directive 
Average Average of Kwant-
ung pro-
Spring vince 
1959 i960 i960 
Labor distribution plan 
of a production brigade 
in Yunnan 
1962 
50.0 55.0 60(grain) 80 
( 2 0 )  
• 15.0 • 15.0 • 20 
25.0 2 0 . 0  
2.5 
7.5 
2.5 
7.5 
5 
k. 10 
• 20 
100.0 100.0 100 100 
390, p. 24; 291 cited in 10, p. 90; 351, pp. 8-9, cited in 
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Table l6. Resource development and uses in China* 
Cultivated area Sown area 3 
Million As % of Million Index of Million 
mou national mou multiple mou 
territory^ crop {%) 
(cultivation 
index) 
1949 1,468 10.0 240 
1950 1,505 10.3 250 
1951 1,555 10.6 280 
1952 1,619 
1—1 1—I (—1 
2,119 130.9 320 
1953 1,630 11.1 2,160 132.7 330 
1954 1,640 11.2 2,219 135.3 350 
1955 1,652 11.3 2,266 137.2 370 
1956 1,677 11.4 2,388 142.3 480 
1957 1,677 11.4 2,359 140.6 520 
1958 1,617 11.0 2,344 145.0 1,000 
1959 1,600+ 2,167 1,070 
i960 1,679 11.5 1,007 
.^Source; 40, pp. 128, 130 and 133; 351, p. 4; 28?; I96, ; 
8, p. 23; 26O; 263. 
^Chinese territory equals 97^,101,000 hectares or l4,64l, 
* 
una 
Irrigated area Afforested area each year 
!X of Million As % at area under Million As % of 
iple mou culti- electric mou national 
» {%) vated irrigation territory^ 
as % of 
irrigated 
area 
240 16.3 
250 16.6 1.9 
280 18.0 6.8 
.9 320 19.8 16.3 0.1 
.7 330 20.2 16.7 0.1 
.3 350 21.3 17.5 0.1 
.2 370 22.4 25.7 0.2 
.3 480 28.6 85.8 0.6 
. 6 520 31.6 65.3 0.4 
,0 1,000 61.8 261.9 1.8 
1,070 60+ 10 600.0 4.1 
1,007 60 16.7 
4; 287; 196, p. 281; 3^7, p. 24; 358, p. 35; 10, p. 95; 7, p. 10; 
ares or l4,64l,5l5 thousand mou. 
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Table 17. Cultivation index by regions* 
Cultivation 
index 
(*) 
Cultivated area 
per capita of 
farm population 
(mou) 
Llaoning, Klrln, 
Hellungkiang 20,02 7.54 
Hopei, Shansi, 
Shantung, Honan 46.11 3.38 
Inner Mongolia 4.45 12.27 
Shensl, Kansu, 
Tslnghal 7.21 5.19 
Slnklang 1.03 6.89 
Kleuigsu, Anhwei, 
Cheklang 41.88 2.58 
Hunan, Hupeh, 
Klangsl 19.17 2.25 
Kwangtung, Kwansl, 
Puklen 13.45 2.00 
Szechwan, Yunnan, 
Kweichou 10.41 2.00 
National average: 
For China in 1957 11.4 3.1 
For United States 24.7 50.0 
For Soviet Union 9.0 30.0 
•Source: 102, p. 94; Table l6; 192, p. 59-65. 
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seasons and crops also resulted in a continuous expansion 
of multiple crop areas, except in 1957. The ratio of sown 
area over cultivated area increased from 130.9# in 1952 
to 137.2# in 1955 and 142,3# in 1956, but dropped to 140.6# 
in 1957 (Table l6). The decline in the latter year is un­
explained. Of the 1,677 million mou of cultivated land in 
1956, 672 million mou, about 40#, grew two or three crops a 
year (224, p. 6). 
3* Promotion in farm output 
Increased use of the existing labor force in farming 
and the high rate of capital accumulation achieved in 
advanced APC's resulted in a higher yield per unit of land 
than that achieved by private farmers. Figures from the model 
survey show that in 1956 the advanced APC's had yields per mou 
10# higher in rice, 7# in wheat, 19# in soybean and 26# in 
cotton than did private farmers (223, p. 7). Per capita grain 
output of advanced APC's was also higher than those of elemen­
tary APC's and private farmers. In 1955, it was 966 catties in 
advanced APC's, 808 catties in elementary APC's and 706 
catties for the national average (434, p. 64), In 1957 30# 
of the APC's surpassed upper middle peasants in yield per 
mou of farm output (412, p. 3). Those counties and cities 
which achieved ahead of schedule the 196? target of grain out­
put and cotton output per mou set for each region by the 
National Program of Agricultural Development numbered 65-69 
and 184 respectively, APC's equalling the I967 targets 
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Table 18. Land adjustments within 5 APC*s in Hopei and 
Shantung (mou) 
Before adjustment After adjustment 
Total Area 124,283.00 124,283.00 
1. Cultivated 
land 103,430.84 106,399.90 
2. Nonfarming 
land: 16,286.30 12,570.14 
Housing 7,760.30 7,625.55 
Hoads 1,969.00 1,235.89 
Ditches & 
dikes 2,343.10 2,649.70 
Graveyard 1,795.10 1,059.00 
Wasteland 2,418.80 
3. Others®- 4,566.00 5,312.94 
*Source: 320, p. 23. 
^"Others" here includes orchards, livestock farms, 
private plots and water surface, etc. 
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ahead of schedule accounted for more than of the total 
(412, p. 5). 
An incomplete time series of farm output at Ruan Chwan 
Village in Northeast China shows that despite heavy flood 
and severe drought, output per mou of food grain in both 
1956 and 1957 was higher than in 1954, when the weather 
conditions were normal. The output per mou in 1956 and 1957 
was, however, below that of 1952, when the weather conditions 
were "favorable" to crop production. Although there was 
droiught in the early part of 1958, the average weather con­
ditions of the remaining period brought the yield per mou 
in the Ruan Chwan to 356 catties in 1958 and total output 
to 189,651 catties (Table 19). It appears that the advanced 
APC's under normal weather conditions have the potential to 
increase farm output substantially. However, the case of 
Ruan Chwan may not be representative for other areas in the 
nation. 
A survey of 1,154 APC*s in l4 provinces and municipali­
ties showed that in 1956, 67.6^ of them increased their 
production, 23.6^ decreased, and 8.8^ remained the same 
(434, p. 67). A survey of 228 APC's showed almost the same 
picture for 1957; 61.4-^ of the APC's studied increased out­
put, 31.6^ showed a decrease and 7*0% reported that output 
had remained the same (391, p. 11). Bad weather and lack of 
managerial experiences were reported to be major problems 
among those APC's reporting a decline in output. These 
9? 
Table 19. Agricultural output at Ruan Chwan* 
Type of farming Climate conditions Food grain output 
per mou 
(catties) 
1947 Individual Severe droughts 32 
1952 Mutual aid Good rainfall 250 
1954 Mutual aid Average 190 
1955 Elementary APC Drought & insects 172 
1956 Advanced APC Heavy flood 247 
1957 Advanced APC Severe drought 222 
1958 Advanced APC Drought at the early 
part of the year 
356 
^Source; 85, p. 29. 
Tan 
iltions Food grain output 
per mou 
(catties) 
Total farm output Gross receipts 
(catties) (Yuan) 
ghts 
.1 
isects 
:ht 
he early 
year 
^2 J 
250 
190 
172 
24? 
222 
356 
19,200 
150,000 
150,900 
101,163 
145,942 
123,133 
189,651 
14,500.00 
18,303.54 
19,074.5 
24,363.05 
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difficulties will be discussed more fully in the next 
section. 
For the whole nation, yield per mou of food grain 
increased from I83 catties in 1952 to 197 catties in 1955 
and 204 catties in 1957. Most of the farm products, except 
wheat and rape seed, recorded a higher productivity in 1957 
than in previous year (Table 47). This, plus expansion 
of sown area, resulted in growth of aggregate output of food 
grain from 320 billion catties in 1954 to 370 billion in 
1957. Output of ginned cotton increased from 2.130 million 
to 2,280 million catties in the same period (Table 44; 13, 
p. 34; 122, pp. 23-24). 
Despite the fact that more than 70^ of the draft animals 
were collectivized, their number increased in this period, 
with the exception of cattle and donkeys. The number of the 
former declined 1.1# and the number of the latter 6.7# in 
1957. The number of pigs Increased substantially in 1957; 
rising 62.5# over the 1952 level (Table 48). 
Value of total agricultural output increased from 51.6 
billion yuan in 1954 to 60.4 billion yuan in 1957 at constant 
1952 prices (Table 46). Its average growth rate during 
the period of 1955 and 1957 was 5.4#, more than double the 
growth rate of population which apparently was between 2.0 
and 2.2#. This growth in agricultural output occurred 
during a period when 6.5# to 13.7# of cultivated area was 
affected by adverse weather and crop conditions (Table 5). 
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The weather conditions did contribute to slackening in the 
growth rate during 1956 and 1957. Considering the occurence 
of famines in the Soviet Union during the period of 1932-33 
following collectivization, this modest increase in output in 
China's agriculture must be regarded as a substantial 
achievement. Increases in farm output during this period, 
to the extent that they did indeed occur, certainly must be 
attributed mainly to the structural change in rural areas 
as technical reform had not been undertaken on a large scale 
up to this point. 
4. Improvement of farm income and living conditions 
A higher output in agriculture was accompanied by 
increased income and a higher level of living among peasant 
households. In 1956, the gross income of an average peasant 
household was 776 yuan for those in advanced APC's, but only 
424 yuan for those in elementary APC*s, After deducting 
production cost and public funds, the actual payment to 
peasant households was 274 yuan for those in elementary APC's 
and 413 yuan for those in the advanced types (405, pp. 6-8; 
434, p. 64). In 1957, gross income and actual income received 
by each peasant household from advanced APC's were; according 
to a survey of 228 advanced APC's, 4ll yuan and 220 yuan, 
respectively (391» p. 9). For all the peasants in the country 
actual income per peasant household from agricultural pro­
duction was said to be about 300 yuan (104, p. 55; cf. 391, 
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p. 11-12). Peasants' income in 1957 was 28^ higher than the 
1952 level while "wages of workers and other employees were 
^3% higher (40, p. 216; 396, p. 24). The growth rate of 
national income was more than double that of population 
during the 1956 to 1957 period (149, p. 369). 
The typical peasant household of all different classes 
increased its actual income from the APC upon joining the 
collective farm (391, p. 12), Statistical data obtained 
from 195,354 peasant households in 564 APCs in 20 provinces 
show that in 1956, 67*53% of peasant households increased 
their income, 28,09.^ decreased and 4.38^ remained at the 
former level. Most new lower middle peasants and poor 
peasants experienced increases in income upon joining the 
advanced APC*s (434, p. 79). 
Living standards of peasant households in advanced APC*s 
also improved, during the 1956-1957 period. In about 20^ 
of APC*s, the average living standards of their members 
raised to the level of the well-to-do peasants in 1957 (412, 
p. 3). For the nation as a whole in 1956, the peasants 
Increased their consumption of all commodities, except pork, 
by more than 50^ over the 1949 level. Consumption of sugar 
increased by more than four times and that of coal by more 
than two times over the 1949 level (225, p. 6). In 1957, 
about 20-30% of peasants were said to have some savings, 60^ 
had "adequate" food and clothes, and 10-15% were short of 
necessities (1, p. 22). The population in China in thisperiod 
101 
was provided the minimum food intake requirement of 2,400 
calories, which was suggested by the Chinese Medical 
Council in 1958 (450, pp. l64). 
5» Accumulation of public savings 
With |its larger output, the advanced APC's in 1955 
allocated a higher percentage of its revenue funds than did 
the elementary APC's. Probably to encourage the organiza­
tion of advanced APC*s and because of the poor harvest in 
1956, the regime decided to cut down temporarily the -reserve-
funds in 1956. The proportion of gross revenue allocated to 
reserve funds was reduced from 8.7# in 1955 to 3# in 1956. 
It was increased to 5*6# in 1957 (Table 8), even though, 
considering the population growth, the harvest was not 
encouraging. In early 1958, Chao Sze APC in Ninghsia 
planned to boost its reserve funds from 6% of its gross 
revenue in 1957 to 39# in 1958 (392, pp. 36-39). 
In order to provide more incentives to members of 
advanced APC's, especially those encountering a poor harvest, 
the government had reduced agricultural tax. The tax 
revenues dropped from 3,278 million yuan in 1954, to 2,970 
in 1957. Agricultural taxes as a percentage of state bud­
get revenue was 12.5# in 1954, 10.3# in 1956 and 9*6# in 
1957 (443, p* 10; cf. 166, pp. 38 and 40). 
Besides paying taxes, peasants and APC*s had to sell 
their agricultural products to the state. The trends of 
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State purchase of food grain and agricultural products were 
similar to that of the agricultural tax and of all state 
taxes imposed on the agricultural sector (Table 20). 
Another set of data shows that food grains taxed in real 
terms as well as purchased by the government averaged 28^ of 
the output in the period of 4 crop-years from 1953-5^ to 
1956-57. However, more than half of the state-controlled grain 
was distributed to rural areas where natural disasters fell 
heavily, for example, those in Hopei, Honan, Kiangsu, Hunan, 
Checkiang, Anhwei and Kwangsi. As the result, only 12.04# 
of food grain in these four crop years was supplied to 13# 
of the population in urban areas (394, pp. 31-33). 
Because of necessity, the country maintained its export 
of food grain at 1.4# of its output in the three crop years, 
1954 to 1956. Average food grain consumed by the domestic 
population, however, increased as the growth rate of food 
grain output had been higher than that of population and the 
percentage exported remained at the same level. A large pro­
portion of food grain exported was soybeans, not a major 
food crop. The quality of food was said to have improved 
greatly (399, pp. 28 and 32). Despite the fact that a small 
percentage of food grain had been exported, export of pro­
ducts directly and indirectly related to agriculture 
accounted for 73.3# of total volume of China's export in 
1955-57 and 75.5# in 1953-57. The export of food grain was 
able to support the import of producers goods, which 
10 3 
Table 20. State purchase of food grains and agricultural 
products* 
Purchase of food grains Purchase of agricultural 
products and products of 
side-occupations 
Million 
catties 
As ^  of food 
grain output Million Yuan 
% of gross value 
of agriculture 
1950 17,450 6.98 8,000 20.86 
1951 34,800 12.88 10,000 25.02 
1952 60,900 19.72 12,970 26.80 
1953 73,900 23.55 15,320 30.70 
1954 93,200 29.04 17,360 33.66 
1955 87,600 25.06 17,800 32.05 
1956 75,700 20.74 18,400 31.57 
1957 — — - 20,280 33.60 
1958 mm MM ammm 22,760 30.18 
*Source: 231, 128 cited in 71; 4o, p. l68; T^les'^f 
and ^ 6. 
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accounted for 93^ of the total imports of China in the same 
period and were badly needed (40, p. 176). 
With the steady growth of agricultural production, 
although at a low rate, total capital formation increased 
during the First Five-Year Plan, except during 1957. Capital 
investment under the state plan and total investment during 
1953-57 amounted to 49.27 and 55 billion yuan respectively.* 
The former was 14.8# higher than the original plan target 
set in 1953 (4o, p. 56-57; of. 135, p. 23; l66, p. 36). 
About 97^ of investment was estimated to be financed by dom­
estic sources. Economic loans from the Soviet Union accounted 
for only 1.5# of capital investment on the state plan (149, 
p. 371; 166, pp. 36 and 40). As capital investment in 
agriculture, water conservation, forestry and meteorology was 
only a small portion of agricultural taxes, achievement of 
national construction and development should be attributed 
greatly to the development in the agricultural sector, (40, 
pp. 55-61; 443, p. 10). 
Apart from structural advantages of advanced APC's, 
agricultural development in China depended greatly on the 
correct leadership of the Communist party in exploiting tradi­
tional values of industriousness and thrift and in elevating 
nationalism and socialist consciousness of peasants. Thus 
Chinese Communists had been able to accomplish what Russian 
Communists failed in their collectivization movement. 
Furthermore, there were other factors which had played their 
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role in promoting agricultural production in this period, e.g., 
reduction of price discrepancy between agricultural and 
industrial goods, provision of increasing quantity of means 
of production to agriculture and extension of considerable 
amounts of agricultural credit. 
D. Defects and Contradictions 
It must be noted that agricultural collectivization was 
not successful in many aspects. Althou^ farm output in 
aggregate increased at a rate of more than twice that of 
population during 1955-57, production of food grains failed in 
1957 to reach the initial target of 30^ over the 1952 level 
(Tables 44 and 45; 450, p. l64). Production of wheat and 
coarse grains actually declined in 1957. Reduction of culti­
vated area and of manure collection in the autumn of 1956 and 
the spring of 1957 might have had a direct adverse effect on 
the 1957 harvest. This slackening rate of agricultural growth 
during 1957 directly and indirectly affected the expansion of 
industry, capital formation and national income that year. 
The growth in the agricultural sector during the duration of , 
the First Pive=Year Plan period was dwarfed by the growth of 
modem industry. The gross industrial output grew at a rate 
of 18.3^ during 1953-57, with capital goods at 25.4^ and 
consumer goods at 12.8^ (Table 46; 40, p. 89). This unbal­
anced growth between the industrial and agricultural sectors 
resulted in excess capacity in the former, especially in 
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light industry, which accounted for 80^ of total industrial 
output. For example, the cotton industry in 1956 operated at 
80^ of its capacity due to decreased output of ginned cotton 
(1, p. 22), Compared with the cotton industry, other light 
industries suffered even more as the output of their raw 
materials decreased in 1957 (Table 44). The development of 
the entire national economy was thus affected. 
Unfavorable weather conditions and a lack of capital 
and land certainly retarded agricultural development in the 
period of collectivization. Another cause was the lopsided 
investment in the industrial sector, 
1. Policy of unbalanced growth 
Because industrialization and an increased national power 
are immediate goals of national policy, the communist govern­
ment allocated a large share of national investment to 
industry, mostly heavy industry. Of 55 billion yuan 
invested in 1953-57, 45,5# went to industry; 16,4# to trans­
port and communications; and only 7.6# to agriculture, 
forestry and water conservation (40, pp. 55-61; cf. 24, p. 
286, 149, p. 372). 
Investment in light and heavy industries accounted for 
15# and 85#, respectively, of that in industry (40, p. 6l), 
The regime also allocated a great number of skilled 
techniciems to modern industry and gave preferential wages 
to its workers. As a result, industry mushroomed. It led 
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Some economists to predict that by 1962 Communist China 
would have concluded its take-off and entered the stage of 
sustained growth in the Rostow sense (126, p. 80), 
Agriculture remained the weak link of the national 
economy partly because of the low investment allocated to it 
by the state in relation to cultivated land. Many APC's felt 
the capital pinch. It is true that the capital supplied 
annually by the government to agriculture doubled during the 
1952 to 1957 period. However, the capital allocation seemed 
negligible when distributed over the vast area of culti­
vated land. Capital investment per mou was only 1.7 yuan 
in 1955 and 1.9 yuan in 1957 (Table 21; 40, pp. 170-171). 
One of the most important routes to increased produc­
tion is the use of more chemical fertilizers. Studies in 
different regions conclude that application of one catty of 
chemical fertilizer will, under normal conditions, yield 
3.5 catties of food grains or one catty of cotton (318, p. 
7). Quantities of chemical fertilizer supplied by the 
industrial sector have been small, considering the vast 
arable land in China. It is true that compared with the 
1952 level, chemical fertilizer supplied to agriculture 
was increased by 5 times in 1957. However, the amount of 
chemical fertilizer applied to each mou of cultivated area 
and sown area was small. It was 2.3 catties per cultivated 
mou in 1957, as compared with 72 catties for a corresponding 
unit of land in Japan in 1952 (Table 21; 318, p. 7). 
108 
* 
Table €1. Capital goods supplied to agriculture 
Total amount^ Chemical ferti 
Million Yuan per Yuan per Total supply Catties Cat 
Yuan culti­ sown 1,000 tons per mou pel 
vated area for area foi 
area cultivated are 
1950 730 0.5 
1951 1,030 0.7 
1952 1,410 0.9 0.7 318 0.4 0 
1953 1,920 1.2 0.9 592 0.7 0 
1954 2,500 1.5 1.1 802 1.0 0 
1955 2,820 1.7 1.2 1,255 1.5 1 
1956 3,700 2.2 1.5 1,608 1.9 1 
1957 . 3,260 1.9 1.4 1,944 2.3 1 
1958 6,680 4.1 2.8 2,708 3.3 2 
1959 8,148 2,745 
i960 11,000 4 
(planned) 
1961 
1962 5 
1963 
*Source; 40, pp. 170-171; 78; 79; 103, d. 15; 156, p. 19; 18 
p. 4; 222, p. 5; 227, p. 4; 254; 318, p. 7; 3^9; 44 
^Includes chemical fertilizer, insecticide, insecticide spra 
machines, etc. 
^During 196O-61, machinery for irrigation increased by 3,300 
is estimated by halving this increment. 
* 
ire 
Chemical fertilizer 
pply Catties 
ons per mou 
for area 
Catties 
per mou 
for sown 
cultivated area 
Domestic 
production 
(1,000 tons) 
Machinery for irrigation 
and drainage 
Capacity Area covered 
(thousand Thousand As % of 
horse- mou culti-
power vated 
area 
0.4 0.3 194 127 
0.7 0.5 
1.0 0.7 160-176 5,500-
5,700 
0.3 
1.5 1.1 426 220 8,300 0.5 
1.9 1.3 663 500 5,850 0.3 
2.3 1.6 750 563 45,291 2.7 
3.3 2.3 960 1,600 
1,510 3,380 100,000 6.2 
4.3 2,000 
2,000+ 
5,030* 
6,680 
168,169 
0
 
0
 
1—I 
5.3 
0
 0
 
0
 0
 
0
 7,000 
100,000 
15; 156, p. 19; 185; 186; 187; 189; 206, pp. 13-15; 213; 221, 
318, p. 7; 349; 447, p. 46; Table l6. 
3, insecticide sprayers, two-wheeled share ploughs and power 
increased by 3,300 thousand horsepower. The figure for I96O 
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During the collectivization period, the area under 
irrigation expanded greatly, both in absolute terms and in 
relation to cultivated area. But, the portion irrigated and 
drained by machinery remained small in this period. It was 
less thatn 2,7% in early 1957 (Table 21). Therefore, produc­
tion on most farm land was vulnerable to the extreme 
variation in weather. 
The modest attempt at agricultural semi-mechanization 
also failed because China's agricultural machinery industry 
was still underdeveloped. Owing to the low base in 1952, 
power machines supplied to agriculture in 1957 were 20 times 
greater than in 1952 and two-wheeled share ploughs provided 
in 1956 were too heavy for draft animals to draw and also 
proved unsuitable for the wet soils of China. At this time, 
Japan had already for many years mass-produced efficient 
power cultivators for wet paddy fields and many other types 
of agricultural machines. 
China has allocated most of its capital to heavy 
industry, which requires little unskilled labor as a comple­
mentary input. A large proportion of the labor force there­
fore remained in the countryside. As capital and land 
were scarce in rural areas and collective farms were not 
experienced in developing a diversified economy, surplus 
labor remained the most serious problem to be solved. In 
many areas, more than 30% of the labor force was unused 
in 1955-56 (102, p. 90). Female labor was particularly 
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underemployed. In 20 out of 24 provinces and regions, women 
laborers worked less than 74 labor days a year in 1955 and 
contributed less than 31.7^ of total labor days in each 
locality (Table 2 2 ) ,  
As a result of the economic policies described above and 
a lack of land and water resources, agricultural productivity 
in Communist China remained relatively low. About 70,^ of 
APC's in 1957 recorded per mou yield of farm products lower 
than that of the upper middle peasants (cf. p. 94). Accord­
ing to the survey of 5038 APC's in thirteen Hsiens of 
Chekiang province, 67.6^ of APC's registered output per mou 
lower than that of the well-to-do peasants and l6.5^ of 
them approximated that level (192, pp. 59-65). For the 
nation as a whole, yield per mou of rice, like other farm 
products, has increased since the founding of the Communist 
government; however, up to 1957 it had not reached the 1932 
level of 366 catties per mou (10, p. 78). Compared with 
other countries, the low productivity of Chinese agriculture 
becomes much more apparent. In 1957, yield per mou of rice 
in China was less than a half that of Spain in 1956; wheat, 
less than a quarter achieved by Denmark and Holland in 
1952; and cotton, a half that recorded in Egypt in 1953 
(Table 23; cf, I67, p. 294). 
Measures to expand farm production through the 
efficient use of abundant labor therefore becomes the main 
Ill 
Table 22. Utilization of female labor, 1955* 
Labor days Provinces Percentage of labor 
accomplished and days contributed by 
each year regions female labor 
More than 75 Honan, Kwantung, Kwangsi, 
Yunnan 
34.7 
50-74 days Tsinghai, Kansu, Kiangsu, 
Anhwei, Pukien, Hupeh, 
Szechwan, Kwei chou 
31.7 
25-49 days Hopei, Shansi, Shensi, 
Shangtung, Chekiang, Hunan, 
Kiangsi 
16.5 
Less than 24 Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, 
Kirin, Heilungkiang, Sinkiang 
11.0 
*Source; 4o5, p. 6. 
concern in the agricultural sector. In this regard, the 
Draft National Programme for Agricultural Development was 
first proposed in January, 1956. Experiments were then 
initiated to search for means of increasing productivity. 
After two revisions, the final Programme was adopted on 
April,10, i960, by the Second Session of the Second 
National People's Congress (l8^). In October, 1958, mea­
sures to increase farm output were further dramatized by 
Mao Tse-tung in the "eight-point charter" for agricultural 
development.^ Exploration for the most efficient combina­
tion of measures to increase farm output has been a major 
^See section A5 of Chapter X. 
Il2 
Table 23. International comparison of yield per mou of agricultural 
Nation Year Catties Nation Year Cattie 
per mou per mo; 
Rice Wheat 
Spain 1956 776 Denmark 1952 542 
Italy 1952 713 Holland 1952 532 
Japan 1955 642 United 
Kingdom 1952 447 
China 1957 359 China 1957 114 
Soybeans Ground nuts 
U.S.A. 1955 195 Japan 1955 241 
Japan 1955 176 U.S.A. 1956 173 
China 1957 106 China 1957 143 
* 
Source: 9, P. 78; Table 47; 1, p. 21. 
3r mou of agricultural products* 
Year Catties 
per mou 
Nation Year Catties 
per mou 
Wheat 
1952 
1952 
1952 
1957 
rround nuts 
1955 
1956 
1957 
5^2 
532 
#7 
114 
241 
173 
143 
Japan 
China 
Food grain (Average) 
1957 
U.S.S.R. 
Egypt 
Peru 
Mexico 
China 
Ginned Cotton 
193^ 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1957 
640 
204 
93 
76 
73 
62 
38 
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concern of the nation In the Second and Third Five-Year 
plans. 
2. Deficiency In leadership 
The low rate of agricultural growth has also been 
attributed to a lack of leadership In the collectivization 
movement. As shown In Tables 6 and 7» many peasants joined 
advanced APC's without going through the stage of elementary 
ones. The rapid expansion of collective farms runs directly 
against the original Idea of gradual and orderly transfor­
mation of rural areas, as conceived by the Communist 
leaders In charge of rural works (25» p. 178). It created 
difficulties for the leadership at both the local and 
national. 
Loss of land ownership caused uneasiness among poor 
peasants who had acquired their Isuid only three years 
previously through mass trials, and also created unrest a-
mong the well-to-do peasants who relied for their personal 
comforts and security on land ownership. However, it was 
contended that the loss of land ownership would not have 
such adverse effects on poor peasants if their economic 
welfare could be improved. If peasants under the pressure 
of poverty and starvation, it was argued, committed 
infanticide In the pre-communist period, it would not be 
so difficult for them to accommodate to the new system 
which might improve their living conditions (104, pp. 54-
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55). 
The swift expansion of advanced APC* s also begot new 
y 
problems to national planners, who have had little experiences 
in economic planning. The shortage of basic data concerning 
the agricultural sector made it difficult for the national 
planning agency to map out a production plan which would 
match local conditions and serve the needs of each collective 
faim and its members. Nor was the planning agency able to 
contrive a plan which would guarantee an adequate and timely 
supply of means of production to meet the needs of col­
lective farms. 
However, the greatest difficulty of the collective 
farms was the insufficiency of competent leadership at the 
local level. When the number of APC's was still less than 
634 thousands in 1955» there already was emerging an insuf­
ficiency of cadres in the countryside. Oiere were 4,180,000 
party members and members of the Communist Youth League, 
2,060,000 of them were party members. The APC's managed 
and guided by party maabers numbered 550 thousands, about 
86.8# of the total, while those managed by members of 
Communist Youth League numbered 60 thousands, 9.7# of the 
total. But, 20 thousands of APG*s, about 3.5# had neither 
manbers of the Communist party or of the Communist Youth 
League, (404, pp. 12-13). When the number of APC's increased 
to more than 78O thousand in June, 1957, shortage of party 
cadres became graver. The role of party cadres in local 
i 
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administration is critical because institutionally they are 
in charge of all activities at local levels. 
The majority of party cadres working in rural areas 
were new members of the Oommunist Party who lacked, both the 
Communist spirit and administrative experience. According 
1 
to Liu Shao-Ghi's statement on June, 1961, 80^ of the exist­
ing 17 million party members had. joined, the party since 
1949, and 70^ since 1953 (387» P. 343; 1^7, P. 19; cf. 148, 
p. 110). At the local level, the proportion of new party 
members should, be higher as most of the veteran party members 
worked at top echelons. 
These new members were more concerned, with personal 
"fame", position and material compensation than with 
struggle for socialist construction, lamented. Hu Yao-Pang, 
Head of Communist Youth League in April, 1957 (74, pp. 8-
9). Disputes among the collective leaders and. the rank and. 
file members were usual. In order to raise their personal 
position, some party cadres had collective farms formed under 
party decree and violence, instead of through education and 
the persuasion processes. Bureaucracy, dogmatism, indolence 
and corruption prevailed in many APC's (I68, pp. 59-60). 
Strikes, conflicts with the cadres and withdrawals from APC's 
occurred in many places. Most of incidents, it was said, were 
due to the lack of competence on the part of party cadres 
(415, pp. 15-16; 417, pp. 9-11). 
Purtheimore, a good political cadre might not be 
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effective in planning and management of collective economic 
activities, such as production, accumulation and distribution 
of output. There was also lack of accountants, technicians 
and management personnel in the APC*s, but the extent of 
shortage was not given. ®ie administrative cost of advanced 
APC's at 2.1# of their gross revenue in 1956 was much higher 
than the 0.5# criterion set by regulation (Table 8; 170, p. 
23). 
In order to correct the mistakes of party cadres and 
improve the management of Ji|W*s, a "rectification campaign" 
inside the party was launched in May, 1957» side by side 
with the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, which allowed the 
public to criticize the party leadership. During the cam­
paign, as many as a million party members, about a tenth of 
the total, were put on probation (387, pp. 343-44). 
3» Institutional "contradictions" 
As local leadership was not highly competent in guiding 
collective farms and peasants were not sufficiently well 
indoctrinated with the socialist spirit, conflicts of 
economic interests among collective bodies and individual 
peasants prevailed# It must be noted that the Communist 
leaders do not consider these conflicts or contradictions in 
the Communist terms, antagonistic in nature, but only fric­
tions among people who support the cause of socialism. 
According to party doctrine these contradictions, if properly 
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channeled, will be the prime mover of all advancements (168, 
p. 8). Discussion of these contradictions follows. 
1 
a. Contradictions between the state and collective farm 
i 
In order to achieve socialist industrialization in the 
shortest possible time, the state, on behalf of the long-
term interests of the entire nation, would levy on APC's in­
creasingly high levels of taxation to be used for capital 
accumulation, and also require APC*s to make available land 
and corve'e for construction of highways, railways, large 
water conservation projects and other public works which 
cut across several APC's or counties. But the APC*s, 
especially those poor in resources, preferred to use their 
resources for their direct benefits. Compared with the 
individual farmers, members of APC's surrendered to the state 
a higher percentage of their products in taxes. The state, 
in order to maintain the agricultural prices in urban areas 
at a constant level, required AFC*s to deliver more food 
grains at a low price while APC* s sought to deliver less 
at a high price. Some APC's therefore resorted to under­
reporting their grain production. Continuous discrepancy in 
prices and incomes of agricultural and other sectors also 
resulted in conflicts between peasants and city workers and 
encouraged an exodus of the rural population to urban areas 
as the latter offered better opportunities. 
The state sometimes required specific APC* s to grow 
more industrial crops and less food grains than the latter 
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preferred, or vice versa, In hope of developing a diversified 
economy in each area and balancing the supply and demand of 
agricultural products for the nation as a whole. Some APC's 
serving their own interests, simply disregarded the request 
of the national plan and grew what they wanted. Thus the 
political base of the regime was weakened. Rapid develop­
ment of APC's as well as combination of several villages 
into one created more confusion concerning the Jurisdiction 
of the local state agency and the management committee of 
the APC in the same district. 
b. Contradictions among various collective economies 
In addition to conflicts between the state and APC*s differ­
ent APC*s sometimes disputed among themselves their jurisdic­
tion of water resources, forests and land, and their right to 
use the scanty water and reclaim, the cultiva table land. The 
APC* s also were in conflict with the handicraft cooperatives 
and factories over the supply of raw materials emd their mar­
keting areas; with marketing cooperatives over purchasing 
means of production for farming and selling products of APC* s 
and with credit cooperatives over extending loans for inveslaaent. 
c. Conflicts within the APC There were within the 
APC conflicts in the distribution of output between consump­
tion and accumulation, allocation of collective funds and the 
labor force, arrangement of private plots, and the operation 
of subsidiary occupations. Conflicts also developed in at­
tempting to balance the immediate and the long-run Interests 
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of the APC*s members. The cessation of APC's compensation 
payment to the former landowners and payment of a small com­
pensation to collectivized capital and draught animais had 
at least upset those members who were formerly well-to-do. 
Some passive resistance In the form of decreasing work, 
destruction of public properties, and slaughter of livestock 
occurred occasionally. ' 
In order to Increase the efficiency of resource 
utilization and promote the rapid expansion of the advanced 
APC, the management committee of the APC sought to bring a 
wide scope of economic activity under Its unified control. 
This extension of control Impinged upon the functions of 
party cadres at the level of production brigades and teams. 
When the APC was so large as to compose several villages, 
conflicts developed between the rich and poor villages. 
The economic Interests of the skilled al^% diverged from 
that of the unskilled members. As It Is difficult to 
organize generally acceptable wage rates for different 
kinds of work, the principle of "to each according to his 
labor" as adopted In the APC*s did not effectively eliminate 
these contradictions. For these different reasons, some 
160,000 peasant households In the province of Kwangtung, 
for example, were reported to have applied for withdrawal 
In the winter of 1956 (32, p. 36). 
When, in late 195^ and 1957, the government finally 
allowed a wide range of farm products to be traded in the 
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market, tho^se well-to-do peasants who were then not members 
of APC*s profited greatly from transactions in farm products. 
ISiis brought further adverse effects on APC* s members. 
1 
The third kind of institutional contradictions, i.e., 
contradictions within the APC, was to be resolved by the 
rectification campaign and the consolidation of the APC* s 
structure. The rectification campaign, which was first 
introduced in China in 1942, was aimed at bringing about 
unity among people through the process of criticism, per­
suasion, and education. The directive concerning the 
consolidation of APC*s by the Central Committee of Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) issued on September 14, 1957 (313» 
pp. 517-18) demanded the scaling down of over-sized APC* s 
and adherence to the principle of a unified planning and 
decentralized management in the APC* s. These were common 
practices of many APC*s during 1957 (430, p. 86). Special 
rewards were also given to experienced and skilled veteran 
workers to stimulate their work effort. 
However, enhancement of quality of party cadres and 
strengthening of socialist consciousness of peasants could 
not resolve difficulties created by the economic policy of 
unbalsmced growth nor by the first two types of institutional 
contradictions. These require a change in socio-economic 
institutions as well as a change in economic policy. In 
1957 the industrial sector was called to support the 
agricultural sector in increasing production. Local govern-
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ments were also urged to operate a wide range of small-
scale industries to meet the local needs. Biese measures 
nevertheless failed to effect the desired results. Follow­
ing the movement of the #great leap forward" endorsed by the 
Ei^th National People's Congress in the spring of 1958, 
Liu Shao-Chij on the behalf of the Party Central Committee, 
further proposed on May 5, 1958, the "general line of 
building socialism" by exerting the utmost efforts and pres­
sing ahead consistently to achieve "greater, faster, better 
and more economical results." (73)* The movements of the 
big leap forward and of the general line of socialist con­
struction were supported by the OOP official adoption of 
initiating people's communes on August 29, I958 (228). This 
completed the celebrated "three red banners" of China's 
socialist construction. One month later, more than 98^ of 
the rural population was organized into 26,425 communes (40, 
p. 43; 402, p. 23) and communization was virtually accomplished. 
By the end of 1958 the number pf communes increased to 
26,578, comprised 99^ of the rural population. 
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VIII. CHARACTERISTICS OF RURAL COMMUNES 
IN THE EARLY STAGE 
As discussed in the last chapter, there were, in the 
course of collectivization, defects undesired by the Cimmunist 
leaders. Remedying these defects necessitated changes in 
policy and institutions. The most of 1957 witnessed a 
contraction of excessively large APC*s, but in April, 1958, 
there emerged new rural institutions of immense size, 
called the People's Communes (cf. 381, p. 3). The name "the 
people's commune" was actually adopted in June, 1958, by 
Ifao Tse-tung and the Central Committee for a huge rural 
organization set up at Chayashan in Suiping Hslen, Hbnan in 
April, 1958. This new institution combined 27 advanced APC's 
with 9*369 households into a single unit, originally called 
Weihsing (Sputnik) Cooperative (228, p. 34; 63, p. 41). The 
establishment of the people's communes could be characterized 
as the culmination of socialization in rural China which 
started with the founding of the Communist regime. For 
example, the first sprout of the people's commune was in 
Ma-Yi Isle, Chekiang. As early as in 1954 this Isle had 
already combined four kinds of cooperatives (fishery, APC's, 
supply and marketing, and credit) into one large unit, merged 
the administration of its industry, agriculture, fishery, 
trading, education and military affairs, and so accomplished 
the integration of its "superstructure" and economic base. 
Structurally, the new organization already possessed all the 
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essentials of the people's oommime (U?; 237), During the 
period 1955 to early 1958» many APC*s in the provinces of 
Mhwei, Honan, Liaoning and Szechwan also possessed some 
features of the people's commune (I98, p. 1; 228, pp. 31-34; 
243, p. 42; 344, p. 18). In order to grasp the underlying 
reasons contributing to the rapid proliferation of rural 
communes in 1958» it will be helpful to discuss in order the 
basic features of the people's commune in its early stage, 
significant events related to the evolution of the commune, 
and then the structural advantages of the commune from the 
viewpoint of the communist leaders. 
A. Defining Two Stages of the Commune System 
Discussing the basic features of the commune requires 
the definition of different stages in the development of the 
commune. Since the Central Committee of CCP decided in 
August, 1958, to establish the people's commune all over 
China, the commune system had made many adjustments. 
Althou^ regulations of the Weihsing (Sputnik) Commune were 
recommended as patterns for other communes, the definite 
pattern of the commune system to be fashioned in the Chinese 
countryside was not mapped out until August, 1959» The 
exact form of the rural commune in each locality before 
August, 1959» was actually a function of the physical 
conditions of that area and the manipulations of the local 
party cadres. Q5ie CCP resolution on the establishment of 
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the rural commune has never been enacted as a law, nor 
promulgated as an administrative directive by the State 
Council. 
Economists might divide the development of the commune 
system into various stages on the basis of changes in its 
ownership system, distribution system, policy on private 
plots, or the commune planning authorities. Efowever, the 
structural change of the commune system is a continuous pro­
cess; it is not easy to divide the process into meaningful 
stages, nor possible to draw clear-cut demarcation lines 
between them. As will be shown in the next chapter, the 
development of the commune system was closely related to the 
policies of the "great leap forward" and "general line" of 
socialist construction. % establish stages of the commune 
development certainly should take chsuiges in these policies 
into account. In August 1959» Chinese communists admitted 
that the commune system was not able to help achieve a "great 
leap forward" in faim production. The "great leap forward", 
"general line" of socialist construction and the commune 
system entered into a new phase. G3ie month of August, 
1959» was thus used in this study to mark the termination of 
the phase of trial and error and the beginning of the period 
of reason and adjustment. "The first period was characterized 
by its vigor and single-mindedness, the second, by retreat 
and caution. The institutional arrangement, ownership system, 
and distribution system of the communes also were clearly 
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distinct between these two periods. 
The following sections will discuss the basic features 
of the rural communes before August, 1959. The discussion 
will proceed in order of organization and functions of the 
commune, its ownership and distribution systems, and finally 
its relation with the state, 
B. Organization and Function 
The establishment of rural communes usually took three 
forms: (1) the combining of a state farm with its neighboring 
APC's and the instituting of a new rural organization; (2) 
placing agricultural research institutes and local factories 
under the control of the newly established commune, and (3) 
merging several kinds of cooperatives into a large economic 
unit to form a commune. The most commonly adopted process of 
commune formation was the third one, that is to say, the 
establishment of the commune usually commenced with a combi­
nation of different kinds of cooperatives already in operation 
in that area, such as APC's, credit coops, supply and 
marketing coops, handicraft coops and/or transportation coops. 
This newly combined economic unit was soon integrated 
with the local state organ and the unity of "superstructure" 
and "economic base" at the local level was thus accomplished. 
In this integrated unit, the population was organized along 
military lines and worked with a combat spirit, with means of 
production and consumption basically controlled by the 
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communes. 
The rural commune evolved into a unique administrative 
unit in each locality and was responsible for the following 
tasks: (1) the all-round development of agricultural activi­
ties, such as farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline 
occupations and fishing; (2) a unified administration of 
I 
industry, agriculture, trading, culture and education, and 
military affairs; (3) the collective management of family 
consumption activities by operating mess halls, housing, 
kindergartens, nurseries, "happy homes" for the aged, sewing 
and barber shops, public baths, libraries, clinics and 
hospitals, theatres, etc, (228, pp. 2-3). In essence, the 
rural commune could be considered as a rural development 
region aimed at promoting production in agriculture and 
industry by coordinating productive forces. 
However, to maintain the morale of commune members, 
establishment of the commune was to be carried out on a 
voluntary and democratic basis as was stipulated in the period 
of collectivization. Repeated propaganda, debate and 
criticism were conducted under the guidance and encouragement 
of party cadres until the socialist consciousness and 
"subjective activism"^ of the masses were aroused and peasants 
joined "voluntarily" in the commune (228, pp. 4 and 15). 
^According to the thinking of Chinese Communists, 
"activism" here will be better defined as the attitude of 
"daring to think, daring to speak, and daring to act" for the 
communist cause. 
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In the establishment of the oommwie, stress was placed 
on the principle of relying on the poor and lower-middle 
peasants and uniting with the majority of the upper-middle 
peasants who favored it (228, pp. 4-^). These groups had 
been the supporters of agrarian transformation. According to 
the regulations of Sputnik Commune in Suiping Hsien, Honan, 
persons who are over 16 years old are eligible for full 
membership, but former landlords, rich peasants and counter­
revolutionaries will only be accepted as unofficial members 
who have no right to vote, or to be elected to administra­
tive posts (228, p. 62). The communization movement, it 
appeared, sought to eliminate the well-to-do middle peasants 
as a class. 
Although the people were organized along military 
lines and lived a "collective life" in the commune, it does 
not mean that people lived ii^military barracks. The simple 
conjugal family with its size smaller than the traditioneuL, 
survived. Married couples, their unmarried children and the 
aged of each family still lived together (72, p. 65; 100, p. 
346; 381, p. 8). Ihe change of family system in rural China 
could be considered as an extension of that in urban areas 
which started at the end of the 19th century aind accelerated 
after the founding of the Communist regime. The exercise 
of military discipline with its emphasis on the combat 
spirit of peasants was mainly aimed at increasing mobility 
and interchangeability of manpower in different kinds of 
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production activities and national security. It was hoped 
that the rural population would be as disiplined as industrial 
workers. Men aged between 16 and 30 and women between 1? and 
22 were organized into militias and used as the labor shock 
force in emergencies to work against floods and droughts, 
and save crops from the sudden attacks of natural forces. 
The commune typically comprises three levels of admin­
istrative units: commune management committe, production 
brigade and production team. However, it has only two levels 
in a small commune, i.e., the commune management committee 
and the production brigade. In the early stage of the 
commune formation, the party was mainly concerned with the 
establishment of the management committee and the communal 
organization at the upper level rather than with immediate 
structural change at the lower levels. %e management 
committee made the operating plan, controlled the use and 
distribution of resources, and directed other activities of 
the collective body in accordance with the policy decided 
by the congress of the commune, which was the chief govern­
ing body of the commune. The routine affairs of the 
commune were actually handled by its director and his 
deputies. The communsLl plan for production is a subplan 
of the national plan, according to the adopted principle 
of centralized planning and decentralized management 
(73, pp. 50-55; 228). Under the management committee, 
there are several departments and commissions responsible 
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for various specified works, such as planning, farming, 
industry, communications, finance, and culture, etc. 
In the early stage of the commune system, the units 
directly in charge of production were the production brigades, 
the former advanced APC's. ®ie production brigade was also 
called the administrative district or the work zone. The 
production brigade also served as a basic unit for economic 
calculation or simply called the accounting unit and checked 
the economic efficiency of the commune production activities. 
Theoretically, the authority of economic calculation and of 
production planning should be placed with the same unit. 
But it was not necessarily true in many communes. The 
production brigades pledged to the commune accomplishment 
of certain production targets with a fixed labor consump­
tion and cost. The production brigade would receive 
rewards whenever it had fulfilled or overfulfilled the 
pledged quotas. 
Each production brigade elected its own council and 
the councils of various brigades constituted the commune 
congress. A production brigade in turn consisted of 
several production teams, which were the former elementary 
APC*s or brigades in the advanced APC*s (72, p. 67). The 
production team was the basic unit for organizing labor, 
land and small farm tools in production. 
In its August, 1958, resolution, the Central Party 
had no definite idea about the size of the commune to be 
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formed. Generally, it depended upon the local topographical 
conditions and the needs for developing production. As a 
result, the size of the communes varied widely (cf. Table 33). 
"July 1" People's Commune, the first commune established in 
the suburb of Shanghai on September 21, 1958» for example, 
encompassed more than 22,000 households and 100,000 inhabi­
tants (97» p. 1). The party Central Committee neither 
openly opposed nor encouraged the establishment of the 
commune with more than 10,000 households, but it recommended 
that a commune with approximately 2,000 households would 
be appropriate. It meant to set up a commune to one hsiang 
(equivalent to one township). The commune management 
committee and the hsiang people's council would thus fuse 
into one entity (228, pp. 4 and 85). According to Barnett's 
investigation of rural organization in the vicinity of 
Chung-king in 1948, each hsiang was an integrated economic 
region (12, p. 122); therefore, the establishment of one 
commune to a hsiang might be proper. However the excessive 
enthusiasm of local cadres extended the scale of rural 
communes to compose, on the average, 5*000 households, two 
and a half times that of the recommended level. 
In addition to hsiang communes, there were the hsien 
(county) federation of communes and-the hsien (county) 
communes. The county commune, an integrated unit of the 
county people* s government and a commune with its size 
extending over the whole county, functioned fundamentally 
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like the hsians commune. A hsien commune might be so large 
as to cover 39 hsiangs with 260,000 population (120, pp. 
156-157)» Existence of the hsien communes could be inferred 
from the fact that there were only 26,578 communes at the 
end of 1958 while hsianss and townships numbered 102,582 in 
1957 (153, p. 17). %e county federation of communes was 
not a basic unit of local administration but an agency for 
coordinating aiitf directing the activities of hsiang communes 
(228, p. 59). Hsien federation of communes was considered 
as the first step for the transition from the collective 
ownership toward the ownership by the whole people. In 
December, 1958, the Party Central suggested the establish­
ment of the commune federations and expansion of their 
share in total means of production wherever the economic 
conditions and political consciousness of the masses had 
improved (72, pp. 21-23). 
Table 24 shows that on the average, the scale of a 
commune, in terms of its participating households, labor 
force and cultivated land, was 30 times as large as a 
collective farm and more than 100 times as large as an 
elementary APC in 1955* Between August, 1958, and about 
the end of 1959f the commune tended to expand its scale, as 
shown in Tables 24- and 25. The average number of house­
holds in both communes and production brigades increased 
while the number of production brigades and production 
teams declined. Paralleling the expanding size of the 
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Table 24. Comparison of the scale of a commune with others^ 
Private 
farms 
Elementary 
APC, 
Advanced 
APC, 
Sts 
fai 
Unit 1954 1955^ 1955^ 19! 
Collective enterprises 
in rural China 1,000 633 0.529 2.2 
Households in each 1 1 31.2 115.7 
Labor force Man 2.4 69 236 
Common funds^ Yuan 2,084 19,627 
Cultivated area Mou 15.8 555 1,747 2,6 
Tractors 15 h.p. 
unit 1 
Combine harvester Unit 0 
Draft animals Head 13.1 33.6 25 
^Source; 394, p. 31; 4o5, po. 6-8; 63 cited in 10, p. 70; Ta 
341, p. 14; 381, p. 18; 254; 72, p. 3. 
^Common funds here include reserve funds, welfare funds, uni 
and advanced receipts of various items. 
^Except for the number of elementary and a.dvanced APC's show 
of a sample survey of 26,733 elementary APC's and 202 advan 
^Except for the number of advanced APC's in the country, oth 
228 APC's. 
le with others* 
itary Advanced state Advanced Advanced Rural ( commune 
1 
J APC, farm APC, APC, December Spring 
1955^ 1955 1957° 1958 spring 1958 i960 
33 0.529 2.242 668 740 26.5 24.0+ 
.2 115.7 337 170 5,000 5,000 
)9 236 47 667 350 10,000 10,000 
34 19,627 66,895 
>5 1,747 2,640 5,596 2,000+ 60,000 64,000 
1.8 
0.3 
,1 33.6 25.9 l4o 
;ecL in 10, p. 70; Tables 6 sjid 7; 312, p. 472; 391, pp. 8 and 10; 
p. 3. 
welfare funds, unrefunded loans, outstanding investment of members 
advanced APC's shovm on the first row, other data are the result 
APC's and 202 advanced APC's. 
in the country, other figures are the result of a model survey of 
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Table 25, Change 
units* 
in the scale of commune and its subordinate 
End of 
1958 
August 
1959 
End of 
1961 
End of 
1962 
Total rural 
communes in China Unit 26,578 24,000 50,000 74,700 
Households in 
each commune Unit 4,637 5,000 2,465 1,800 
Total production 
brigades 1,000 740 500 700 672 
Production brigades 
in each commune Unit 27.8 20.8 14.0 9 
Households in 
each brigade Unit 166 240 176 200 
Total production 
teams 1,000 M 3,000 4,600 5,602 
Production teams 
in each commune Iftiit 125 92 75 
Production teams 
in each brigade Unit 6.0 6.6 8.3 
Households in 
each team Unit 40 27 24 
*Source: 40, p. 43; 10, p. 97; 240; 409, P. 97. 
commune was the Increasing size and decreasing number of 
county (hsien)» The number of counties decreased from 2,084 
in 1957 to 1,747 in 1958 (156* P. 17)• These trends actually-
had been underway since the founding of Red China. In 1961, 
the number of counties under various provinces was compiled 
in China News Analysis. Hiose provinces for which 
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relatively complete data were available showed a continuous 
decline in the number of their counties (36, pp. 4-5). 
C. Ownership 
Although private ownership was to be eliminated in the 
near future, the Central Committee, in comparison with local 
cadres, was more realistic in approaching this goal. It 
suggested that the immediate target was to put all means of 
production, not including means of livelihood, under the 
collective ownership of the commune (72, p. 19; 381, p. l4). 
Some communes, such as the Red Flag Commune in Lo-tu Hsien, 
Tsinghai and the Sputnik Commune, had already at their 
initiation turned over to the collective ownership of the 
communes most of the privately owned means of production, 
for example, land, house sites, draught animals, major farm 
implements, orchards and forests, etc. The vice-chairman 
of the State Planning Commission, Lo Keng-mo, further 
contended that the communes had labor along with other means 
of production under its collective ownership (435» p. 4l). 
But the principle of "to each according to his labor" 
adopted in the communes appears to recognize the indivi­
duality of each laborer and thus negates his contention. 
The members were still allowed to own their means of 
livelihood (including-houses, clothing, bedding and 
furniture), small farm tools, bank accounts, government 
bonds, share funds in the commune, scattered trees around 
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their houses, and a small number of domestic animals and 
fowl (228, p. 63; 229, PP. 21 and 47; 72, p. 53). Although 
still registered in the name of their owners, the share 
funds, according to the regulations of the Sputnik Commune, 
bears no interest and cannot be withdrawn when the members 
move away or die (228, p. 63). As the initiation of the 
commune corresponded to the busy season of autumn harvest, 
cultivation and planting, the Central Committee in its 
Peitaiho resolution in August, 1958, suggested that problems 
of private plots of land, scattered trees and share funds 
in the communes did not need to be resolved in a hurry 
(228, p. 6). 
Then at the Wuchang meeting in December, 1958, the 
Central Committee publicly announced that means of 
livelihood originally owned by members and their bank 
deposits would remain private property after they joined 
the communes and would permanently belong to them. During 
the high tide of cooperative amalgamation and communization 
in 1958, the commune members in some communes or equiva­
lents were still allowed to grow vegetables and raise 
livestock in the private plots. The size of private plots, 
for example, was 0.3 mou for each individual in Tai-Yang 
Sheng and Kang-Ching Tzu, but only 0.1 mou in Chien Yang 
(198, pp. 4-5). The commune members were, in December, 
1958, "officially" allowed to engage in some family side­
line occupations on the condition that their participation 
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- in the collective labor was not hampered (72, p. 53)* 
Private plots, not more than 5^ of the commune* s cultivated 
land, was granted for private uses in April, 1959* However, 
the regime hoped to promote communal production and income, 
and improve the members* economic position. When this was 
achieved, the members would no longer need these private 
plots. Thus all properties would eventually be handed over 
to public ownership and management (72, pp. 11-13)• 
It must be noted that the commune could, with the 
consent of the owner, use the privately owned houses when 
they were not occupied (381, p. 14). Gflie private plot, like 
the family sideline occupations, possesses elements of both 
individual economy and socialism. The private plot possesses 
elements of individual economy, because (1) its operation 
emphasizes the individual role; (2) the farm tools used 
in the private plot were small and privately owned; (3) 
it is cultivated by the individual in the leisure time 
and holidays; (4) the fruits of the private plot belong 
to the individual and are mainly used to meet the family 
needs (365# P. 35)• It is socialist, because it was 
collectively owned by the commune or by the production 
prigade in the later period, not by the individual m.ember. 
The private plot in the commune therefore is different from 
that in the collective farm wherein it was privately owned. 
G3ie members only have the right to use it permanently, but 
not to sell or loan the plot to others. Still, some of 
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the products from private plots, such as grains, cotton and 
oil seeds, must be sold to the state purchase boards. Other 
products, such as tobacco, tea, hogs and eggs, can be sold 
in the market only when the quotas of state purchase have 
been fulfilled. Finally, the time spent by members on the 
private plot is restricted. 
The collective ownership of major means of production 
for agricultural production implies that the commune at 
the present state was still socialist in nature. However, 
it contained elements of communism. For example, the 
local industries and banks which were placed under the 
management of communes were still owned by the state, thus 
conceptually by the whole poeple. Some social overhead 
capital constructed by the communes also extended their 
services to the whole people (72, pp. 21-23). The Central 
Committee in August, 1958, hoped to transfer the prevailing 
collective ownership into ownership by the entire people 
within 3 to 6 years (228, p. 7). %e time table for this 
transition to ownership by the people as a whole was, in 
December, 1958, extended to 20 years or more (72). 
A transition of ownership to the whole people does not 
mean an arrival of a communist society. According to the 
Chinese Communists, the communist society requires the 
following conditions: (1) affluent social products, enough 
to eliminate poverty; (2) properties in both industry and 
agriculture owned by the entire people; (3) distribution 
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of income and output on the principle of "to each according 
to his needs"; (4) a high level of communist consciousness; 
(5) a high standard of education and culture for the whole 
people; (6) vanishment of the difference between mental and 
manual labor, between workers and peasants and between 
town and countryside; and (7) fading of the internal function 
of the state power (228, p. 7; 72, pp. 25-27 and 33-35). 
As shown in Figure 1, the commune system at the first 
stage featured collective ownership with the basic owner­
ship at the commune level. 
Figure 1. Possible ownership systems under the people's 
Granted that ownership by the whole people can be 
achieved within 20 years, it will still take more time 
before the society will change from socialism, as implied in 
the above figure, to communism. However, the thijee-level 
ownership had instead been tried in some communes since 
the Chengchow conference in February, 1959. In August, 
1959» the Central Committee declared that three-level 
ownership with basic ownership at the production brigade 
was the prototype of the commune to be fashioned in the 
ensuing years (88, p. 10). Thus the communization entered 
A. 
.ownership 
"Ownership 
r Collective 
"L
[Own
- the whole 
[{Basic ownership at the commune. 
•-[Basic ownership at the brigade. 
B. Communism i-People 
commune. 
"1 
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into a new phase. QJie properties owned by the communes 
from then on consists of: (1) factories and collective 
undertakings operated by the communes, e.g., dining rooms 
and nurseries; (2) reserve funds, components of which are 
drawn each year from profits of the commune-operated 
enterprises, and (3) welfare funds. The total value of 
these properties owned by the communes per se is small 
compared with the total value of wealth within the commune. 
Before the basic ownership of the commune was transferred to 
the teams in 1962, a much smaller portion of wealth, for ex­
ample, orchards and small farm tools, was retained by the 
production teams (88, p. 10; 63, pp. 43-44). The establish­
ment of three-level ownership of the means of production 
was intended to check the trends of excessive centraliza­
tion, equalitarianism and extravagance which had developed 
since the initiation of the commune. Thus the Central 
Committee hoped to provide an incentive to the commune 
members and lead the communes toward the road of "sound 
and consolidated" development. 
D. Distribution 
The distribution system experienced in various communes 
differed widely. ®iis variation was due to the fact that 
the Central Committee had no definite plan in this respect 
and that the physical conditions of various communes 
differed (72, p. 49). One of the striking features of the 
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distribution system found in the majority of rural communes 
was the free supply system, or more exactly, a system 
combining free supply, wages, and rewards. Because of this 
distribution system, the communes were said to contain the 
first shoot of communism, that is, the principle of "to 
each according to his needs." 
As shown in Table 26, goods and service supplied "free" 
ranged from food grain alone, to all goods and services in 
collective dining halls, and finally to seven or ten items 
of daily necessities. Under the system of supplying food 
grains "free", members ate the main course (excluding meat 
and vegetables) at mess halls. The value of "free supply" 
also ranged from 50 to 78^ of the portion of the commune's 
gross income which was allocated to the members. Of the 
1355 communes in the province of Honan at the end of August, 
1958, about 70^ of them implemented free supply systems, 
m 1959» 95.8# of 28,595 production brigades in Honan 
enforced supply systems(Table 27)• However, some communes 
have openly permitted their members to cook at home since 
December, 1958 (72, p. 59; 63, p. 12). 
At the Lushan conference in August, 1959, the Central 
Committee suggested that voluntary participation in mess 
halls was appropriate (88, p. I6). Food grains would be 
delivered to each family that did not participate in the 
mess hall, on the basis of a fixed amount for each individ­
ual. There were, as shovm in Table 27» 5,^62 out of 28,595 
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Table 26. The supply system of five communes In Honan province, ; 
Name of the commune 
Ratio of members' 
allocated portion 
to the commune's 
gross income {%) 
(1) 
Money and goods al: 
(per capits 
] 
Total value 
(yuan) 
( 2 )  
Converted ii 
money (yuan 
(3) 
Sputnik Commune, 
Cha Ya San, 
Suiping Hsien 
Chi-li Yin Commune, 
Hain Shiang 
Liao-Ho Commune, 
Nan Yang Hsien 
Wu-ai Commune, 
Kai Fen Hsien 
Chu-kou Commune, 
An Yang Hsien 
26.9 
20.6 
40.0 
3?.4 
33.0 
57.6 
100.0 
48.2 
66.5 
70 .0  
31.5 
50.0 
28.0 
45.0 
54.8 
^Source; 203, P. 119. 
&"Seven guarantees": meal, clothing, housing, child care, ec 
funeral, 
^"Ten guarantees": seven guarantees plus fuel, haircut, and 
3 In Honan province, 1958* 
Money and goods allocated to members 
(per capita per year) 
Free supplies 
3,1 value Converted In Percentage of total Scope of free 
iman) money (yuan) _ (3) supplies 
( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 5 )  
7.6 31.5 54.7 Food grain 
).o 50.0 50.0 Seven guarantees^ 
3.2 28.0 58.1 Food grain, fuel 
>.5 45.0 67.7 Meal, Medicare 
).0 54.8 78.3 Ten guarantees^ 
)uslng, child care, education, medical treatment, and wedding and 
is fuel, haircut, and recreation facilities. 
* 
Table 2?. Change of the supply system in Honan communes 
End of August, 1958 1959 
Number of^ 
communes Percentage 
Number of 
production 
brigades Percentage 
1 Total 1,355 100.00 28,595 100.0 
2 Implementing the supply 
system plus wages, 
of which; 
942 69.52 27,394 95.8 
Food grain 454 35.50 i3r4ii 46.9 
Meal 197 14.54 8,521 29.8 
Seven or ten 
guarantees 
291 21.48 
Rations of 
necessities 
5,462 19.1 
3 Others 413 30.48 1,201 4.2 
*Source: 203» P« 118; 3^6, p, l6. 
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brigades in Honan implementing this sort of grain rations. 
As compared with more than Zl% in August, 1958, less 
than 4.2# of the total production brigades in Honan employ-
I 
ed a basic wage system. Although a higher percentage of 
brigades practiced the free supply system in 1959» the 
value of free supplies as a percentage of the portion 
allocated to members seemed to decline (Tables 26 and 30; 
346, p, l6; 424). The main reason could be the narrowing 
scope of free supplies in 1959. 
Wages were paid monthly to the commune's members 
according to their credit points or labor days. The 
monthly wage rate for an individual laborer depended on his 
output, and attitude toward work. Table 28 shows that the 
wage scales in different communes varied from five to 
eleven degrees. The difference between the highest and 
the lowest wage rates ranged as high as four to one. 
Usually, the difference in wage rates was lower in the 
communes which did not operate the free supply system. 
These wage scales were generally set at the end of the year 
on the basis of the wage fund, which was the gross income 
of the commune minus the expenses of production and 
management, taxes, welfare funds, and reserve funds. 
Communist leaders hoped that the workpoint or labor day 
system could be replaced eventually by a simple hourly wage 
system, where each member would be paid on the basis of 
days worked regardless of his output. 
1# 
Table 28. The wage system of five communes in Honan Province, 1958^ 
Items covered in Monthly wage so 
Name of the commune the free supply Î 2 3 3 F" 
Red Flag Commune, 
Suan-Miao Shiang, 
Shian Chen Hsien None 6 7 8 9 10 
Sputnik Commune, 
Suiping Hsien Food grain 2. 03 2. 5^ 3. 30 3. 80 4. 57 5.( 
Chao-Ylng Commune, 
Kao Chen Hsien 
1 
Food grain 6. ? 7. 2 7. 7 8. 2 8. 7 9.2 
Wu-ai Commune, 
Kai Pen Hsien Meal 1. 25 1. 67 2. 17 2. 75 3. 17 3.( 
Chi-li Yin Commune, 
Hsin Shiang Seven guarantees 4 5 6 7 8 9 
^Source: 203, P. 123 
in Province, 1958* 
Monthly wage scales (yuan) Ratio of highest 
? 5 5 7 8 9 10 11 to lowest wages 
9 10 
30 3.80 4.57 5.07 6.09 7.61 
7 8.2 8.7 9.2 9.7 10.2 
17 2.75 3.17 3.85 4.17 4.58 
7 8 9 10 11 
1.67:1 
3.75:1 
10.7  1 .60:1  
5.00 4:1 
12 13 15 3.75:1 
1^5 
In December, 1958» the Central Committee suggested 
that money wages should be Increased at a faster rate than 
the portion of free supply, so that members could satisfy 
the complex variety of their daily needs (72, p. 29), 
This policy intended to provide work incentive on top 
I 
of the basic needs guaranteed by the free supply system. 
Rewards, which accounted for 20 to 30% of money income in 
Hbnan communes in 1958, were also given to members who 
fulfilled and over-fulfilled the production targets. The 
absolute equalitarianism, anticipated by the communist 
leaders, would have to wait until the advent of the 
communist society when the dictum of "from each according 
to his ability and to each according to his needs" could 
fully apply. Absolute equalitarianism at the present 
moment was said to be an illusion of small peasants and a 
sort of Utopian socialism (414, p. 14). For an economically 
backward country, the principle of "to each according to 
his work" was considered a necessary stimulus to increas­
ing production. However, it will be difficult for a 
country to advance into the principle of "to each according 
to his needs", once the people are deeply imbued with the 
principle of "to each according to his work". This dilema 
will face the communist leaders later when they decide 
that material conditions of the country permit of moving 
into the communist society. 
Wages were paid to each individual, not to the head of 
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the family. The communist party thus hoped to help 
emancipate the women and youngsters by strengthening their 
financial independence. This policy was enhanced also by 
the socialization of domestic chores under the free supply 
system. The patriarchal system was to be eliminated from 
Chinese society and the family was to be a union of love 
with no financial bonds involved. 
In 1958 and 1959» the sum of allocated portions, 
including free supplies and wages plus rewards, accounted 
for only a small percent of gross revenue in the commune. 
According to the conference of local ministers for rural 
works, during August to September, 1958, called by the 
provincial committees of CCP, the portion allocated to 
members was stipulated to be 30^ of the commune*s gross 
income, and the remaining part went to the public accumu­
lation and to defray the cost of production and manage­
ment (236). In those communes for which data concerning 
distribution were available, the portion allocated to 
members was generally lower than 40/o of gross income in 
1958 as shown in Table 26 and Table 29. The exceptions 
were Su-lee Commune and Shiu-V/u County Commune, because 
economic conditions of the former and the harvest of the 
latter were poor. The allocated portion in Ma-Lou Commune 
and Shian Chen county Commune was exceptionally low 
because of an abundant harvest (393» pp. 28-32; 5 cited in 
9, p. 254). In December, 1958, the party resolution 
14? 
Table 29. Income distribution in several communes, 1958 
Su-lee Commune, Ho-S 
Sputnik Commune Tai Lai Hsien, C 
Honan Heilung Kiang 
(1,000 Yuan) (,%) (1,000 Yuan) (%) (1, 
1 Gross income 9,265.0 100.0 270.0 100.0 9 
2 Cost of production 54.0 . 20.0 and management 
1,725.1 18.6 
3 Taxes and transfer 
of profits to the 
state 33.0 12.2 
4 Collective savings 
54.5 and accumulation; 5,047.5 58.1 21.5 5 
Reserve funds 56.9 21.1 5 
Welfare funds 1.2 0.4 
5 Portion allocated 
to members 2,492 .3 26.9 124.9 46.3 2 
*Source: 203» p. 128; 393» pp. 28-32; 403» P. 6; 96 cited in 1 
mes, 1958 
Lee Commune, Ho-San Chiao Commune, Tai-Chien Commune 
Lai Hsien, Chang Kuo Hsien, Sou Chang Federation 
Lung Kiang Honan of Commune, Shantung 
}0 Yuan) (%) (1,000 Yuan) (%) (1,000 Yuan) (%) 
fO.O 100.0 9,334.0 100.0 34,735.0 100.0 
54.0 . 20.0 660.0 7.1 10,274.0 29.6 
33.0 12.2 340.0 3.6 333.0 1.0 
58.1 21.5 5,596.0 60.0 16,815.9 48.4 
56.9 21.1 5,409.0 58.2 15,081.9 43.4 
1.2 0.4 187.0 2.0 1,734.0 5.0 
>4.9 46.3 2,739.0 29.3 7,312.1 21.0 
, p. 6; 96 cited in 178, p. 33; 5 cited in 9, P. 25^. 
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Table 29. (Continued) 
Chao Kuo 
Commune 
Chi-li 
Ying 
Li-Wu-Ai 
Commune, 
Kai Pen 
($) 
Red Star C 
Commune Lu 
(^) 
1. Gross income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Cost of production 
and management 22.5 18.1 
3. Taxes and transfer 
of profits to the 
state 11.2 7.0 
4. Collective savings 
and accumulation; 31.3 49.3 27.5 24.0 
Reserve funds — —  —  —  — —  —  —  
Welfare funds —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  
5. Portion allocated 
to members 34.9 25.6 36.7 35.4 
•Ai Ma-Lou Shiang Chen Shlu-Wu 
le, Red Star Commune County County 
in Commune Lu San Hsien Commune Commune 
(3) (2) (2) ($) 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
24.0 66.6 70.0 13.7 
35.4 16.0 13.5 49.5 
l48b 
emphasized the importance of Improving the livelihood of 
members and its positive effect on production (72, p. 55). 
Table 30 shows that both Huang-Pu and Kiang-tung Communes 
allocated more than 50% of their gross income to members in 
1959* Money wages of members were further supplemented 
by their revenues from the private plots and sideline 
occupations officially endorsed since the spring of 1959. 
The communes* members in 1959 therefore enjoyed a greater 
degree of choice in their daily lives than in 1958. 
Figure 2 will help clarify all components of welfare 
and benefits a member could have in a commune where the 
various systems of free supply, money wages and individual 
economy co-exist. It must be noted that benefits from 
collective welfare facilities in this figure, such as 
nursing, medicare, education, and housing, were 
classified as components of free supply in the previous 
discussion. 
E. Relations with the State 
As a unit integrating the state power and economic 
administration at the local level, each commune was to be 
self-financed. The central government would assist the 
communes in case of a natural calamity. Ordinarily, the 
commune pays agricultural taxes to the state, which 
amounted to 7.8# and 6.1% of the state budgetary revenue 
respectively in 1958 and 1959 (443, p. 10). An 80^ profit 
Table 30. Income distribution in rural communes, 1959 and I96O* 
rrmi 
Huang-Pu Commune Kiang-tung Commune Five brigades in Chin-
Canton, 1959 Nanking, 1959 chon Commune, Tung-
ohuan City, Yun nan, 
(1,000 Yuan) {%) (1,000 Yuan) {%) (1,000 Yuan) {%) 
Gross income 12,360.0 100.0 8,300 100.0 568 100.0 
Cost of production 
and management 3,337.2 27.0 2,490 30.0 90 15.9 
Taxes 618.0 5.0 25 4.5 
Collective savings 
and accumulation 2,224.8 18.0 1,411 17.0 40 7.1 
Portion allocated 
to members 
of which: 
6,180.0 50.0 4,399 53.0 412 72.5 
Free supply 2,163.0 35.0 1,188 ; 27 
Money wage 4,017.0 65.0 3,211 73 
Allotment per 
cap!ta (yuan) 154.5 126.4 
*Source: 9, pp. 224-226; 425 cited in 177» pp. 215-216. 
Benefits from collective 
4»welfare facilities in — 
commune and. production 
brigades 
-^Free supplies— 
^Communistic 
'"in nature 
Welfare of a 
commune member 
Portions allocated to 
an Individual member — 
by the commune 
Money 
"^income 
.Wages 
.Rewards-
Direct rewards 
"from the commune 
Indirect rewards 
from the commune 
•through production, 
units which have 
attained the target 
Socialist 
"in nature 
Revenues from the private 
plot and sideline occupations -•Individual economy 
Figure 2. Components of the Welfare Function of a Commune Member 
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earned by the commune industries, which were originally 
under the jurisdiction of the central government, had to be 
transferred to the state. The remaining 20^ was retained 
by the commune. A part of profits made by the credit depart­
ment and the supply and marketing department of the commune 
were claimed by the people's bank and the higher-level 
trading agency which represented the state, as these two 
departments were still owned by the state. 
The commune was required to sell its excess farm 
products to the government purchasing boards, or to the 
national and provincial factories at relatively low prices 
fixed by the government (316, p. 366). 
Even the rural market was permitted to reopen in the 
spring of 1959» a few major products, such as grain, edible 
oil, oil-bearing products, cotton and cotton piece-goods, 
were earmarked exclusively for state purchase. 
Prom the foregoing discussions, it becomes evident 
that the rural commune is not a farm, but a rural development 
region integrating both state power and economic administration 
at the local level. The Chinese commune therefore resembles 
the "agro-city" or "agro-town" experimented with in the 
Soviet Union in the 1950*3. The significance of the 
people's communes in rural China will be better comprehended 
from Table 31» which compares characteristics of different 
rural institutions directly related to agricultural 
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Table 31 • Evolution of rural communes in China®-
Mutual-aid team Elementary APC Advanced APC 
Structural 
essence 
Fundamental 
unit of 
management 
•Semi-socialist small, individual 
economy 
Individual house •Cooperative man-
hold agement committee 
Ownership and 
use of 
resources in 
rural areas 
Individual owner­
ship 
•Basically private 
ownership and man­
agement; some com­
mon property 
Function 
of common 
property 
Form of 
labor 
activity 
Distribution 
system 
Little 
Collective action-
on a voluntary 
basis 
Small, but in­
creasing 
•Collective action 
and labor emu­
lation 
Based on labor-
done and land 
ownership 
-•Socialist-
Management com­
mittee 
-•Collective owner­
ship and manage­
ment; private own 
ership of small 
plots under 5% of 
land in APCs 
-•l)wages paid on the -
basis of labor days 
2)fixed dividends 
to land 
3 ) 5 %  of income to 
reserve funds 
-• Significant 
Collective actlor 
in production bri 
gadss and emula­
tion campaign 
•Wages paid on the 
basis of labor ds 
plus awards 
-• Indicates a significant development. 
c Advanced APC Rural commune 
in the period 
triai 
Commune in second 
phase, August 1959 
on 
-•Socialist- -•Socialist, unity of 
superstructure and 
economic base 
Socialist, dis-inte-
grating of super­
structure and econo­
mic base 
Management com­
mittee 
-•Commune manage­
ment committee 
with production 
brigades as a 
basic calcula­
tion unit 
Agricultural activi­
ties under manage­
ment of brigade and 
team, the rest under 
commune management 
committee 
-•Collective owner­
ship and manage­
ment; private own­
ership of small 
plots under 5% of 
land in APCs 
•Local industries 
and financial agen­
cies under the 
state ownership. 
Communal owner­
ship prevail, small 
plots allowed for 
individual uses 
4» Three-level ownership 
with basic ownership 
at brigade(1959-1961) 
and at teams(1962-
1965); The commune 
owns factories, public 
undertakings, reserve 
funds & welfare funds. 
Small plots allowed. 
-• Significant • -•Dominant Dominant 
Collective action •Collective action Collective action 
in production bri- with military lines 
gades and emula- and combat spirit 
tion campaign 
'Wages paid on the—•Combination of free4»Ration of good grain; 
basis of labor days supply and wage sys- scope of free supply 
plus awards tems, plus awards; narrowed to 30^ of 
Wages paid on labor allocated portion; 
days wages paid on labor 
days 
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Table 31, (Continued) 
Mutual-aid team Elementary APC Advanced APC 
Division 
of labor 
Farming, with 
some sidelines 
Economic 
planning 
Production 
techniques 
Average 
number of 
participating 
households 
Size in terms 
of administra­
tive unit 
Form of 
consumption 
None 
Smaller than 
one chia 
Individual 
Farming and sub •Fanning, forestry,—•Ai 
sidiary occupations animal husbandry, di 
fishing, handicraft ai 
transport and e< 
other sidelines m! 
Mainly tradi-
tional 
4-10 households 
Planning in pro­
duction, distri­
bution and mar­
keting 
Improved farming 
method and tools 
27 households-1955 
5^ households-1957 
Smaller than a 
village 
Plans in produc 
tion, capital con­
struction, work 
and distribution 
Beginning of agri— 
cultural mechaniza­
tion and electri­
fication 
-•P: 
p-
ai 
•Ci 
t' 
»246 households-1956-^5 
171 households-1957 
•>A village or several—K 
Individual basi 
cally, the coop 
provided medicare 
and nursery in the 
busy season 
>Individual, some — 
APCs supported 
adult education, 
public health, 
child care, and 
nursing activities 
- • <  
Advanced APC Rural commune Commune in second 
in the period phase, August 1959 
trial on 
•Panning, forestry,—•Agriculture, in-
>ns animal husbandry, dustry, trade, fin-
fishing, handicraft ancing, transport, 
transport and education, and 
other sidelines military affairs 
Agriculture, industry, 
trade, financing, 
transport; education, 
and military affairs 
Plans in produc 
tion, capital con­
struction, work 
and distribution 
-•Planning in all as­
pects of communal 
activities 
Planning in all as­
pects of communal 
activities 
Beginning of agri— 
cultural mechaniza­
tion and electri­
fication 
•Capitalization on 
technical duality 
»246 households-1956-^5»000 households 
171 households-1957 
•Emphasis on agricul­
tural modernization 
->2,465 households-1961 
1,800 households-1962 
-•A village or several—•Two or three a hsiang 
hsiangs 
•Individual, some •Collecjyive • Voluntary partici-
APCs supported pation in mess halls 
! adult education, 
le public health, 
child care, and 
nursing activities 
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production in Communist China. Although the rural communes 
evolved from previous rural institutions, they differ 
significantly from them. With these striking features, the 
rural communes are certainly revolutionary. On August, 
1958, the Central Committee of CCP proclaimed: "The people's 
communes are the best form of organization for the 
attainment of socialism and gradual transition to 
communism," and "they will develop into the basic social 
units in communist society," (228, pp. 8 and 20). Before 
this statement is evaluated, it will be helpful to discuss 
first the process by which this new and comprehensive system 
has been evolved. 
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IX. EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OP THE COMMUNE 
The emergence of the Chinese communes is not simply due 
to the operation of "universal gravity", nor to the 
communist dogmatism. It is customary in Communist China to 
experiment with a new institution a Certain period, then 
extend it throughout the nation after it has demonstrated its 
capacity to achieve purposes of the regime (cf. l68, p. 4%). 
The real causes behind the establishment of the rural 
communes are still a matter of educated guesses in the West. 
It has been speculated by some outsiders that the failure 
of APC's to operate at profits and the desire of the CCP 
to be ready in case of war necessitated a drastic change in 
the rural structure (65, pp. 225 ff). These two reasons, 
even if true, are only the necessary but not the sufficient 
conditions for initiating the rural communes. The Central 
Committee of CCP explained that the people's communes were 
a product of China's economic and political development, a 
result of the socialist "rectifications campaign" of the 
CCP, and an outcome of the Party "general line" for socialist 
construction and the "great leap" movement in 1958 (72, p. 
3; ^0, p. 32). It has also been said by some communist 
leaders that organization of the people's communes is a 
response to the call of Mao Tse-tung and proceeds under his 
direct leadership (357, p. 5; 228, p. 2?). Another party 
explanation is that the communal movement is a "spontaneous" 
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action of the masses. 
To reconcile the last two contradictory notions of Mao's 
leadership and masses' spontaneity, one must look into the 
OOP's hierarchy and the policy of "mass line". Mao Tse-tung 
and the Party's veterans in the Oentral Committee have for 
decades established their leading status in the party. Their 
concepts of important programs often become the "general line" 
of the party through the fiery "rectification campaign" and 
"unity-criticism-unity" process of persuasion within the 
party. After the ideas have crystallized into the Party's 
general line, they become the "aspirations of the people" 
through the subtle workings of the "mass line". As the COP 
Minister of Organization, An Tse-wen put it, one aspect of 
the "mass line" is "to transform the party's policy into the 
conscious action of the masses, through an extensive and 
intensive propaganda" (3^5, pp. 3-4). This process of 
changing beliefs and attitudes is coined by socio-psychol-
ogists Schein, Schneier and Barker as "coercive persuasion." 
They further point out that "coercive persuasion" has been 
practiced by many religions, social and political organiza­
tions in non-communist societies (337, pp. 268 and 282). 
Perhaps, the same technique is also practised in educational 
institutions. However, according to the "mass line" policy 
party programs should ideally reflect the "aspirations" and 
"rich experiences" of the masses. For these purposes, face-
to-face relations between party cadres and the masses are 
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stressed. Here, the Chinese communists seem to view them­
selves a minority group capable of discerning the aspira­
tions of the Chinese people and of formulating the optimum 
program for fulfilling these aspirations. 
The social and political backgrounds which have con­
tributed greatly to the establishment of national goals were 
enumerated in Chapter III. Chapter VII explains how the 
institutional contradictions of collective farms and their 
failure to accomplish their role in the national construction 
demanded a further change in rural organization. How this 
necessity resulted in the formation of a particular insti­
tution such as the people's commune could only be discerned 
from the evolutionary process of "three red flags" — "great 
leap forward"; "general line for socialist construction" 
and the commune, 
A. Great Leap Forward 
A "great leap forward" can be considered "revolutionary 
terminology" for the same process called in the West an 
industrial revolution, a take-off or a big push. The concept 
of great leap forward was quantified by Chou En-lai in 
August, 1959. An annual increase of industrial output by 
more than 20^, according to Chou, is a leap forward; by 
more than 25,^, a great leap forward; and by more than 30^, 
an exceptionally great leap forward. In agriculture, an 
annual increase of more than 10^ is a leap forward; more 
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than 15^, a great leap forward; and more than 20%, an 
exceptionally great leap forward (39, p. 22). This 
ambitious policy of economic growth had taken many years to 
develop in Communist China. Before the country decided to 
try to overtake Britain within 15 years in the production of 
steel, coal, electric power, machine tools, cement and 
chemical fertilizers, the communist leaders had no definite 
idea about the growth pace to be followed. But they hoped 
to accelerate the pace as quickly as possible. 
In his preface to the Socialist Upsurge in China's 
countryside, Mao in September, 1955» urged an "appropriate" 
expansion and acceleration of industrialization and develop­
ment of science, culture, education, and public health (389» 
p. 8). In that winter the Party Central Committee put 
forth the general principle for achieving socialist 
construction with "greater, faster, better, and more 
economical results" (4l3, P* 15). For effecting this 
principle, Mao in April, 1956, formulated a series of guide­
lines governing "ten sets of relations" in the country, 
which included the principle of simultaneously developing 
industry and agriculture with priority given to heavy 
industry (73, pp. 36-37; 419, p. 9). 
The high priority assigned to the development of 
heavy industry, coupled with bad weather and the institu­
tional difficulties encountered on the collective farms, 
resulted in a relatively low increase in the rate of 
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agricultural production in 1956-57. In turn the 
cummulative effects of agricultural bottlenecks led to an 
under-utilization of productive capacity in both light and 
heavy industries. For example, a low rate of growth in 
cotton and food grain in 1956-57 in comparison with 
previous years resulted in underemployment of machinery 
in textile and food processing industries. The corollary 
of excess capacity in light industry was a relatively 
low demand for machinery and equipment. Coupled with the 
shortage of raw materials such as iron and steel and 
electric power, the machinery industry had to operate 
below 75^ of its capacity during 1956-57 (90, p. 26; 135, 
p. 110; 91, p. 9; 101, pp. 73-74). 
The importance of agricultural production to overall 
economic development seems to have been recognized early 
by the Communist leaders. Ideally, agriculture would help 
accelerate industrialization if it could accomplish the 
following tasks; (1) supply adequate food for the urban 
and industrial population, (2) provide raw materials for 
light industry, (3) serve as a reservoir of human resources 
for the industrial sector, (4) produce a surplus for 
exports in exchange for machinery, and (5) promote the 
utilization of heavy industry by purchasing chemical 
fertilizers and agricultural machinery. In the National 
Programme for Agricultural Development drafted in early 
1956, the CCP Central Committee had already decided to 
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increase food output by 150^ and treble cotton production 
within 12 years (136, p. 71). If both food and cotton 
output were assumed to increase at constant rates 
during 12 years the above figures imply a compound rate of 
growth of 8^ for food production and 9.6^ for cotton out­
put, It means that the Central Committee had attempted 
the policy of a "leap forward** in cotton production since 
early 1956. However, the role of agriculture as a 
reservoir of labor for the industrial sector seems to have 
been unimportant in the late 1950*s because Communist 
China had so far emphasized capital-intensive Investments 
in the industrial sector. Thus industry could not absorb 
unemployed labor on a significant scale. On the other 
hand, the structure of the machinery and heavy industries 
was such that they could not provide needed farm imple­
ments and fertilizers to the agricultural sector. 
Consequently, the Communist leaders became interested in 
finding an economic strategy which could simultaneously 
promote agricultural and industrial output without 
diverting scarce capital from Industry to agriculture, 
that is, a strategy which could utilize unemployed labor 
in rural areas. 
This strategy became especially desirable when 
Communist China, at the Moscow Conference of the Communist 
and Workers' parties in November, 1957» conceived the 
idea of overtaking Britain in output of steel and other 
l6l 
major industrial products within 15 years, in coordination 
with the Soviet Union's effort to keep up to or overtake 
the United States in output of most important agricultural 
and industrial products. This idea of overtaking Britain ' 
was advocated "by Liu Shao-chi in his speech of December 2, 
1957> and endorsed by the National People's Congress in 
the spring of 1958 (70, pp. 389-91 and 401-402; 234). The 
aspiration of Communist China to overtake Britain within 
15 years was perhaps greatly encouraged by its rapid 
expansion of industrial productive capacity during the 
first Five-Year Plan and the successful launching of the 
first two Sputniks before the Moscow Conference. To 
Communist leaders, these two facts indicated a superiority 
of the socialist system in national development. The 
Chinese Communist leaders were also encouraged by nevr 
discoveries of mineral deposits such as iron ore, coal, 
copper, oil, gas, nickel, molybdenum, lead, zinc, chromium, 
and platinum as the result of prospecting by the increasing 
number of geological workers. (108, pp. 504-506; 101, p. 48). 
The rationality and underlying theory of overtaking Britain 
in 15 years will be evaluated in Chapter XIII. The main 
concern of the Communist leaders in this regardwas whether 
the agricultural sector can help accomplish this ambitious 
endeavour. 
The immediate results of agricultural experiments in 
the winter of 1957 and the spring of 1958, which used an 
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increasing amount of labor in close planting, deep plowing 
and heavy fertilizing, seemed to give the Communist leaders 
an impression that the "walking on two legs"^ - capitaliza­
tion on the structural duality - was the best strategy to 
achieve a great leap forward (cf. 64, p. 10). In late 
February, 1958, the target for the expansion in food grain 
production in 1958 was raised from the original 6 to 15,^ 
and that for cotton output from 6,7 to 20% above the 1957 
level. The industrial output was to be more than 25,'^ 
higher than the level attained in 1957 (400, pp. 1-5). 
These targets, according to Chou Sn-lal*s definition, 
marked the beginning of great leaps forward in both agri­
cultural and industrial output. Later the Central Committee 
called for doubling steel output in 1953 and raising the 
growth rate of industrial output to 52% over the 1957 level 
(135, p. 138; 73; 153, pp. 100-101). The 1959 targets 
were set in April, 1959, at 525 million tons for grain 
production and 5 million tonsfor cotton production. Out­
puts of grain and cotton in 1953 were then claimed to be 
375 and 3.35 million tons respectively^ (135, p. 291; 153, 
^Economic interpretation of "walking on two legs" or 
capitalization on the structural duality as applied in 
agriculture is presented in Chapter XIII. 
^The grain and cotton output in 1958 were in August, 
1959, scaled dovm to 250 and 2.1 million tons respectively 
(153,  p .  90) .  
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p. 90). These 1959 targets represented an attempt to 
achieve increases of and over 1958 for grain and 
cotton production. 
B. General Line for Socialist Construction 
The general line for socialist construction was propos­
ed by Mao and the CCP Central Committee and adopted by the 
party's Eighth National Congress on May 23, 1958. Its idea 
was to "build socialism by exerting utmost efforts and 
pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster, 
better and more economical results." In other words, the 
general line is a strategy designed to accomplish the great 
leap forward in both agricultural and industrial production 
and to transform China from a backward to an advanced country 
at the quickest possible pace. It was said that the general 
line had gradually taken shape during the past eight years 
of economic development (70, p. 427). The strategy 
emphasized (1) the maximum utilization of the "tremendous 
potentials provided by the socialist system", (2) mobili­
zation of all available factors of production, and (3) 
unification of all contradictory factors. The dominant 
theme is to capitalize fully on the "dual structure" of 
the economy, or in the Communist terms, to accelerate 
economic growth by "walking on two legs." 
1. Capitalization on the structural duality 
The policy of "walking on two legs", according to the 
Chinese communists, consists of the following strategy; 
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(1) simultaneous development of industry and agriculture 
with priority given to industry; (2) simultaneous development 
of heavy and light industries with priority given to heavy 
industry; (3) simultaneous development of national and local 
industries, and, of large, small and medium-size enterprises 
with priority given to local and small enterprises; (4) simul­
taneous build-up of industrial cities from large cities and 
industrial "complexes" from county towns; (5) simultaneous 
application of modern and indigenous methods of production; 
(6) combined use of theory and practice, intellectuals and 
manual workers, and the political cadres and experts; (7) 
equal emphasis on capital accumulation and the optimum use 
of the existing capital capacity; (8) a centralized leader­
ship and decentralized operation (40, p. 80; 73, pp. 41-43), 
With respect to the agricultural sector, this policy aims 
at promoting agricultural development mainly through an 
intensive and effective use of all available resources in 
rural areas, especially labor and traditional methods of 
production. 
As discussed in the previous section, the agricultural 
sector became a bottleneck of China's overall economic 
development during 1956-57 and will continue to be one in 
any lean year. In 1952, the 308.8 billion catties of food 
(excluding soybeans) produced by China was greater than in 
any other country of the world including the United States. 
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The total food, grain production increased to 370 billion 
catties in 1957, 14% higher than in the U.S.A. (4o, p. 122). 
The outputs of both soybean and cotton in the same year were 
next only to the United States (135» p. 296; 40, p. 123). 
But this amount of food grain was produced on 76.9^ of 
China's sown area (4o, pp. 128-29) and provided a bare 
subsistence to the growing population. Less than \0fo of the 
cultivated land was used to grow cash crops in this period 
(397, p. 11). One reason for a large proportion of culti­
vated land having been used in food production was the 
relative low yield per mou in agriculture (Table 23) as the 
result of low Investment, old methods of production and 
inefficient management. Furthermore, only a small portion 
of China's territory was cultivated (Table l6). Pood 
production had to be given priority over other uses for land. 
Any attempt to break China's agricultural bottlenecks must 
deal with the problems of the relative low productivity and 
small proportion of cultivated land. 
The relatively small amount of Soviet credit was 
nearly exhausted by 1957. Not only was little additional 
credit expected from the Soviet Union but China also needed 
to maintain an export surplus for servicing her debt. The 
American embargo of Communist China's trade with non-
communist countries also complicated China's efforts to 
improve her foreign exchange position. However, the Chinese 
communist leaders were so obsessed by the desire for rapid 
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industrialization that they would not divert to the agricul­
tural sector a large amount of capital. Even if the 
communist leaders had decided to launch technical reforms 
in agriculture, it would, according to their estimate, take 
four or five Five Year Plans to accomplish this task on a 
nation-wide scale (170, p. 34). No immediate improvement 
in farm productivity could be expected. Although there is 
always a danger of over-emphasizing the importance of 
capital in raising output, capital goods in Chinese agricul­
ture were no doubt extremely scarce as a complementary 
input to labor. This dilemma led the communist leaders to 
look into the possibility of transforming labor into 
capital. Thus began the large-scale mobilization of the 
labor force for rural construction. 
2. The "mass line" 
The Chinese Communist policy of the "mass line" is 
characterized by its stress on the role of peasants 
and industrial workers in innovations and economic 
development. The historical roots of the "mass line" 
however, pre-date the Communist Party. An old Chinese 
proverb says; "Three cobblers with their wits combined 
would equal Chukeh Liang the master mind." As the masses 
of people are considered makers of history by the communist 
leaders (171, p. 246; l60, pp. 56-58), six to seven hundred 
million population become assets for creating social wealth. 
The whole nation has been continuously educated to believe 
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in the masses. In his On Coalition Government, for example, 
Mao said; "No enemy can crush us but we can crush any 
enemy and overcome any difficulty so long as we rely on the 
people, firmly believe in their inexhaustible creative 
power and consequently trust them and become one with 
them." (171, p. 313; cf. 170, p. 9). The philosophy that a 
lack of concern for one's ovm welfare can create a tremen­
dous and perpetual power was anticipated by the ancient 
metaphysician Lao Tse (l44, pp. 16-I8). The communist 
leaders thus called upon the masses to catch the spirit of 
Yu Kung in moving the mountain and to engage in a 
"protracted war" for constructing the communist society. 
In the "protracted war", man, and not material, is the 
decisive factor, said Mao in 1938 (172, p. 192). 
In addition to their belief in the ability of the 
masses to create a favorable condition for future develop­
ment, other considerations also contributed to the 
communist party's adoption of the mass line. There had 
been a growing aspiration within the party leadership to 
rely mainly upon its countrymen in national development. 
It was pointed out that during the first Five-Year Plan, 
China by her ovm efforts designed and equipped 4l3 large 
and medium plants, factories and mines (45, p. 4). The 
only requirement, according to the party leaders, is the 
determination of the masses to build China into a strong 
socialist country by diligence, thrift, and courage to 
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engage in technical revolution and innovation. 
There had been unemployment in both urban and rural areas 
during 1953-1957• The urban unemployment largely resulted 
from the capital-intensive investment in heavy industry which 
failed to absorb the increasing migrants from rural areas. 
During 1953-57> the urban population grew at an average rate 
of 5.90 per year while the non-agricultural employment growth 
rate was 2.2# per year (89, p.75). In order to prevent 
increasing urban unemployment and the creation of new slums, 
communist leaders felt it necessary to keep the population in 
rural areas and even send back those who migrated to cities 
and were unemployed. These unemployed laborers and other 
unused resources would be a great loss to any underdeveloped 
country.if no scheme was developed to fully use them. This 
desirability of capitalizing on the unemployed labor is 
shared by the Chinese communist leaders as well as many 
Western economists who favor community development schemes 
(cf 119» p.85). All these considerations certainly contri­
buted greatly to the formation of the "mass line" policy. 
In the National Programme for Agricultural Development 
first drafted in January 1956 and finally approved in April 
i960, the chief measures suggested to increase agricultural 
productivity all involve an increasing use of manpower (70, 
p. 122-125; 184, p. 10-23). Man is considered as the 
critical factor in this Programme. The Agricultural Programme 
therefore can be considered the first shot of the "mass line". 
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The most significant development in the "mass line" 
policy was the massive mobilization of seasonally unemployed 
labor for water control, soil improvement, manure collection 
and afforestation in the ^ »rinter of 195? and the spring of 
1958. These measures have since been regarded as the most 
productive approaches among the "Eight-point Charter*. 
Every day more than 100 million workers were said to be mobil­
ized. Those living in North-east China, Inner Mongolia and 
North Shensi worked in temperatures of -30°C (45, p. 2). The 
Chinese Communist Party officially claimed that during the 
period October, 1957 and April, 1958, this mass movement col­
lected 310 billion tan of organic fertilizers^, afforested 
290 million mou of land, and added 350 million mou of irrigated 
areas mainly by building small irrigation projects (73, p. 32). 
In most APC's more than 90^ of the ablebodied members took 
part in this collective activity (73, p. 32; 135, p. 290). 
These labor-intensive water control projects saved many 
capital resources for the central government. The large 
scale irrigation works accomplished in Honan by this mass 
movement cost the central government only 1 to 5 yuan for each 
mou of irrigated land in 1957» During 1953-56 when the mass 
movement was not applied in building irrigation works, it 
cost the central government 32 yuan to irrigate one mou of 
land from the large irrigation works and 17 yuan from the 
lone tan equals 1/20 ton. At the present writing, it is 
impossible to determine accuracy of this figure. However, the 
quantity of material collected is not as impressive as a casual 
reading might suggest because the organic fertilizers such as 
river mud, animal waste and green manure are heavy, but have a 
low nutrient content. 
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middle-sized irrigation works (318, pp. 15-17; 322, pp. 13-
15; 390, p. 66). 
Another important mass movement is agricultural 
experimentation conducted not by scientific researchers, 
but by peasants. All those mass movements were claimed to 
have increased agricultural productivity greatly. In 1957 
it was reported that 65-69 counties and cities in the nation 
had reached the 1967 yield targets for grain production of 
400, 500, and 800 catties per mou set by the Agricultural 
Program for the respective localities. One hundred eighty-
four counties in 1957 reached the 1967 targets for cotton 
production set by the same program (412, p. 5). In July, 
1958, the Ministry of Agriculture reported that output of 
winter wheat in 1958 was 68,^ higher than in 1957 (92, pp. 
43-^5). This record, if true, would certainly encourage the 
national planners to push further the policy of "mass line". 
3. Decentralization 
Physical conditions differ among areas. Information 
and knowledge about the local resources and technical 
personnel to facilitate national plamiing were lacking. 
Furthermore, the communist leaders hoped to concentrate their 
energies on large-scale projects of key importance leaving 
the management of smaller, less important projects to the 
local cadres. The logical approach was to transfer author­
ity to lower echelons and allow them greater flexibility in 
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mobilizing local labor and material resources to achieve 
production targets. The principle of "centralized leader­
ship and decentralized operation" was thus crystallized. 
In the framework of centralized leadership and decen­
tralized operation, the central government sets an over-all 
national plan and establishes the general direction of 
socio-economic development while local governments develop 
subplans and are responsible for their actual implementa­
tion. The national plan generally covers only stategic 
segments of the national economy with activities of less 
importance left with local authorities. This tactic of 
decentralization apparently originated with Mao himself in 
January, 19^5 (171, p. 230). 
The feasibility of the centralized planning and decen­
tralized operation, however, rests with the loyalty and 
initiative of local cadres. In order to obtain the 
loyalty of cadres and to intensify their "activism", the 
reactification campaign was launched in May, 1957. The party 
cadres were asked to change their dictatorial approach and 
to devote a part of their time, about one-third, to manual 
labor with the rank and file of workers. Hopefully this 
would help them gain the respect and co-operation of the 
ruled. When the communist leaders felt that the rectifica­
tion campaign had improved the discipline of the party 
cadres, many of the latter were sent to the countryside to 
supervise and participate in production work. This 
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hsla-fang (going to the lower levels) movement was reported 
to involve a "demotion" of more than one million cadres in 
the nation (4l4, pp. 22-23; 379» P. 60). This movement was 
anticipated by Mao's report "On Coalition Government" in 
April, 19^5 (171, p. 296). Especially recommended for the 
party cadres was their participation in"experimental plots" 
for farm crops, pig breeding eind forestry. The development 
of "experimental plots" was labelled the movement toward the 
"red and .expert", a person who possesses both professional 
skill and communist ideology (413, p. 2). 
However, the massive emphasis on experimental plots and 
water control projects soon outstripped available manpower 
in many areas due to the shortage of capital equipment in 
rural areas. Success with these projects required an increas­
ing number of improved farm tools and machinery. Because 
the availability of nutrients through green manures and 
other organic fertilizers was limited, more chemical fertil­
izers were needed. Perishable farm products had to be 
processed. It was estimated that in 1957» demand of rural 
areas for manufactured goods accounted for more than 12^ 
of iron output, more than 50^ of the coal output, about 
30% of timber and 100^ of chemical fertilizers and insecti­
cides (1, pp. 17-18). All these called for the establish­
ment of small local industries which could utilize local 
resources to satisfy local needs. 
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Early in his report on "ten sets of relations'* in 
April, 1956, Mao warned against the excessive concentration 
of economic functions at the central government. Later in 
February, 1957, he proposed to the State Council a program 
of simultaneous development of the large and small 
industries, and of central and local enterprises. The 
state council in November, 1957» promulgated the Regulations 
Governing the Improvement of Industrial Management System, 
which authorized some state-owned enterprises, especially 
light industry and medium-sized heavy industry (3l4, pp. 
46I-62). The local authorities were also granted more 
power in personnel management. The speech of the Chairman 
of State Economic Commission Po Yi-po on December 19, 1957, 
repeated the same theme (4l3, pp. 1-17). 
In March, 1958, Mao felt that the time had. come to 
substitute machinery and modern engineering works for human 
labor in repairing irrigation projects (37, cited in 20, p. 
16). Thus at the Cheng-tu meeting of the same month, Mao 
proposed a massive construction of local industries. Since 
the existing collective farm could not fulfill these tasks, 
he also proposed an amalgamation of small APG's in a 
systematic way. These proposals were approved by the 
Central Committee in May, 1958, (73, PP. 57-58; 39, p. 40). 
However, a directive had already been issued on April 11, 
extending authority to local governments to construct and 
manage local industries (64, p. 11). By June 15, 1958, 
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80^ of Industries originally operated by the various 
ministries of the central government had "been handed over 
to local authorities (194, p. 63). During the spring and 
summer of 1958» a massive movement was underway to construct 
new mines and factories for producing ball bearings, improved 
farm implements, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, 
electricity, and handicraft goods. The variety almost 
covered all those needed in each locality. Reports on 
output of these local industries flooded in. Their progress 
was however hard to determine. The communist leaders hoped 
that they could develop in each region an economic area which 
would have a comparatively sound industrial base. 
C. Advent and Development of the Rural Commune 
This "general line" and decentralization process 
effected changes in many aspects of the administrative system. 
The role of local authorities was nonetheless increasing in 
importance and confusion developed in the division of 
direction between the central authority and the efficient 
administration of the APC. There was a great desire to 
unify administrative direction so that the great leap forward 
could move along harmoniously. At the 37th anniversary of 
the founding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1958, 
Mao suggested that all the administration of industry, 
agriculture, trade, education and military affairs should 
be unified under a single entity, which would become the 
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basic unit of administration in rural China (338, p. 8), 
On his inspection tour to Hopei, Honan and Shantung in early 
August, 1958, Mao gave further instruction to organize the 
people's communes because it facilitated leadership 
(228, p. 34). At the enlarged session the Political Bureau 
of the CCP Central Committee officially resolved on August 29, 
1958, to establish the people's communes all over China, and 
communization swept the country like a gale of wind. 
Table 32 shows that at the time the resolution to 
establish communes was adopted, there were already 8,730 
communes comprising 30.4^ of the total rural households. 
One month later, about 98^ of the rural households joined in 
26,425 communes. The geographical distribution of communes 
at the end of September, 1958 indicated that except for 
those remote areas inhabited by national minorities, such as 
Ningsia, Sinkiang and Yunnan, all other rural villages were 
virtually communized (Table 33) • It was reported that in 
October of the same year several communes were preparing to 
enter communism (325, p. 15). At the end of 1958, 99,1# of 
the total rural households were in 26,278 communes. The 
mushrooming of the people's communes took people all over the 
world by surprise, even those sympathetic with the communist 
regime. The Communist Party proclaimed that this "triumphant" 
movement was mainly due to "spontaneous" action of the masses. 
The Minister of Agriculture, Liao Lu-Yuan, claimed that poor 
peasants and lower middle peasants who approximated 70# 
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Table 32. Development of the rural people's communes* 
End of Early Mid Late Early 
August SeptemberSeptemberSeptember Octobe; 
Unit 1958 1958 1958 1958 1958 
1 Total rural 
households Thousand 124,276 124,304 124,380 124,428 128,0. 
2 Total rural 
communes One 8,730 12,824 16,989 26,425 26,50< 
3 Households 
in communes Thousand 37,780 59,790 81,220 121,940 126,90* 
4 Percentage of 
households in 
communes Percent 30.4 48.1 65.3 98.0 99.: 
5 Average num­
ber of house­
holds in each 
commune One 4,328 4,662 4,781 4,6l4 4,75' 
^Source: 4o, p. 43; 402, p. 23; 238; 3l4, p. 54; 240; 10, p. 
ommunes* 
1 Late Early Late End of End End 
TiberSeptember October October December August Spring of of Summer 
58 1958 1958 1958 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 
80 124,428 128,052 124,369 120,000+ 
(125,000) 
89 26,425 26,500+ 26, 578 26,578 24,000+ 24,000 50,000 74,700 74000 
20 121,940 126,900+127, 000 123,250 120,000+ 
(124,000) 
123250 134,460 
.3 98.0 99.1 99.1 99.0+ 
81 4,6l4 4,756 4, 778 4,637 5,000+ 2,465 1,800 
p. 54; 240; 10, p. 97; 409, p. 97; 197, p. 319; 255. 
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Table 33. Geographical distribution of rural people's communes in China 
End of September, 1958 
Established Participating Percent Household 
communes households of total 
households 
per 
commune 
Total 26,425 121,936,350 98.2 4,6l4 
Peking 56 663,124 100,0 11,841 
Shanghai 23 256,000 100.0 11,130 
Hopei 951 8,402,639 100.0 8,836 
Shansi 975 3,483,564 100.0 3,573 
Inner Mongolia 812 1,561,023 98.6 1,922 
Liaoning 428 3,264,579 100.0 7,627 
Kirin 481 1,914,547 100.0 3,980 
Heilungkiang 718 1,946,478 100.0 2,710 
Shensi 1,678 3,232,904 100.0 1,932 
Kan su 794 2,006,389 100.0 2,527 
Tsinghai 144 245,624 100.0 2,456 
Ninghaia 53 201,815 67.3 3,808 
Sinkiang 389 625,151 59.3 1,607 
Shangtung 1,580 11,347,989 100.0 7,182 
Kiangsu 1,490 9,127,234 99.4 6,126 
Anhwei 1,054 7,219,244 100.0 6,849 
Chekiang 761 5,697,412 100.0 7,487 
Fuki en 622 2,672,839 95.1 4,297 
Honan 1,285 10,272,517 100.0 7,994 
Hupeh 729 6,040,000 96.1 8,286 
Hunan 1,284 8,172,440 100.0 6,635 
Kiangsi 1,240 3,720,000 92.0 3,000 
Kwangtung 803 7,905,553 100.0 9,845 
Kwangsi 784 4,041,944 100.0 5,155 
Szechwan 4,827 13,676,988 99.1 2,833 
Kweichow 2,194 3,101,205 94.5 1,413 
Yunnan 275 1,137,148 31.0 4,135 
^Source: 402, p. 23; 31^» P. 5^. 
&Data show that numbers of rural communes in these two provinces chan^ 
It arouses suspicion whether figures in these provinces were misplac* 
people's communes in China 
ember, 1958 Communes 
established 
Percent Households as of 
of total per October 31, 1958 
households commune 
98.2 4,6l4 26,578 
100,0 11,841 79 
100.0 11,130 23 
100.0 8,836 945 
100.0 3,573 865 
98.6 1,922 778 
100.0 7,627 428 
100.0 3,980 444 
100.0 2,710 692 
100.0 1,932 1,504 
100.0 2,527 707" 
100.0 2,456 72* 
67.3 3,808 152* 
59.3 1,607 542 
100.0 7,182 1,578 
99.4 6,126 1,356 
100.0 6,849 1,047 
100.0 7,487 742 
95.1 4,297 656 
100.0 7,994 1,177 
96.1 8,286 729 
100.0 6,635 1,259 
92.0 3,000 1,240 
100.0 9,845 752 
100.0 5,155 814 
99.1 2,833 4,857 
94.5 1,413 2,320 
31.0 4,135 820 
;s in these two provinces changed in the exact reverse directions. 
1 these provinces were misplaced in printing. 
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of rural population firmly supported the establishment of 
rural communes. A small portion of the remaining 30^ 
which consisted of ex-landlords and rich farmers opposed it, 
while the rest wavered between. (429, p. 184). According 
to a sample survey made in Hsu-chang, Honan, 89^ of the 
rural population were said to be ardently for the new 
system; 7^ basically for it; and only 4^ against it (228, 
p. 4l). However, another report indicated that about 50,^ 
of Chinese youth were but the followers of the mainstream 
and did not have any special attachment to the commune system, 
while about 12-15^ of them took an attitude of suspicion 
and Were opposed to it (46), 
However, establishment of the communal administrative 
"super-structure" is one thing and an efficient management 
of it is another matter. Soon after the communes were 
organized, their members began the autumn harvest, ploughing, 
and sowing, and the nation-wide drive for indigenous produc­
tion of iron and steel. No real effort vias made to improve 
labor and resource deployment among various social and 
economic activities, nor to consolidate the ownership and 
distribution systems. Neither the peasant population nor 
land under the commune was redistributed among brigades and 
teams within it. That is to say, "zoning" was not the main 
concern of the communes at this stage. The border of each 
commune usually followed the traditions of natural villages 
and hsiangs. The size of communes, therefore, varied greatly. 
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When the busy season was over, the period of consolidation 
and adjustment followed. 
In the spring of 1959» there were serious natural 
calamities recorded in some areas. Despite the fact that the 
first half of 1959 witnessed an increased supply of some 
consumer goods, the supply of meat, such as pork, beef, 
mutton, eggs and aquatic products was insufficient, (63, pp. 
2 and 13-14; 88, p, 24). In order to provide some supple­
ments to daily needs of peasants and to promote private 
incentives, a small plot, not exceeding 5% of the commune's 
usable land, was granted in April, 1959, to members for 
gardening and raising livestock for private consumption. 
This limitation of the private plot was lifted to 10% in 
the following summer (63, p, 18; 88, p. 14), But the pri­
vate plot was only alloted for individual uses and it was 
still owned by the commune. 
The communist leaders must have felt at this time that 
the 1959 target for agricultural production would not be 
fulfilled if adjustments in resource allocations were not 
made. The regime stipulated that not less than 80^ of the 
labor force in the commune should be allocated to agricultural 
production (64, p. 29). The city workers as well as idlers 
who recently immigrated from the country-side were sent to 
help with agricultural production. The modem industrial 
sector was also urged to support technical reforms in 
rural areas (63, p. 27). Table 15 shows that for the nation 
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as a whole,the communes in defiance of the Central Committee 
suggestions actually allocated 25,of their labor force to 
basic construction and 2,5^ to industry and transportation, 
and only 65^ to farming and other agricultural activities. 
In August, 1959J the Eighth Plenary Session of the 
Central Committee maintained that three "red banners" had 
been successful (88,pp. 1-5). It also claimed that the 
commune system had been advancing along the path of a 
consolidated and sound development (88, p. 5). However, it 
critized three major shortcomings of the communes, i.e., 
excessive centralization of power, equalitarianism, and 
waste (88, p. 10). The Central Committee especially warned 
against the emergence of rightist sentiments among cadres 
who were starting to doubt the wisdom of "three red banners" 
(88, p. 10). In order to promote the spirit of the "great 
leap" among the masses and cadres, three-level ownership 
with the basic ownership a.t production brigades was defined 
in August, 1959. 'This new form of ownership vested with 
the production brigades the management and ownership of 
major properties in agriculture. The commune management 
committee took charge of local industries end political 
activities formerly administered by the local state organs. 
This marked the separation of agricultural production from 
industrial production. 
The failure of national planning authorities to design 
a policy of "balanced" and rapid growth was admitted, by 
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Chou En-lai at the Eighth Plenary Session (63, pp. 24-25). 
In late August, 1959» the original 1959 targets were revised 
as follows: the target for grain output was adjusted from the 
original 1,050 billion catties to 550 billion catties; cotton 
from the original 10 billion catties to 4.62 billion catties; 
steel, from 18 million tons to 12 million tons; coal, from 
380 million tons to 335 million tons. The target date 
for overtaking Britain in major industrial products was, 
however, shortened from 15 to 10 years. The target for 
total value of agricultural production was changed from 122 
to 73*8 billion yuan. The target for industrial output was 
reduced from 165 to 14? billion yuan, all at constant 1957 
prices. These new targets indicated that the communist 
leaders still felt that a 25.5# increase was feasible in the 
industrial sector during 1959 as contrasted to 10^ in the 
agricultural sector (63, p. 21; 88, pp. 3-4, 11-12 and 26). 
Because of the serious agricultural failures during 
late 1959 and up to 1962, the "three red banners" had been 
"degenerated." The next chapter will discuss advantages and 
difficulties of the communization from economic aspects. The 
changes in policy goals, developmental strategy and the commune 
system since late 1959 will be elaborated in Chapter XI. 
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X. ADVANTAGES AND DEFECTS 
OP THE COMMUNIZATION 
Why was communization advancing so rapidly in the 
first two years of the movement and slackening or even 
retreating thereafter? It is the purpose of this chapter to 
analyze the underlying reasons for this whole process of 
change. 
It could be assumed that in the communization from 1958 
to 1959t the positive effects of instituting the rural 
communes, at least to the party leaders, outweighed the 
adverse effects. The reverse was true for the following 
period. This chapter will first elaborate the positive 
forces of the communes, then the negative ones. The discus­
sion will emphasize a step by step analysis of the relation 
between the communization and economic and agricultural devel­
opment, The latter will be considered one at a time and 
the analysis will proceed from the presumption of "other 
things being equal," The combined effect these different 
forces brought forth on agricultural development will be 
considered in Chapter XIII. 
A, Advantages 
The advantages considered here relate mainly to the 
commune system of the first two years, i.e., 1958 and 1959. 
However, these advantages, as demonstrated in the following 
discussion, are also applicable to the new stage of the 
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commune system after August, 1959. 
1. Enhancement of central control and leadership 
The establishment of the rural comnwœs theoretically 
resolved the conflicts existing among the collective econ­
omies and between the state and collective economies. 
Under the commune system all social, economic and political 
activities are coordinated by a single authority. As 
benefits and costs are shared by all commune members, the 
overall planning and coordination of the management committee 
can be directed toward achieving maximum utilization of 
available resources for development and modernization. This 
statement should be conditioned by a qualification that mem­
bers must be satisfied with ownership and distribution 
systems of the commune. However, this qualification is in 
the category of "other beings being equal", as mentioned 
above. Ideally, the agricultural sector of the commune will 
provide adequate food and raw materials for other sectors. 
Local industries will provide farm implements needed by 
peasants and process the agricultural products which are 
perishable. The credit department will provide required 
capital funds to local industries and production brigades. 
The labor shock force organized by young militiamen can be 
used to meet emergencies either in production or for security. 
National planning authorities were in 1953-1959 dealing 
with 24,000 to 27,000 communes in rural China instead of 
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752,113 APC s, 88,368 credit coops, more than 30,56? supply 
and marketing coops, 100,000 handicrafts coops and more 
than ten million peasant households (Tables 6 and ?), This 
reduction in units certainly simplifies substantially the 
tasks involved in national planning and coordination. Com­
bination of several agencies into one will also reduce the 
requirements for administrative personnel and the pressure on 
the local leadership. The central control became tighter 
and nation-wide coordination closer when 98^  of people's 
communes and 59^  of production brigades in communes could 
be reached by telephone by the end of 1958, and every corner 
of the Chinese country-side by 1959 was connected by tele­
communications, with their center in Peking (40, pp. 42 and 
195). 
But the expanding local power might not remain perman­
ently in the grip of the central authority unless an 
effective control system was developed. This system was 
provided by the expansion of local communist party committees 
and cadres. The CCP Central Committee has strongly empha­
sized the leading position of the CCP members in government 
at all levels. The party members increased from 10.7 in 
1956 to l4.0 millions in 1959 and finally to 17*0 millions 
in 1961 (148, p. 116), About 40^  of 17.0 million members 
was estimated to have joined the CCP after 1956 (148, pp. 
111-112). As a result, the ratio of population to party 
members declined from 56.5 in 1956 to 46.0 in 1959 and to 
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39.4 in 1961 (l48, p. I I 6 ) ,  A hi^i proportion of new party 
members was recruited from rural areas. The party members 
of peasant origin increased from 66,5% of the total members 
in 1957 to 80% in 1961 (124, pp. l4-l6). In addition an 
increasing number of party members from provincial and country 
levels were sent to villages and mountainous areas during 
and following the winter of 1957. The party leadership had 
been strenghtened by support from poor and lower middle 
class peasants who presumably would gain from the commun!zation. 
The principle of "politics in command" stressed since 
the great leap forward movement in 1958 further makes the 
party the actual ruler in rural areas, as party members are 
the legitimate "priest" in charge of politics. The central 
government therefore through the party system can control 
rural areas even in the course of decentralization. The 
formidable status of the communist party is evidenced by the 
fact that establishment of the people's communes throughout 
rural China was carried out by the resolution of the CCP 
Central Committee alone, without being enacted by the 
National People's Congress nor promulgated by the State 
Council, 
According to the "mass line," the cadres were directed 
to increase their initiative, creativity and "activism", and 
to eat, live, work and consult with the peasants. It was 
said that only through these constant and intimate contacts 
would the cadres understand more about peasants and command 
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their respect and support. Every cadre was supposed to be 
red in thinking and an expert in production. When agricul­
ture suffered serious calamities during 196O-I962 and 
I 
there was an increasing need to win the support of peasants, 
the cadres were urged to live and work with peasants for 
seven out of ten or five of seven days, and to review their 
work in the remaining days ( 2 7 8 ) .  
The communists believe neither in the existence of "God" 
nor in traditional wisdom. They hope to win "salvation" 
through class struggle, change and progress which in turn 
rely on the cooperation of the masses. "The Communist 
cause", said Liu Shao-Chi, "is nothing but the cause of the 
masses of the people" (Cited in ^35» p. 269). All the cadres 
are encouraged to imitate Mao's spirit of scorning difficul­
ties while taking full account of them (155> p. 37). To 
develop a large number of "communist men" who "dare to 
think, dare to speak, and dare to act" for the communist 
cause with less concern about material remuneration became 
a prime task of the CCP. Extensive and intensive education 
as well as inculcation were to be conducted in the communes 
until the peasants change their value systems and behavior 
patterns, and support the party policy "spontaneously". 
This idea was advocated by Robert Owen early in 1012. He, 
like Confucious, asserted that the human character could be 
moulded and perfected by habituating good behavior and re­
ceiving proper guidance (210, p. 5; 211, p. 6). 
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As yet there is Insufficient evidence to prove or 
disprove Owen's contention. But propaganda and indoctrin­
ation, or the formation of "collective"and "guided" 
thinking in terms of Tinbergen, has been a common practice 
of almost every society for the last fifty years (433, p. 
20). The difference is but a matter of degree and technique. 
Communist China has been notorious for its intensity in 
this process. Almost all the mass media and public institu­
tions have been effective armies for fostering the 
"collective thinking" (cf. 125). Houn even asserts: "Chinese 
culture differs from that of the West in that indoctrination 
by the government is not commonly held to be objectionable" 
(124, p. 3)* The result of indoctrination certainly cannot 
be belittled. According to thematic apperception tests 
(T.A.T.) conducted by Dr. Denis Lazure of the University of 
Montreal on the number of children aged ten to sixteen in 
China, child attitudes toward the family and the state have 
changed immensely (38?, pp. 298-299). It has also been 
observed that "brain-washing" was certainly successsful in 
changing educated Westerners and senior officers during the 
Korean War (449, p. 12). 
Shiao Chuan-lin's claim, that the majority of people 
are wavering between socialism and capitalism has been 
fiercely denounced in mass media. Party leaders insist that 
about 70^ of peasants actively support socialism and the 
commune system. Any achievement in the collective economy 
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has been well publicized. National farm machinery exhibitions 
which display new farm tools devised by peasants them­
selves are used to demonstrate the creativity and strength 
of the common people. Achievements and virtues of labor 
heroes, veteran peasants, and finally the People's Libera­
tion Army have be^n given special emphasis. All these are 
used to support ' .le party's position that the "mass line" 
is correct and that it is possible to transform the 
"tremendous spiritual force" into "gigantic material power" 
( 2 9 8 ) .  
Because rural areas are firmly controlled by the party 
branches and cadres, the central government also can, 
through the operation of the party organization, implement 
important policies with relative ease. The Chinese communists 
during the communization period have relatively succeeded in 
launching birth control programs and in arresting the outmigra-
tion of rural people. Efforts in these areas prior to the com­
munes failed. The attempt of the communist regime to promote 
birth control began in 1955 (266), Although the establishment of 
the people's communes was to achieve a great leap forward in 
production, they have aided greatly in promoting the Birth 
Control program. A firm control of peasants and food ration 
schemes facilitate the enforcement of later marriage among 
people. Contraceptives are provided free of charge in 
the communes to encourage their use. Intensive propaganda 
and indoctrinzation are conducted to educate peasants 
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to the importance of birth control, not from the viewpoint of 
China's food shortage, but under the pretext of labor produc­
tivity and health of feamel workers and the welfare of young­
sters, 
2. Maximum utilization of labor for resources development 
One of the distinctive features before the communization 
was overpopulation and unemployment in rural China, Even after 
the swift collectivization and a series of production drives, 
a typical male laborer in rural areas worked 2^9 days a 
year in 1957 and a female laborer, l66 days (Table 13). The 
underemployment of the labor force during a large part of 
the year can be partly attributed to an uneven distribution 
of the rural labor force and complementary resources among 
areas of the country. The mountainous area, for example, 
is characterized by its sparse inhabitation while the neigh­
boring plain, a small area crowded with people. The 
former gets not enough hands when it is engaging in reforest­
ing and terracing. The same is true for the latter when 
it is busy in planting and harvesting. The unemployment in 
rural areas is also due to the lack of job opportunities in 
the slack seasons, that is, the existence of seasonal 
unemployment. To reduce structural and seasonal unemploy­
ment and promote economic development is the central theme 
of the "general line" policy. But this objective could 
hardly be achieved if various regions were controlled by 
different authorities and there was no single planning 
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agency responsible for developing a diversified economy 
over a large area. 
Establishment of a commune over several villages with 
different resource combinations will facilitate se effective 
allocation and utilization of labor force over various uses, 
time and space. During 1958-1959, the typical measures 
stressed by the communist leaders to increase labor utili­
zation were deep plowing, close planting and careful 
weeding in the busy season, and water control and soil 
conservation during the slack period. 
a. Labor-intensive farming The mass movements for 
close planting and deep plowing were inspired by the 
results achieved in experimental plots and "bumper-
production fields" in early 1958. The "bumper-production 
fields" were the extension of experimental plots over a 
large parcel of land. Their development will be discussed 
later. While the per mou yield of wheat in 1957 was ll4 
catties for the national average, 7,320 catties per mou 
was said to be produced during 1958 in an experimental plot 
in Hoping APC of Hsiping Hsien, Honsui and 7,201 catties per 
mou in a plot on the Menchin APC of the same Hsien. The 
experimental plot in Chien-kuo APC of Ma-Cheng Hsien, 
Hupei yielded 36,956 catties per mou of the early rice and 
that in Red Flag Commune of Kwang-Kiang Hsien, Kwangsi 
yielded 130,434 catties per mou of the middle rice. This 
contrasts to the national average yield for rice of 359 
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catties per mou In 1957 (401, p. 32; , Table 4-7). Exper­
imental plots in other provinces also recorded yields 
many times higher than the national average. 
The large tract "bumper-production fields" also record­
ed output substantially higher than the national average, 
though lower than the experimental plots. The average 
yield per mou of winter wheat in 1958 was 350 catties for 
7,l4 million mou of "bumper-production fields" in Hsian-
Yang Special District, Hupel and 600 catties for 258 
thousand mou of "bumper-production fields" in Men Hsien, 
Honan. The l6o thousand mou of "bumper-production fields" 
in Kianghu Hsien, Hupel produced 2,077 catties of middle 
rice per mou (401, p. 32). These results were attributed 
to intensive use of labor in close planting and deep plow­
ing. 
The preliminary studies at seven investigation stations 
in six provinces show that on the average, one working day 
in 1958 produced rice valued at 3,66 and 5,15 yuan from the 
ordinary fields and the bumper-production fields respectively. 
Thirty five working days per mou were applied to the culti­
vation of the former and 265 days to the latter. In another 
situation, each of 18 working days spent ,on one mou of 
ordinary land yielded 7.9 yuan worth of cotton while each 
of 112 working days on the experimental plots yielded 13.7 
yuan of cotton. Up to this point, no evidence is shown 
that a diminishing return to labor took place. Table 15 
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shows that labor days used for farming one mou of land 
increased from l6 to 20 from 1957 to 1959» It can be 
expected that labor days per mou in 1958 was higher than 
in 1959. Later, the limitation of increasing labor on 
close planting and deep plowing was recognized. 
b. Water conservation The most spectacular effort 
during the 1958 to 1959 period was the massive mobilization 
of labor power in the slack season for large-scale water 
conservation, soil development, manure collection, 
afforestation, and construction of public facilities and 
highways. 
Historically, success or failure of water control 
programs usually corresponds with the ascent and fall of a 
dynasty in China. The Chinese communists frequently cited 
natural disasters in the past to promote mass movements 
for water control and reforestation programs. The most 
recent and appalling episode was the 1931 floods which 
resulted from the breakdown of the dykes along the middle 
and lower reaches of the Yangtze and the Huai River. Some 
320,000 square kilometres of land in 18 provinces south of 
Shsuighai-kuan were subjected to floods and over 100 million 
people were affected. One hundred and thirty-one counties 
remained waterlogged for months (135, p. 273; 43, p. l4; 
3^, p. 54). 
As weather changes are extreme in China, droughts 
haunt China, especially its North and Northwest regions. 
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as often as floods. It has been estimated that during the 
588 years between I368 and 1956 A.D., the province of 
Hope! suffered from 4o6 droughts and 309 floods, approxi­
mately two droughts and two floods every three years (216, 
p. 15). Recently, the province of Honan experienced 
floods during the wheat harvest in June, 1956 and droughts 
in the following winter. This fact perhaps had motivated 
Honan considerably in its water conservation movement during 
the winter of 1957 and made it the model province in com-
munization. According to records of Kansu province, there 
were during the 82 year period from I865 to 19^7» 11 severe 
droughts, one lasted 2 years, a second 3 years and another 
extended over a period of 4 years (343, p. 37). The 1877-
1978 droughts which struck four northern provinces of Hopei, 
Honan, Shansi and Shensi, were estimated to have taken 9 to 
13 million human lives (117» PP. 231-232). In the 1956 
Draft National Programme for Agricultural Development, local 
governments and APC's were urged to undertake small-scale 
water conservation projects, in coordination with the large-
scale projects carried out by the state. These projects hope­
fully would eliminate all "ordinary" floods and droughts within 
7 to 12 years (70, pp. 122-123). In these water control 
projects, the diversion of surging water to avoid floods 
and waterlogging as well as the storage of water to combat 
droughts was equally stressed. 
Not only can the ravages from floods and droughts be 
reduced by the water control schemes, but irrigated areas 
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can be expanded. Table 34 shows that In the same area,' 
irrigated land registered a per mou yield of 46 to 122# 
higher than non-irrigated land. 
Table 34. Irrigation and output, 1957* 
Catties per Catties per 
Irrigation Province Crop mou from mou from non- {%) 
area (2) (3) irrigated irrigated Ratio 
(1) land land (6) 
ii] £ii 
Chu-Yuan 
Ditch 
Shangtung wheat 260 120 216.7 
Ching-Hva'i 
Ditch 
Shensi cotton 285 195 146,2 
Wei-Hwei 
Ditch 
Shensi com 417 220 189.5 
Kwang Sung 
Peng Lien 
Szechwan rice 585 360 162.5 
Yung-Ching 
Ditch 
Hopei millet 200 90 222,21 
*Source: 235. 
A massive movement for water control was thus launched 
in the winter of 1957» The APC's and rural communes 
mobilized available labor to dig wells,to build ponds and 
ditches, and to construct millions of small and medium sized 
earthen dams and reservoirs. With the large-scale water 
conservation projects constructed by the state, the total 
irrigated area in 1958 doubled that of 1957. However, the 
total cultivated area in 1958 declined (Table l6). The 
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water control projects certainly took away much cultivatable 
land. Based on the preliminary results of the experimental 
plots in early 1958, they thought that intensive farming and 
irrigation would increase farm output enough to offset the 
effect of reduced cultivated land. 
The mass movement for water conservation carried into 
1959* However, the irrigated areas expanded less in 1959 
than in 1958. Ten Great Years, published by the State Statis­
tics Bureau in 1959 claimed that the over 70,000 million cubic 
metres of earthwork and masonry completed for water conserva­
tion projects from 1950 to 1958 was equivalent to the construc­
tion of 960 Suez Canals or 400 Panama Canals (40, p. 51). 
Continuous efforts were devoted to the expansion of 
water conservation projects in I96O. In addition to large-
scale projects undertaken under the state plan, the people's 
communes were reported to be building more than 1,400 
reservoirs with storage capacity each ranging from 10 million 
to 100 million cubic metres and millions of small-scale 
projects with capacity of less than 1,000 cubic metres. Thus 
the Minister of Water Conservation, Pu Tso-Yi, optimistically 
announced in early April, I960, that within ten years or a 
little longer the major production areas along all principal 
rivers would be able to avoid ordinary floods and over 80^ 
of the arable land would be able to resist the severest 
drought ever experienced (188). 
However, the limitation of these earthen dams and 
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reservoirs was revealed not ten years later, but soon after 
Pu*s statement when the severe drought of 200 to 300 days 
attacked large areas of North China in 196O. These were 
described as "the worst series of disasters since the 19th 
century." There were dams and reservoirs, but no water in 
North China. Since 1960, the state has shifted its priority 
and financed a large number of mechanized pumping stations, 
large-size reservoirs with capacity of more thsin 100 million 
cubic metres, and large hydro-electric power stations. This 
modern equipment presumably could achieve the dual purposes 
of drainage and irrigation with less time and greater effects 
(cf. 217, p. 15). 
c. Reclamation, soil improvement and afforestation 
Other measures to increase labor utilization in the slack 
season are land reclamation, soil improvement and afforesta­
tion. According to investigations conducted in 19^9» there 
were 850 millions mou of reclaimable waste land. About 500 
millions mou could be transformed into cultivated land 
(320, p. 21). During the period of 1950-1957, 209 million 
mou of waste land was developed (Table I6). Although land 
reclamation was not stressed in the first two years of the 
great leap forward and communization, it was reported that 
50 millions mou of waste land was reclaimed during the fall 
of 1959 and March, i960 (256). Land with a rolling or steep 
topography amounting to 200 million mou in 1959 j was to be 
terraced so as to facilitate irrigation (38, pp. 7-8). 
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Field size and irrigation systems were adjusted to achieve 
efficient farming. 
It was estimated in 1959 that about 400 millions mou 
of low-yield land needed to be Improved (38, pp. 7-8). The 
low yield was due primarily to salinization as the result 
of a long period of waterlogging and water leaking from 
ditches and canals. Labor was mobilized for the desalini-
zation and soil improvement. There have been scattered 
reports on increasing output on the improved land (cf. 304). 
Success of water and soil conservation depends greatly 
on afforestation in the upper reaches of river valleys 
which will reduce soil erosion and silt accumulation in 
the lower reaches of the rivers. Construction of forest 
belts has been stressed since the founding of Communist China. 
In 1949, the forested land in Mainland China, approximately 
1,455 million mou, accounted for about 10^ of China's terri­
tory, as compared with 67% in Japan, in the Soviet Union 
and 30^ in the United States (8, pp. 21-22; cf. 9> p. 10). 
As a result of continuous efforts in afforestation during 
the period from 1958 to 1959» the forested area in China 
increased from 1.5 billion mou in 1957 to 2.4 billion mou 
in 1959. The 1959 figures represented l6% of the national 
territory (9» p. 10; 10, p. 20; Table I6). The growth rate 
of forested area since the founding of the communist regime 
appears to be higher than that of cultivated land. 
d. Manure collection A universal shortage of chemical 
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and organic fertilizers has been one of the major causes for 
the low productivity in Chinese agriculture. In 19^9» only 
^5% of farm land was fertilized, with 1500 catties of 
chemical and organic fertilizers applied to each mou of 
land. The proportion of farm land fertilized was 85% of the 
total in 1956 with an application of 2500 catties of chem­
ical and organic fertilizers per unit of land (9, p. l4). 
Since the winter of 1957, a considerable number of 
rural population was deployed for collection, accumulation 
and shipping of organic fertilizers. Some communes in 
1958 and 1959 even allocated 30 to of their agricul­
tural labor force to this undertaking (342, p. 11). As 
the result, 1,930 million tons of organic fertilizers were 
reported to have been collected in 1958 as compared with 
168 million tons in 1957 (153, p. 90). It was estimated 
that 10,000 catties (sic) of chemical and organic fertilizers 
were applied per mou of land in 1958 (9, p. l4). 
e. Labor shock force for emergencies Rural popula­
tion, especially young folk, in the communes are also 
organized into labor shock forces to meet emergencies such 
as protection of river banks and dykes amid floods, repara­
tion of broken irrigation networks, campaigns against frost 
threats and watering of parched fields. 
It was reported that in the winter of 1959, more than 
2 million people in Shensi, about one-fourth of its total 
labor force, was mobilized in anti-drought undertakings (253). 
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When there was no rain for about 250 days between July, 
1959 and March, i960, the population in Honan was called 
upon several times to engage in anti-drought and anti-frost 
campaigns. The total labor force mobilized each time 
numbered more than 10 millions, about one-half of the total 
labor force or one-fourth of population in that province. 
The land watered in these campaigns, in accumulation, 
equalled 270 million mou (258, p. 59). 
f. Increasing use of female labor The above 
mentioned farming and resource development projects were 
greatly aided by female labor, freed by the collectivization 
of traditional domestic chores in early years of the communi-
zation. Before being combined into a commune, the Hsinhsin 
APC in Yenshih Hsien was composed of 356 households with I78 
persons cooking for the APC population. The institution of 
mess halls during 1958 released more than three-fourths 
of female labor for other tasks as only 40 persons were 
deployed in 1958 to cook for the 356 households (339, p. 24). 
It was estimated that in 22 Hsiens along the Chao and Pai 
Rivers in Hopei, 1,117,994 persons were previously engaged 
in household duties. After the establishment of I80 People's 
Communes in that area, only 26^ of them were deployed for 
the same duties with 21^ of them released for serving in the 
communes* welfare facilities and 53^ of them became available 
for field work (252). 
According to the statistics of seven provinces, Honan, 
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Hunan, Shantung, Shansi, Kiansi, Liaoning and Heilungkiang, 
more than 20 million women were reported to have been 
relieved of domestic duties after the communization (3^0, 
p. 22). The households participating in the communes at 
the end of September in 1958 totaled 42,207,56? in these 
seven provinces (Table 33)* This means that on the average, 
every two households relieved more than one woman from 
child care, sewing, laundry, shoe-making, cleaning, cook­
ing and waiting on the old folks. If the situation in these 
seven provinces was representative of the whole nation, 
then collectivization of domestic chores would have released 
about 6l million women for "production" work. The actual 
number of women released for field production in 1958 was 
reported to be about 55 million, accounting for 45 to 50% 
of the labor force in rural areas (205, p. 60; 24l). Per­
haps viewed only from this angle, the argument that the 
emancipation of women and degree of economic developnent 
are positively correlated can be sustained. 
In addition, unified management of diversified activi­
ties in the communes also permits arrangements whereby the 
aged, the weak and the handicapped are assigned light work, 
such as handicraft, raising fowl and domestic animals, and 
elimination of flies, mosquitoes and rats. 
As a result of the large-scale mobilization of labor 
for various economic activities and for establishing small 
rural industries, which will be discussed later, almost all 
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the able-bodied in rural China by 1958 were taking part in 
productive work. On the average, they worked approximately 
300 days per year in 1959 (Table 13), Their working days 
in 1958 might have been higher. Table 15 shows that 25^ of 
the labor force in 1959 was allocated to basic construction; 
15^ to livestock breeding, afforestation, and subsidiary 
occupation; and 50^ to farming. 
3. Acceleration of collective savings and capital accumula­
tion 
The communization movement during 1958-1959 also 
enhanced the leadership's control over financial resources 
in rural areas. In addition to expanding the tax revenues of 
the central government, a unified administration of all 
economic and political activities in the communes enabled the 
leadership to plow back into capital accumulation virtually 
all increase in output. Some communes in 1958 also cut back 
the existing level of living. There were instances during 
the hightide of communization, when peasants in some communes 
ate only three pieces of dough buns (man-tow) per meal and 
sometimes had only soup for supper (109, p. l64). The 
crucial problem confronting the regime was to determine the 
optimum level of saving for the long-run economic development 
in rural China. Unfortunately, the existing statistical 
system and especially economic conditions in rural China defy 
any attempt to estimate meaningful coefficients, such as 
capital-output ratios and capital-labor ratios, for policy 
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purposes. 
Only a few communes in 1958 and 1959 had data concerning 
income distribution available for comparison. Those communes 
which experienced a large increase in gross income in 1958 
generally set aside 50^ or more of their gross revenue for 
accumulation (Table 29), Table 35 shows that the average 
saving rate in four communes was 51.3^ in 1958 as compared 
with 8.3^ for their predecessors in 1957. Agricultural 
failures in some communes perhaps forced a reduction of their 
saving rates in 1959» Two suburban communes in Table 35 
registered a saving rate of 17.6# in 1959. However, the 
aggregate savings of the rural communes, which included 
retained profits of the commune-operated industries and trans­
ferred payments from production brigades, totalled 100 to 200 
million yuan in 1959 (244). The financial conditions of pro­
duction brigades in 1959 was better than in 1958. The total 
collective savings in three-levels of the commîmes was said 
to be more than 10 billion yuan in 1959, about 6.7# of gross 
national output. On the average, each rural Inhabitant saved 
about 20 yuan. Adding the working capital, the 24,000 
communes in 1959 had 20 billion yuan of common funds at their 
disposal (347). This means that each commune in 1959 had on 
the average 833 thousand yuan of common funds, equivalent to 
23 units of the Stalin-80 type tractor or 192 Ferguson units. 
These high rates of savings in the communes raised the 
proportion of the aggregate investment to gross national 
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product during 1958 and 1959. According to Hollister*s esti­
mate, gross fixed investment as a proportion of gross na­
tional product increased from 15.9# in 1957 to 25.7# in 1959 
(121, p. 40). Fixed investment here is defined to include 
all additions and major repairs to buildings and productive 
facilities and to exclude changes in inventories and pro­
curement of military equipment. A substantial increase in 
fixed investment resulted from capital investment in small-
scale heavy industry, which presumably was financed prima­
rily by rural communes (cf 121, p. 51). 
Table 35. Change in savings and consumption in rural 
communes* 
Pour communes^ Five 
(and their Two Brigades in 
Unit predecessors) communes^ Chin-Chou 
1957 1958 1959 Commune 
i960 
Gross 
income 
1,000 
yuan 
8,990.5 53,604.0 20,660 568 
Collective 
savings as 
% of gross 
income 
% 8.3 51.3 17.6 7.1 
Allocated 
portion as 
% of gross 
income 
% 71.6 23.6 51.2 72.5 
•Source: Tables 29 and 30; 203, p. 128; 393, p. 28-32; 
403, p. 20. 
*Refer to Sputnik, Su-lee, Ho-san Chiao and Tai-Chien 
Communes. 
^Huang-pu and Kiang-tung Communes. 
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Not all savings in rural communes were allocated to 
construct small industries. A part was used to procure 
agricultural machinery, diesel pumps, and chemical fertili­
zers, which increased at high rates in 1958 and 1959 (Table 
21). The increase rates of these capital goods has acceler­
ated since i960. For example, 80% of mechanized facilities 
for irrigation and drainage in Kwangtung in 1964 had been 
built after the communization (427, p. 11). 
Social overhead capital in the form of schools, 
hospitals, roads and communication facilities also expanded 
rapidly in the communes. By the end of 1958» there were 
established in the people's communes 3.4 million mess halls, 
over 3.4 million nurseries and kindergartens, 150 thousand 
"happy homes" for the aged, about 60 thousand cultural 
halls and stations, and I80 thousand amateur dramatic 
groups (40, pp. 33 and 44). At the end of 1959, one million 
doctors and public health personnel worked in 200,000 
hospitals, maternity homes, and public health stations 
operated by 24,000 communes (275» p. 7). 
Compared with non-communist countries, social overhead 
capital has a different connotation in Communist China. In 
the non-communist countries social overhead capital stimu­
lates the expansion of private enterprises by reducing their 
cost of production, thus raising their profits. Expansion 
of private enterprises will bring about general economic 
development. In Communist China, social overhead investment 
205 
in rural communes will not promote private enterprises, 
which are prohibited by the regime. However, social over­
head capital can increase the productivity of the communes* 
members and push down the direct production cost of small 
industries operated by the communes. As discussed in 
Chapter VIII, 80^ of profits earned by the commune industries 
had to be transferred to the state. Therefore, capital 
accumulation in rural communes not only relieves the burden 
of central government in rural modernization, it makes more 
rural resources available to the central government. 
In addition, rural communes also transferred a part of 
their income in forms of agricultural taxes to support 
industrialization in urban areas. Table 29 shows that some 
communes surrendered more than 12^ of their gross revenues 
to the central government in forms of agricultural taxes 
and transferred payments of profits. Agricultural taxes 
of 3,260 million yusui in 1958, though larger than that in any 
previous years, accounted for 7.8# of the total state budget 
for the year (44], p. 10). This proportion is lower than 
that in the 1953-1957 period (4l5, p. 23), 
To the communist leaders, at least during the period 
1958-1959» the high rates of savings and capital formation 
were essential and will accelerate the transition of the 
economically backward country into an industrial one. 
According to Mao Tse-tung, "three years of tremendous effort" 
will bring forth "a thousand years" of happiness (cf. 68, 
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p. 3-4). This idea is very close to the "critical minimum 
effort" hypothesis advocated by some economists in the West 
(l46, p. 94-110; 374, p. 19-26), These economists argue that 
in order to put the low-income countries into the orbit of 
"sustained development", the initial effort to development is 
necessarily of a certain critical minimum size. Historically, 
industrial development of European countries in the late l6th 
century and early 17th century and industrialization of 
England in the last half of the I8th century relied heavily 
on high rates of capital formation, or in terms of Marxian, 
"primitive accumulation" (111). According to Kuznet's cal­
culation, Sweden plowed 20,2^ of gross national product back 
to capital formation during 1911-1920 (374, p. 43). However, 
capital formation at 25^ of gross national product experi­
enced in China in 1958 and 1959 has few historical prece­
dents, It clearly reveals that the Chinese communists 
weighted more heavily on the preference scale future develop­
ment them present material comfort. 
It is true that in the early period of economic develop­
ment, the living standards of the population cannot be used as 
criteria to measure the achievement of economic policy. How­
ever, excessive saving or low consumption will impair health 
and vitality of workers smd so their productivity. Never­
theless, there were no signs to show that health conditions 
of communes* members were affected adversely in the period 
1958-1959» though there were such signs in ensuing years. 
207 
4-. Promotion of rural Industries 
Not only the rural communes can increase collective 
savings, they also can allocate these savings in the desired 
direction. The rural communes have promoted rural indus­
trialization, in the sense of rapid expansion of small mining 
and manufactures on a considerable scale. 
a. Development of rural industries With their own 
financial resources and existing primitive technology, the* 
rural communes have established a variety of small factories, 
which facilitate exploiting and transforming scattered 
natural resources into needed products for each locality. 
These rural industries include iron smelting mills, power 
plants, oil extraction works, coal mines, fertilizer plants, 
cement works, brick factories, sugar-refining plants, 
lumbering mills, workshops for producing and repairing farm 
tools, and food processing plants. Such industries are small 
to medium in scale and employ both modern and indigenous 
methods of production. 
Since the beginning of 1958, almost every province was 
reported to have established small factories at a high rate. 
In the first eight months of 1958, the industrial output in 
China was reported to be ^7% over the corresponding period of 
1957 (237). It was also reported that 6 million out of 7.5 
million small enterprises constructed in January-September, 195^ 
were built and operated by APC's and the rural communes (108, 
pp. 236-237). The small factories continued to grow. By 
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the first half of 1959» the rural communes ran more than 
700,000 Industrial units which produced a gross output value 
of 7.1 billion yuan, about 10^ of the gross output value of 
Industry (4o, p. 32 and 44). After the back-yard furnaces 
were abandoned In the spring of 1959, other modern small 
Industries took their place. By the end of 1959, there were 
1 
200,000 Industrial units run by the rural communes (357, pp. 
1-7). In 1959» products of these small and medium-sized 
Industries were said to account for three-quarters of the 
total coke output In the nation, three-fifths of the paper 
output, over two-thirds of the edible vegetable oils, one-
half of both pig Iron and sugar, one-third of crude steel, 
and one-slzth of cement (423, P. 42; 254, p. 2). 
After Intensive analysis, reorganization and Improvement 
In 1959, there were In the country more than 60,000 Industrial 
units operated by the hslen government and more than 200,000 
by the communes In early I96O (excluding those operated by the 
production brigades) (351, p. 29). As of the last half of 
i960 the communes still produced about 10^ of the gross product 
of the country (363» PP. 20-21). 
Two significant rural Industries were electric power 
stations and fertilizer plants. Since the adoption of the 
Twelve-Year Science Plan and the Draft Programme for Agricul­
tural Development In 1956, the regime began to pay attention 
to the possibility of farm mechanization, rural electrifica­
tion and Increased use of chemical fertilizers. When the 
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rural commîmes were finally set up in 1958, 4,334 electric 
power stations were immediately built in rural areas with 
capacity totalling 131,502 kilowatts. The number of rural 
electric stations grew to 4,878 in 1959 with a power 
generating capacity of 151,8o6 kilowatts. Most of these 
-stations were small and indigenous, with an average capacity 
of 31»5 K.W. (248). It is impossible to evaluate whether 
they were optimum in scale as there were no data concerning 
the available resources and technical possibilities in each 
locality. Partly owing to the swift establishment of small 
fertilizer plants in rural areas, the total production of 
chemical fertilizers excluding ammonium nitrate in the 
nation increased from 63I thousand tons in 1957 to 1,330 
thousands in 1959 (Table 39). The total output of all 
chemical fertilizers was 750,000 tons in 1957 and 1,510,000 
tons in 1959 (Table 21). 
b. Backyard furnaces The boldest and most signifi­
cant development in the rural industrialization movement 
was the mushrooming of small blast furnaces and Bessemer 
converters in the backyards of farm houses. It was reported 
that in 1957, there were in the nation only 22 provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions smelting iron and only 
17 of them making steel; and that there were in the nation 
only 95 iron and steel enterprises, small and large (155, 
p. 6). By July, 1959) there were more than 12,000 small 
blast furnaces, about 95% of them smaller than 70 cubic 
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meters, and more than 7,000 of them applying indigenous 
method and smaller than 3 cubic meters (420, p. l6). These 
small furnaces increased to more than 500,000 in September, 
1958 (135, p. 115). 
In 1958, these indigenous small furnaces and converters 
produced 30^ of the 13*69 million tons of steel output in 
the nation (Table 39). It was claimed that at the end of 
1958, the production capacity of the steel industry was 
twice the steel requirement of the machine building 
industry (127, p. 308). 
But the pig iron produced by the indigenous methods was 
later proved to be unsuitable for steel making (63, p. 5). 
It was also highly uneconomical as far as the labor output 
was concerned. It required 50-60 work-days, for example, 
to produce one ton of pig iron (127, p. 306). Thus replace­
ment of native iron-smelting furnaces by the small and 
medium-sized modem furnaces took place in the spring of 
1959. In his report in August, 1959, Chou En-lai^ indicated 
that the small blast furnaces then in operation were between 
6,5 and 100 cubic meters each. Those furnaces smaller than 
3 cubic meters which were in operation in the last half of 
1958 were presumably abandoned. The proportion of pig iron 
which met the specified standard had increased to about 75,^ of 
the total output produced by small blast furnaces in July, 
1959. The aggregate capacity of the small blast furnaces 
in 1959 amounted to 43,000 cubic meters, nearly twice as much 
\ 
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as the total volume of the large blast furnaces in the 
cou n t r y .  T h e  l a t t e r  t o t a l l e d  2 4 , 0 0 0  c u b i c  m e t e r s  ( 6 3 ,  p .  6 ) .  
It was claimed that by the end of 1959 all provinces, muni­
cipalities, and autonomous regions, except Tibet, could 
produce iron and steel, and that there were 1,400 iron and 
steel enterprises of different sizes and some 3,000 small 
iron and steel producing units employing indigenous methods 
(155» p. 6). These native furnaces thus provided the needed 
raw materials for farm implements and facilitated the semi-
mechanization of agriculture. 
Owing to rapid development of iron, steel and machinery 
industries and their better geographical distribution, the 
Chairman of National Planning Commission Li Pu-chun pro­
claimed in August, i960, that a complete national industrial 
system was taking shape and that China's ability to supply 
itself with machinery and equipment increased from some 60^ 
in 1957 to over 80^ in 1959 (23, p. 6). This 80# of 
machinery requirements likely does not include those of 
agricultural machinery. 
c« Advantages of rural industries Despite the low 
quality of their product, small indigenous industries had 
advantages in exploiting fully the scattered resources and 
satisfying the imperative needs of the inhabitants. They 
relieved modem large industries of the burden of rural 
modernization. For example, iron and steel produced by 
backyard farmers were used to make primitive railway tracks 
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on which light locomotives or hand-operated carts could run. 
These transportation facilities are not efficient by stan­
dards of modern society, but are very useful in the 
backward countryside. In 1959, about 55% of the gross 
output of the commune-operated industries was used to assist 
agricultural production (155, p. 7; 249). The proportion 
of rural industrial output serving agricultural production 
dropped to kO-50% in late i960 (363, pp. 20-21). 
The cost of producing goods for local use by 
rural industries is low. As products of rural industries 
are mainly used to meet local needs, they reduce the 
transportation cost between material sources, manufacturing 
firms and the markets. The production of these small 
industries is labor-intensive and so requires little capital 
investment. In addition, the gestation period of these 
industries is very short. For example, it only takes six 
to eight months to construct the small chemical fertilizer 
plants operated by the hsien governments, but more than two 
years are required to construct medium-sized modern fac­
tories (4l6, pp. 8-9). It was also claimed that the small 
modem blast furnaces of the size of 8 cubic metres re­
quired only 80,000 yuan of capital investment and three 
months of construction, but produced 4,000 tons of pig iron 
(321, p. 31). The small indigenous blast furnaces required 
much less capital investment and only 7 to 8 days for 
construction. According to the investigation on the rural 
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industries operated by 78 people's communes, the profit 
of these industries totalled 12 million yuan in 1959 which 
accounted for about 40^ of the total communal accumulation 
(249% 351, p. 31). 
If these local industries can utilize the seasonally 
unemployed labor, the cost of their products will be lower. 
If a diversified economy can be developed in each commune 
as the result of simultaneous construction of a variety of 
small industries, the impact of weather changes on the rural 
population will be reduced. Furthermore, small and diversi­
fied industries will enlarge the market size for each other 
and increase revenue and utility for the commune members by 
processing the perishable farm products and wild plants, 
and by making by-products from the waste materials. For 
example, sugar cane, in addition to making sugar, can be 
used to make synthetic fiber, paper, alcohol and other 
chemical by-products. 
Some rural industries might operate at a relatively high 
cost at their Initiation, but the cost could be reduced 
after a certain period of operation and improvement. It is 
especially so when the small indigenous Industries in rural 
areas could acquire technical know-how and assistance from 
large and modern industries in urban areas. Rural indus­
trialization and diffusion of technical knowledge to rural 
peasants will help destroy the superstition which has pre­
vailed in rural China and reduce the discrepancy between city 
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and country, and between workers and peasants. The blind 
outmigration of peasants to towns and creation of new slums, 
which are common in most countries in the course of their 
industrialization, can be avoided. As 80^ of the profit 
earned by the commune-operated industries has to be trans­
ferred to the state, expansion of rural industries will 
facilitate the transition from communal ownership of means 
of production to ownership by the state. 
5. Economies of integration and rural modernization 
Besides promoting saving and rural industrialization, 
the rural communes, due to the economies of integration, 
can expedite social overhead investment and rural modemi-
I 
zation. 
a. Economies of integration By integration here is 
meant the merger of collective farms, coordination of 
economic activities in the commune by a single agency, unity 
of state power and economic functions, and identity of 
private benefits and collective benefits at the commune level. 
Therefore, there exists no divergency between private pro­
duct and "social products" nor between "private profits" and 
social benefit within the commune as is the case in the 
market economy. 
Owing to this integration the communes theoretically 
can undertake and/or encourage those enterprises which in the 
long run will turn out maximum output from all available 
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resources, if there are adequate technical and management 
personnel. Social overhead capital, such as government 
services in law and order, education, public health, 
research and development, transportation, communication 
networks, financial facilities, afforestation. Irrigation 
and drainage systems, can be formed and fostered for the 
long-term benefit of the whole commune. 
Risk and uncertainty is the major component of research 
and development. To an individual in the market economy, 
a failure of invention and innovation could mean hardship 
for his family. The commune provides the collective 
insurance to individuals who engage in innovation, which, 
according to Schumpeter, includes new products, new methods 
of production, new markets, new sources of raw materials 
and new organizations. To communist leaders, an innovation 
in forms of organization such as the establishment of commune 
will promote other forms of innovation, ©ils is an exten­
sion of a Marxist-Lenlnst ideology that the proper adjustment 
of the production relations will facilitate the rapid 
technological innovation and development of the productive 
forces. As the collective benefit of the commune and 
Individual benefits of its members coincide in the commune, 
all new discoveries and knowledge of an individual would 
presumably not be kept in secrecy, but would be proliferated 
to other fellow members and even to the whole country. 
In the west, it has been argued that expansion of a 
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firm to a certain scale permits economies of scale. As 
management smd capital equipment are indivisible, it is 
argued, a large firm will have the benefits of realizing 
internal technological economies and internalizing poten­
tial external economies. External economies of a firm 
are the services or benefits of the firm provided free of 
charge to other firms. Social overhead capital provides 
external economies to private firms, in addition a 
simultaneous expansion of various complementary industries 
In a region will promote the cumulative development of the 
areas because, it is also argued in the west, all industries 
will enlarge marketsand provide external economies for each 
other. 
Economies of integration In the commune certainly 
Include the foregoing economies of scale. In addition, a 
coordinated action in the commune will facilitate efficient 
economic planning of various activities, if there is an 
adequate mechanism for resource allocation. However, this 
mechanism was lacking in Communist China during 1958-1959• 
Furthermore, the commune can promote specialization or 
division of labor of all communal activities and harvest 
the advantages of division of labor elaborated by Adam Smith, 
i.e,, enhancement of skill, dexterity and judgment of the 
commune members. In the agricultural sector, the commune 
can redlvide all the cultivated land into several optimum-
size farming fields, in accordance with available technology 
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and capital equipment. In some instances, the farm can be 
expanded to the size much larger than that dictated by-
optimum use of the existing capital and technology in anti­
cipation of the future mechanization of agriculture. 
Collective raising of swine and cattle in the communes, 
for example, will save manpower. When swine production was 
still a family subsidiary occupation, a person could raise 
only about 40 head of pigs efficiently. A man is able to 
raise 200 head of pigs in the commune when machinery and 
expert knowledge of pig breeding are available (350, p. 48). 
In the communes, less labor will be needed to collect the 
same amounts of hay, vegetables and wild fruits for feeding 
pigs, or to collect pig manure for field use, if some 
skilled personnel are assigned for these jobs. Their skill 
and knowledge of pig breeding will increase if they are 
specialized in their tasks. The communes also have the 
advantage of setting aside a higher proportion of pigs as 
gilts and sows to meet their production quota, a form of 
forced saving to promote production. 
The argument that integration promotes economy in 
production and so the over-all development of the region 
seems to hinge on the assumption that there exist or will 
exist, in the commune an efficient technical capacity and 
skilled management. An integration of all activities in the 
commune facilitates efficient utilization of technical skill 
and capacity. When all production activities in the commune 
are aggregated, the economies of integration imply that their 
relevant average cost curve is downwardly sloping. The 
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optimum size of the commune which will maximize the economies 
of integration at a given time, is a function of available 
leadership, capital equipment, transport facilities and natural 
resources. Therefore, determination of the optimum size of the 
commune is an empirical question and will require years of re­
search and experiment. The commune presently is in its initial 
stage, Basic data about its economic activities are almost 
totally lacking. Therefore the question of the optimum size of 
the commune is for a moment unanswerable. 
Expansion of social overhead capital in the commune has 
been discussed previously.^ This section will be devoted 
to the role of two important types of overhead capital, i.e., 
education and agricultural research in the modernization of 
rural China. 
b. Education An important type of social overhead 
capital is education. Expenditure on education is considered 
a kind of capital investment because this sort of expenditure 
is generally not made to satisfy the immediate want of an 
individual. Still, it will directly increase the productiv­
ity of the educated by enhancing his skill and/or indirectly 
by promoting his ability in scientific discovery and technical 
innovation. The skill and knowledge of the educated will 
presumably benefit the society over their life time. Perhaps 
for these reasons, both communist and non-communist countries 
stress the importance of human capital in social and economic 
^See pp. 204-205. 
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development despite their ideological difference. 
Education appears to be an important enterprise for 
China's modernization as her science and technology have 
lagged behind that of the western countries. Available 
ebidence indicates that more than 80^ of the population were 
illiterate in pre-communist China. In 1940*8 there were 
only about 15 veterinarians in all China, and not more than* 
20 specialists in other phases of animal science (108, p. 
231). Fostering of scientific and technological personnel 
has been the continuous effort of the communist regime (cf. 
108, pp. 5 and 30; 42, pp. 8-9). 
However, science and technology and so education still 
appeared to be the bottlenecks of China's development in the 
1950's. Table 2 shows that the aggregate national income of 
communist China in 1958 ranked third in the world. But her 
rank in human resource development during the 1950-1959 period 
was, according to the composite index of Harbison and Myers, 
50th among 75 countries. China's rank in human resource 
development might not accurately represent her comparative 
position in this aspect, as the Harbison-Myers index does not 
take the spare-time education of China into account (112, pp. 
31-34 and 45-48). The index nevertheless indicates China's 
relative underdevelopment of human resource, which might 
have greatly affected her economic development. The causal 
relation between economic development and human resource 
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development can not be determined from statistical analysis 
but the correlation between.the composite index of human 
resource development and per capita GNP of 75 nations is 
estimated to be + 0.888 (112, pp. 38-44). 
Paralleling with the great leap forward in production, 
education was stressed and developed at a rapid pace during 
1958-1959. In 1958, students in primary schools increased 
from 64.3 millions to 86.4 millions; in middle schools, 
from 6 , 3  millions to 8.5 millions; in vocational schools, 
from 778 thousand to 1,470 thousands; and in institutes of 
higher learning, from 44l thousands to 660 thousands (40, 
p. 192). In the same year, 85^ of school-age children in 
the nation were in school (40, p. 188). As the result, 40 
million people became literate in 1958 as compared with 
7.2 millions in 1957 (4o, p. 198). 
One educational institution in the rural commune as well 
as in the urban factories that has been stressed recently 
is spare-time education. Because of spare-time and commune-
operated schools, the proportion of workers* and peasants* 
children was said to account for 75^ of the 1958 middle 
school enrollment and 48% of advanced institute students 
(75, p. 50). In September, 1959, it was reported that there 
were nearly 100 million students registered in schools of all 
levels, as compared with 97 million in 1958 (75, P» 49). In 
addition to 810,000 regulars, 300,000 part-time students 
attended institutes of higher learing in 1959. A majority 
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of 2.96 million students in more than 30,000 agricultural 
middle schools enrolled in the half-day agricultural schools 
operated by the communes. At the end of 1959» the communes 
operated 25,000 agricultural middle and general middle 
schools and 270,000 primary schools (247). Educational pro­
grams in the communes advanced further in the early i960's 
as China will need the service of one million higher and 
middle-ranking agricultural technicians within a 7 to 10 
year period starting with i960 (87, pp. 26-28). In addition 
to 90 million primary school students, which accounted for 
87^ of the school-aged children, the commune mass-educated 
facilities provided spare-time schooling and training to 
130 million peasants in early i960 177, p. 11; 387, p. 237). 
It is understandable that the quality of the spare-time 
education is low. However it can eliminate illiteracy and 
increase labor productivity at a relatively low cost. A 
spare-time education does not take away labor needed for 
farming. The spare-time education has proliferated because 
it also appeals to the communist leaders as a means of 
achieving the three objectives laid down by the Directive on 
Education Works of 1958, that is, integration of education 
and productive activités, creation of "communist men", and 
promotion of the proletarian cause. These objectives are 
incorporated in the slogan "red and expert". The conviction 
of the communist leaders that technology should be learned 
from actual practice in production certainly also aided 
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the development of this process. In these schools, courses 
relating to technology and agricultural mechanization are 
strongly emphasized. 
In the spring of I960, the Director of the propaganda 
department, Lu Ting-yi, stressed the desirability of estab­
lishing an increasing number of spare-time schools of all 
varieties (77, p. 2). It was reported in January, 1964, that 
those who were graduated from the spare-time elementary 
schools numbered more than a million and those from spare-
time universities more than 15,000 (296). Because of their 
high speed in turning out desired "products", the spare-
time schools were labelled "revolutionary schools". 
There has been in the west the "low absorptive capacity" 
theory, which advocates that for many reasons, the under­
developed economies are not able to increase substantially 
their employment level. If the spare-time education is 
adopted in both industrial factories and rural communes, this 
"low absorptive capacity theory" will lose a great deal of 
its relevance. 
c. Agricultural research and extension Another social 
overhead investment which will directly increase farm output 
and indirectly modernize rural areas is agricultural research 
and extension programs. 15ie communes appear to be a good 
institution for this enterprise. Since their initiation, the 
people's communes have carried out various kinds of agricul­
tural experiments in forms of experimental plots, large-tract 
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"bumper-harvest fields" and demonstration fields. It is the 
purpose of this section to discuss their development. 
Farming had been an individual business and was follow­
ing the same pattern in pre-communist China. Any improved 
methods and advanced knowledge about farming had fallen 
into oblivion soon after the inventors died. No systematic 
effort had been made to find out the "objective rule" for a 
high productivity in some regions. 
The great leap forward movement set in motion a series 
of agricultural experiments and extension works which ori­
ginally were to pool the wisdom of the masses to raise farm 
output. First, the communes have set up many weather 
stations and other research units to explore the soil struc­
ture, topographical and meteorological conditions, and the 
frost-free period of each locality. Thus they facilitate the 
production planning of various crops. Based on this know­
ledge, peasants and party cadres at local levels are urged 
to set up experimental plots in each locality and, through 
trial and error, to seek the optimal application of the 
"eight-point charter" for their agricultural production. In 
other words, the commune members are encouraged to find out 
the optimum mix of the eight measures which presumably will 
increase agricultural output. These eight measures are soil 
improvement (deep plowing and soil amelioration), increased 
use of fertilizers, water conservation, seed selection, 
dense planting, plant protection, field management and 
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improved tools. When the "objective rule" or the optimum 
mix of eight measures is discovered and legitimated "by the 
party leaders, it is spread over other interested areas 
to be initiated. It is the first time in Chinese history 
that the grass-root experiences of peasants are held in 
a high regard and seriously studied. 
Construction of experimental plots actually began in 
1957; the immediate results were reported to be remarkable. 
For example, from two mou of experiment fields for cotton 
improvement built by Wang Shu-Mei of Chen-an Commune, Tse 
Hsien, Hopei recorded 700 catties of cotton per mou in the 
spring of 1958 while the national average of cotton pro­
duction in 1958 was 49 catties (251). Similar results 
were also obtained in experimental plots of rice and wheat. 
The communes were thus called to set up their own experi­
mental plots and analyze the results. The know-how obtained 
from these experimental fields was then applied to large tracts 
of land called "high-yield fields" or "bumper-harvest fields", 
because these fields were expected to realize output much 
higher than ordinary fields. In the fall of 1958, most areas 
had 10 to 20^ of their land cultivated in forms of bumper-
harvest fields (195)' In 1959» 25^ of the sown area in Hopei 
was cultivated in forms of "high-yield plots", which produced 
40^ of the total output in that province (25I). 
Development of a large-tract "bumper-harvest field" 
involved a combining of many tiny plots and redividing them 
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into a few large tracts, depending upon the topographical 
condition, available farm machinery and accessibility of the 
irrigation facilities of each area. There were no data 
available to estimate the optimum size for these large tracts. 
According to Lewis, the optimum size of farms in Western 
Europe ranged from 300 to 400 acres in early 1950's. The 
optimum size in China should be smaller as the levels of 
management and capital equipment in Chinese agricultural 
are expected to be lower than in Western European countries. 
If the optimum farm in Western Europe were used as a norm 
for the large-tract bumper-harvest fields, one bumper-
harvest field could be established in a production brigade. 
Table 24 shows that on the average, an advanced APC, the 
predecessor of the production brigade, possessed about 290 
acres of cultivated land in 1955 and 430 acres in the spring 
of 1958. 
Experiments of farmers in Yenpien District in North­
east Kirin province reportedly resulted in a discovery of 
a new method of raising high-yield paddy rice in the area 
where the frost-free days averaged only 120 to l60 a year. 
A third of the cultivated area in that region was thus sown 
with this crop with the new method in 1962 as compared with 
11^ of arable land planted with paddy rice in 1946 (217, P. 
15). 
The immediate results of bumper-harvest fields were 
remarkable, partly due to some random factors such as 
226 
relative good weather conditions. The incomplete statis­
tical survey of Shensi, Hbpei, Shangtung, Honan, Kiangsu, 
Anhwei, and Hupei provinces registered the following 
"bumper-harvest fields" with per mou yield of wheat over 
500 catties, which is the I967 target set by the National 
Programme for Agricultural Development for the region between 
i 
the Yellow Hiver and Huai River. 
Per mou output ^ ^ 
of wheat (catties) Sown area (mou) 
Over 500 9,240,000.00 
1,000 - 2,000 754,300.00 
2,000 - 3,000 4,236.00 
3,000 - 4,000 267.47 
4,000 - 5,000 34.00 
Over 5,000 8.7O 
An output per mou of over 3,000 catties was actually 
recorded in small plots of land, which perhaps differed 
little from the experimental plots. %e high yield in 
bumper-harvest fields resulted from increased use of inputs 
on the same unit of land. According to the 1959 data in 
four production brigades of the Chi-Chou Commune, An-Kuo 
Hsien, Hbpei, production expenses per mou of wheat in 
"bumper-harvest fields" were 98^ higher than the ordinary 
fields while labor days on the former were 78^ higher than 
Source: 96b, p. 44. 
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the latter (85, p. 25). 
Perhaps impressed by the ability of bumper-harvest 
fields in raising farm output, the party leaders enthus­
iastically encouraged the establishment of these new fields 
over the nation in 1958-1959. At the same time, the total 
cultivated and sown areas in these two years were reduced 
below the 1957 level (Table l6). It must be noted that each 
of the eight measures for increasing farm output has its 
limitations and can contribute to farm output only under 
certain conditicxis. For example, in 1959 when 22 catties 
of wheat and 25 catties of fertilizaer were applied to one 
mou of land, the resulting output was 450 catties per mou. 
The output per mou was raised to 600 catties when 4o catties 
of wheat and 115 catties of fertilizer were applied, but 
dropped to 575 catties when 80 catties of wheat and 294 
catties of fertilizer were applied to the same unit of 
land (342, p. 33; cf. 108, pp. 258-259). 
The construction of "bumper-harvest fields" was based 
on one or two years of experience/ with experimental plots 
conducted by veteran peasants and party cadres, who lacked 
scientific and technological knowledge about farming. It 
should have been anticipated that the optimum mix of inputs 
in various circumstances could not be accertained from a 
short period of experiments, even by professional agrono­
mists. The climate and other factors differ substantially 
over time and space. The output per mou varied accordingly. 
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To build a major program on two years of experimental evidence 
was a risky undertaking. The limitations of these "bumper-
harvest fields" was revealed in early 1959* When weather 
conditions changed abruptly in some areas, the bumper-
harvest fields in these areas failed to bring about high 
yields. Finally, agricultural catastrophe overtook China in 
i960 when the worst natural disasters of the century plagued 
a major part of the nation. 
Since then, the party leaders have turned their 
attention to seeking the objective rule of achieving high 
as well as stable yields under various circumstances. The 
role of professional and technical personnel in discovering 
this objective rule has been emphasized. The close coopera­
tion among party cadres, technicians and veteran peasants 
has also been encouraged in hope of bringing about a better 
coordination between research laboratories, experimental 
plots and field production. Scientists and veteran peasants 
have been called occasionally to take part in national con­
ferences sponsored by the State Council to discuss any 
technological innovations. For example, a national confer­
ence of this sort was called in September, 1963» to discuss 
the new method of cotton production discovered by the model 
farmer Chu Yao-li. It was reported that the production team 
to which he belonged recorded an average yield of 135 catties 
of ginned cotton from 124 mou of land in I96I despite the 
spring dry spell and that the average yield of cotton 
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production of his commune was the highest among all rural 
communes in the nation (218; 41, p. 20). 
In order to spread this advanced knowledge and exper­
iences of agricultural science and production, which are 
gained from the few research laboratories, experimental i 
plots, high-yield fields and other countries, to all the 
peasants in the country, a comprehensive and systematic 
network of agricultural experiments and extension was devel­
oped in 1963. Each local administrative unit, such as 
special district, hsien and commune, and production brigade, 
was requested to have some of its component units set up 
"demonstration plots" or "advanced experience pools". The 
size of a demonstration plot ranged from 100 mou to 10,000 
mou (310). A scientific research unit composed of party 
cadres, agricultural scientists and veteran peasants was 
the assigned to a demonstration plot to collect the pro­
duction experiences in its respective area and conduct 
research and experiments for that region. The demonstra-
ition plot then demonstrates its results to neighboring units 
and serves as a concrete example for them to follow. Bie 
staff of demonstration plots also can operate spare-time 
schools and training classes to propagate agricultural 
knowledge and techniques to the commune members. Various 
neighboring demonstration plots also can exchange their 
infoimation to develop agricultural science. 
According to the report of the Vice-Minister of Agriculture 
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Klaoig Yl-chun in April, 1965, demonstration plots have 
resulted in an increase of farm output by 20 to 30^ in the 
ordinarily hiyield areas and by 30 to 100$ in the ordin­
arily low-yield areas even under adverse conditions (305; 
310). Developing demonstration plots is thus considered as 
an important measure to realize a high and stable yield over 
a large area of China and the central link in promoting 
China's agricultural science. The demonstration plot has 
been publicized as the best unit which integrates science 
and production, theory and practice, experiment and extension, 
and which will foster the "red and expert" in the agricultural 
sector. The number of demonstration plots has multiplied in 
every province. The number of the scientific experimental 
units in rural China increased correspondingly. There were 
only a few experimental units in 1958. The number increased 
to 11,000 in 1964 and to hundreds of thousands in 1965 (309; 
310). The quality of some experimental units may not be 
high, but they can satisfy the immediate needs of each region 
and lay down the foundation for future development. 
The immediate effect of some demonstration fields on the 
output of their nighboring communes and brigades was said 
to be great. There were only three brigades in Chuwo county 
yielding more than 100 catties per mou of cotton in 1962. 
After the e]Gtablishment of demonstration plots in 1963» it 
was reported that 45 brigades in the county recorded per mou 
yields of more than 100 catties in I963 and more brigades 
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were expected to surpass that 100-catty level In 1964 (44). 
The records of Pao-tln Special District, Hopei show that 
after one year of services provided by the demonstration 
fields, more than 30,000 mou of its cotton-producing land 
had a per mou yield of some 70 catties in 1964, twice the 
level of a normal year (309)* The exact reason for this 
large increase in output is unknown. 
Several years of agricultural experiments and one year 
of demonstration plots also helped the party leaders to 
reach a tentative conclusion in early 1964 that the most 
important measures for a stable high yield in production 
were water control, increased use of fertilizer and seed 
selection (297). Fertilizer, formerly used exlusively for 
producing food grains, was commonly applied in cotton pro­
duction in 1964 (4l, p. 20), 
Agricultural research and experimentation with the 
cooperation of industrial factories, have also eventuated 
the invention of new farm implements, e.g., one for rice 
transplantation and another for wheat harvesting, which 
suit the special conditions of each region. Agricultural 
experimentation on a large scale was finàly called for in 
the spring of 1965 after the national conference on experi-
mantal works in the agricultural science. The same process 
of experimentation and extension also can be, and actually 
has been, developed in animal husbandry and other agricul­
tural activities. 
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6, Security measures against perils 
The rural commune can be considered as a formalized in­
stitution of social insurance for the peasants who, in the 
pre-communist period, organized a variety of secret societies 
to protect themselves from national disasters or bandit 
attacks. 
The combined use of wage and free supply systems in the 
communes provides daily necessities to the poor, the aged, 
the weak and disabled members in the ordinary time. Before 
the communization, 30^ of the rural population was unable to 
make both ends meet (344, p. 19). In the time of agricultural 
failures, the commune serves as a center for receiving gov­
ernment relief and distributing available food equitably 
among the commune members. The Chinese communist leadership, 
Joan Robinson, Anna Strong and Greene maintained that this 
free supply system in the communes, with the help of a better 
transportation system, had greatly reduced the Impacts of 
agricultural failures during the I96O-I962 period. As a 
result, there was no report of starvation in the sense of 
death due to hunger. 
The militia system implemented in the communes is also an 
economical means of strengthening the defense capacity of the 
nation. The militiamen are the reserve army for the national 
defense but take part in production activities during peace 
time. They could be used to guard the rear fronts and supple­
ment the regular army in the event of war. The idea of 
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organizing the young commune members into the militia is 
closely related to a military thou^t of Mao: "The deepest 
source of the immense power of war lies in the masses of the 
people." (172, p, 474). However the militia system can be 
considered as an integration of the modern conscription 
system and the ancient military system of "building up the 
army in agriculture". 
As the communes possess potential capacities in the col­
lective security, the communist leaders hope to enhance within 
them the spirit of mutual assistance and one day to transfer 
the present collective ownership in the communes to ownership 
by the whole people. 
B. Defects of the Communization 
If well managed, the potential advantages of the communes 
will promote the agricultural development of communist China. 
However, it can be said without doubt that there has not as 
yet been in history a perfect institution for economic devel­
opment. Establishing the rural communes at this stage of 
China's development certainly has its seamy side. Ironically, 
some of the defects which have been manifest are just what 
the communist leaders sought to overcome by setting up the 
communes. These defects seemed to outweigh the advantages 
of the commune during the I96O-I962 period and as a result 
brought about three years of agricultural failures. These 
three years of bitter experiences certainly had convinced 
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the communist leaders that the socialist transformation of 
rural institutions alone would not surmount the traditional 
problems of Chinese agriculture. The regime thus has made 
a series of adjustments in its economic policies as well as 
in the commune system in hope» of arresting the retarding 
forces on the one hand and to consolidate the moving forces 
on the other. Althou^ the economy started to recover from 
the disasters in late I962 (cf Chapter XII), the regime has 
so far not succeeded in bringing the masses back into the 
lively atmosphere of the early phase of the commune. 
Adjustments of economic policies and the commune system 
will be discussed in the next chapter. The purpose of this 
section is to elaborate the elements which brou^t on disas­
ters to the commune system and Chinese economy at large during 
the I960-I962 period. The order of discussion does not imply 
the relative significance of each factor in the crisis, 
1, Inadequacy to cope with vagaries of weather 
Natural forces are important factors affecting changes 
in agricultural production. But the exact extent of their 
effects depends upon the geographical and soil features, 
varieties of crops planted, and capital investment in each 
area, and their interaction. 
According to the multiple curvilinear regression analyses 
made of com yield in five U,S, Com Belt states for the 
period 1930 to 1962, weather is concluded to be a more im­
portant factor than land selection and technology in affect­
235 
ing the output per acre of com. The variation of weather 
is said to account for two thirds or more of the increase in 
corn yields in the Com Belt from i960 to I96I (^31). For 
the I93O-I962 period, four variables, i.e., technology, pre­
season rainfall, July rainfall and August temperature, were 
concluded to provide 80# of the com yield variation (431, 
p. 9). If the com production in these five states is used 
as a norm for the grain production in other under-developed 
countries wherein technology and capital investment in agri­
culture are negligible, it could lead to an inference that 
weather elements account for some 80# of the change in grain 
output. 
Agronomic science in mainland China is not as*developed 
as in the U.S.A. However, the importance of climatic factors 
has been demonstrated in the studies made so far in China. 
For example, optimum weather conditions for wheat are said 
to be an average temperature of 16° C in the growing season 
and annual rainfall of 510 mm, with no rain in the maturation 
season (8). The winter wheat ceases growing when the average 
temperature falls below 2-3® C (280). When 40 to 60# of 
the wheat stalk was damaged by the frosts in Hsu-Chou Dis­
trict, the wheat output recorded a reduction of 20 to 30#; 
80 to 90# damaged, 40 to 50# output reduction; and more than 
90# damaged, 60 to 70# output reduction (49, p. 20). The 
minimum accumulated temperature for cotton during its grow­
ing season is estimated to be 3,500° C in Hopei (52, pp. 18-
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24). The accumulated temperature here is the summation of 
temperature at the level of 10° C or higher in the entire 
growing season of cotton. The winter irrigation will in­
crease soil moisture, raise surface temperature of fields 
and reduce the damage of frosts and, as a result, increase 
the output per acre substantially (58, p. 16). In north 
China, the winter irrigation on the average raised the yield 
per mou from 5 to 10^ for wheat, and from 3 to 1^% for cot-
1 
ton (275). 
%e result of experiments at Kun-Chu Lin, Kirin during 
the I914-I93I and 1949-1960 periods, as shown in the following 
table*, was that a relative high temperature and small rain­
fall during the month of May and September will be more favor­
able to sorghum production than to com, and vice versa. It 
is a pity that there were no time series of these sorts avail­
able for regression analysis. 
May June July Aug s Sept. May- Sorg.Com 
Sept. Kg/hectare 
Temperature (°G) 15.3 20.6 24.2 22.5 15.4 98.0 3656 2505 
Rainfall (mm) 46.0 85.1 159.3 155.2 47.0 492.6 
Temperature (°C) 14.3 20.2 23.1 21.8 15.3 94.7 33^8 4047 
Hainfall (mm) 54.0 I30.I 189.9 178.0 88.8 640.8 
Economic interpretation of effects of capital investment, 
institutional change and weather factors on faim output will 
* 
Source: 57» P. 31. 
^Refer to the total temperature and rainfall. 
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be presented in Chapter XIII. Œhe present concern is the 
weather changes since the communization. 
A large part of China's cultivated area is in the monsoon 
zone of Eurasia. The annual as well as seasonal variations 
of temperature and rainfall are extremely large. About ^0% 
of annual rainfall in South China concentrates in one or two 
months in the summer season, while in North China 70 to 80^ 
of annual rainfall concentrates in three summer months (7» 
108, p. 247; 55» p. 1). The mouth of big rivers are usually 
narrow and silted. There have been no adequate water control 
facilities. Floods occur in the rainy season, and droughts 
in the rest of the year. In addition, Chinese agriculture 
has been haunted by typhoons, hailstorms, windstorms, waters 
logging, frosts, insect pests and plant diseases. 
Weather seems to be indifferent to the communist regime. 
In 1958, about 23O million mou, 1^% of total cultivated area, 
was affected by natural calamities, but less severe than 
the following years. In June, 1959» the East River Valley 
in Kwangtung was said to be attacked by the largest flood in 
100 years. In many areas, there were severe droughts when 
water was needed most. The 1959 droughts and floods in many 
areas along the Yellow and Yangtse River Valleys were de­
scribed as the worst in 70 years (763 p. 25; 254). For the 
nation as a whole natural disasters affected 65O million mou, 
about m% of cultivated land and about one-third of sown 
areas as indicated in Table 5» 
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Natural forces increased their ravages in I96O. Œhe 
whole nation, except Tibet and Sinkiang, suffered from the 
natural calamities claimed as the worst in the Century. 
Eleven typhoons devastated China* s coast areas from Kwangtung 
to Northeast China (331» p. 160), and almost every province 
in North China and some in Central and Southwest China were 
hit by the unprecedentedly severe droughts. Prom November 
1959 to May i960 there were only a few drops of rain in Yunnan. 
In April i960 the Yu-lung Biver in Yunnan was already re­
ported to be out of flow, the first time in the history (259; 
261). It was also reported that for more than 200 days since 
October 1959» there had been only a sprinkle of rain and 
snow in North Chain in the growing season of the winter and 
spring wheat. For example, it was reported in September 20, 
1960 that during the 256 days from the sowing to harvest of 
wheat, there was only 83.4 mm of rainfall in Hope! (270). 
Droughts thus devastated 60^ of the total area in four im­
portant cotton- and wheat-producing provinces: Hopei, Honan, 
Shangtung and Shansi (275» 266; 288). During the severest 
period of the spring and winter droughts, 8 of 12 rivers in 
Shangtung had no flow of water. So were small rivers in 
Honan. Especially astonishing is the report that for about 
ko days during March and July of i960, there had been no or 
little water in the lower reaches of the Yellow Biver between 
Chi-nan and Pan Hsiens in Shangtung (288). Crop planting was 
almost impossible. 
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The earthem dams constructed in the early phase of the 
communization proved helpless in these severe droughts. Al­
though the irrigated area had expanded to more than one bil­
lion mou by i960 (Table 16; 254), only 610 million mou of 
them were capable to resist the drought for 30 to 70 days, 
the standard set for various localities in the National 
Programme for Agricultural Development. Ohe rest of land was 
capable of withstanding drought for less than 30 days (260). 
But there was almost no rain for about 200 days in North China. 
Still the irrigating facilities in these 610 million mou were 
neither complete nor efficient. 
In the first half of I96I, there were also harsh droughts 
reported in North China, Szechuan and Ninghsia, and heavy 
floods in the South. Locusts were reported to be attacking 
crops (322, p. 170). The total affected area was as large as 
in i960, but with less severity. There were heavy rainfalls 
in the South and droughts in North China in the second quarter 
of 1962 (333> p. 253)» Floods attacked Kiangsu, Hunan, 
Shangtung and Liaoning in late July and early August of 19625 
typhoons devastated Pukien, Chekiang and Anhwei in the fol­
lowing month. But they inflicted less serious damage as 
compared with those in i960 and I96I (334, p. 253). Perhaps 
the completion of Sam-men Dam, the world's third largest re-
servior, in late I96O and the increasing installation of 
mechanized facilities for irrigation and drainage had greatly 
reduced the impact of natural forces. ' 
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Limitations of the earthern dams constructed with human 
labor was well recognized by the communist leaders before 
the great leap forvrard and communization was underway. Per^ 
haps the shortage of capital funds and technological capacity 
had restricted the regime to undertake capital-intensive 
water conservation works. Early in 1957» the idea of "di­
verting South water into North plains" was conceived. The 
water flow is usually glutted in the upper Yangtze River. If 
four dams and canals could be constructed to divert a part 
of the water flow from the upper Yangtze into the North plain, 
the water supply and demand of both regions could be balanced. 
The inspections and surveys of the geological and hydrograph­
ical conditions had reached a conclusion in 1959 that tech­
nologically this gigantic project could be done (343, p. 40). 
However it might take two decades or more to accomplish the 
project and would involve a large-scale migration of rural 
population. Nevertheless, the San-Men Dam was completed in 
late i960, but a few months later than the onset of the 
severe droughts in early I96O. 
The growing agricultural failures in late 1959 led the 
regime to install an increasing amount of mechanized equip­
ment for irrigation and drainage. As shown in Tables I6 and 
21, the area under electric irrigation increased from 10^ 
of the total irrigated area in 1959 to about 1?^ in I96O, or 
from 6.2^ of the total cultivated area in 1959 to 10^ in I96O. 
Domestic production of various types of faim machinery and 
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implements, chemical fertilizers and. insecticides has also 
been continuously boosted up to support agricultural de­
velopment. 
2, Low level of capital equipment and management 
®ie impact of natural disasters on farm output could be 
lessened by improved technology and management, but this was 
not done in China. Although capital investment in the agri­
cultural sector increased steadily since communization, the 
size of investment has been small in relation to the amount re­
quired. To each mou of sown area, the state supplied only 2.8 
yuan worth of capital equipment in 1958. As mentioned above, 
the acreage under mechanized irrigation and drainage amounted 
to only 10^ of the total cultivated area in 1960 or 20^ of 
the total acreage which needs mechanized irrigation and drain­
age (76, p. 6). It implies that a predominant part of the 
cultivated land cannot effectively overcome droughts, floods 
and waterlogging. 
Mechanized farming has the advantages of deep and quick 
plowing, and of saving human labor and feed grains for draft 
animals. It was reported in 1959 that the annual grain output 
of a unit of labor was 8,000 catties in the communes using 
old farm tools, but was 14,000 catties in the communes using 
new animal-drawn implements and 22,000 catties in the state 
farms using faim machineries (429, p. I97; cf. 220, p. 21). 
However, there were in China only 24,629 standard units of 
tractors in 1957» as compared with 120,000 standard units in 
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Japan in the same year (40, p. 135; 49, p. 19), In fact, the 
first Chinese made tractor was produced in April, 1958 (101, 
p. 62). The acreage under mechanized farming in 1957 amounted 
only to 46 million mou, about 2,7^ of China's total cultivated 
area (49, p. 18). The proportion of mechanized farming in­
creased to 5^ in late 1959 and I960 (76, p. 6; 274; cf. 108, 
pp. 263-64 and 275) and to less than 10^ in I962 (141, p. 137). 
The amount of chemical fertilizers supplied to farms re­
mained small. On each mou of sown area, only 2.3 catties and 
4.3 catties respectively were applied in 1958 and i960, as 
compared with 60 catties in Japan in 1952 (Table 21). A 
limited application of fertilizers certainly would affect 
the growth rate of farm output. 
Not only was capital equipment scarce, available capital 
goods were not efficiently utilized to expand agricultural 
production, partly due to the shortage of technical and man­
agement skill in most communes. It was discussed in a pre­
vious section that the communization had promoted agricultural 
research and experiment, which might accelerate China's agri­
cultural modernization and development. However, agricultural 
science in China remains relatively backward and agricultural 
scientists and technicians are lacking. 
Output responses to fertilizer vary with the strain of 
crops, and the time and quantity of fertilizer applied. Ef­
fects of fertilizer on grain output are shown in Table 36, 
which sums up the 143 experiments on nitrogenous fertilizer 
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in Hopei during 1952-1962 (cf. 159» PP. 928-929), However, 
there is no indication that available fertilizers had "been 
optimumly allocated to various grains. 
Table 36. Yield in response to fertilizer (catties per mou)*®" 
1 Catty of Nitrogen 1 Catty of 
Highest Lowest Average Amonlum sulfate 
Paddy rice 54.1 16.4 28.8 5.99 
Com 51.2 11.7 24.0 5.00 
Wheat 31.3 8.3  22.6 4.71 
Grains in 
general 26.4 8.3 16.7 3.48 
Ground nut 4.3 -2.8 — — 
Soybean 
— —2.5 — — 
Cotton 14.5 4.8 ?.6 2.01 
^ource: 61, p. 36 
iBased on the result of applying 20 to 40 catties of am­
monium sulfate on each mou of land. 
The lack of technicians and operators forced Pengpu Special 
District, Anhwei to have a third of its tractors and irriga­
tion machines idle in 1959 (276). In I96O, 30^ of the tractors 
and 20% of all irrigation machines in the whole country were 
reported to be in need of repairs (274). A low technology 
and management in irrigation also forced the irrigation 
facilities in Honan, Shangtung, Hbpei, Liaoning, Shansi and 
Peking to operate at some 70% of their capacity (358, p. 36). 
Inefficient irrigation and drainage practices resulted in 
soil salination in many communes, especially those in the 
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Yellow River Valley (140; 51, p. 8). In I963» the effective 
irrigation areas accounted for only one third of the total 
cultivated land (294). 
The peasants are still bound by the traditional wisdoms 
of farming, which the party has been anxious to destroy. On 
the other hand, the lack of adequate scientific knowledge as 
well as the drive to increase faim output compelled the local 
cadres in some communes to have their members engage in farm­
ing unsuitable to local conditions. A commune, for example, 
might be ordered to become self-sufficient in cotton supply 
in an area unfavorable to its production. Some cadres in­
sisted on planting paddy rice, or growing multiple crops, on 
the places where soil and natural conditions were not suit­
able for them (279). Plowing at a certain depth might im­
prove soil, but excessive depth will accelerate evaporation 
and thus reduce soil moisture. Sparrows were once ordered 
to be exterminated, but were later proved to be of more bene­
fit than harm to grain production. The foregoing activities 
might not be the direct cause for the declining output in 
i960, but their waste of manpower and resources might in­
directly contribute to the recent agricultural failures. 
There have been many instances where good leadership 
and management in some communes resulted in a substantial in­
crease in faim output despite adverse weather conditions. 
For example, the Nan-hang brigade of Chou-ko-tien Commune, 
Peking recorded an annual growth rate of l6j6 per unit of 
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cultivated area during the 1958-62 period, as a result of the 
continuous effort in soil improvement, irrigation works and 
increasing use of fertilizers (3OO). However, poor manage­
ment prevailed in most communes. This can be explained partly 
by the fact that there has been in the rural China a shortage 
of basic and accurate data concerning the labor force, culti­
vated area and land fertility. An optimum allocation of re­
sources is virtually impossible as relevant production func­
tions have not been established. 
The problems of inadequate information was multiplied by 
the lack of competent accountants and statisticians in the 
communes. The assessments of harvest in 1958 were poorly 
done, especially those on the 400 million mou of faimland af­
fected by natural calamities (63, p. 18; 88, p. 3). Some 
cadres simply resorted to data inflation to meet the pro­
duction targets set by the national planners. The inflated 
data were then used as a basis by national planners to design 
economic plans for the following years. Ihe original figures 
of agricultural production in 1958, however, have undergone 
downward revision in 1959» including a 33^ cut of grain out­
put (153, p. 90). 
3. Industrialization bias 
Virtual negligence of agricultural development before 
i960 was largely due to the industrialization bias, which 
prevailed among the decision makers as well as among the 
rural population. The obsession of peasants with rural in-
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dustriallzatlon probably resiilted from the prolonged and ef­
fective indoctrination marshalled by the local cadres. Al-
thou^ the national planners have recognized the importance 
of agricultural modernization in increasing agricultural pro­
duction, the cumulative effects of agricultural production 
on the output of other sectors and its importance in over­
all national development, many political and economic con­
siderations make the party leaders favor the priority develop­
ment of heavy industry. 
a. Rationale of the priority development of heavy in­
dustry In Chapter III, the historical heritage which com­
pelled the Chinese communists to make the establishment of 
military power within the shortest possible period the prime 
target of the regime was discussed. As a powerful heavy in­
dustry means to them a strong national defense and a high 
international prestige, a large proportion of scarce capital, 
skilled labor and raw materials have been allocated to 
this strategic sector with relatively low controlled prices. 
Ihe policy of subsidizing heavy industry does not imply that 
capital is free, but that the long-term benefits of develop­
ing heavy industry to the whole economy are considered to be 
far greater than its opportunity costs. Subsidizing indus­
tries which are potentially viable has been a common practice 
of almost every nation, either under the pretext of political 
independence or economic development. 
Besides political consideration, it is, at least, to 
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communist leaders economically rational to give priority to 
heavy industry. First, it was estimated that agricultural 
mechanization required annually at least half a million 
tractors, millions of tractor-drawn farm tools, ten million 
tons of petroleum and ten million tons of chemical fertili­
zers (202, pp. 37-38; 318; 220, p. 22). Before 1957 China 
was unable to make tractors domestically nor produce farm 
tools on a large scale and she had to procure them from the 
communist-bloc countries or some European nations. According 
to data proveded by Planned Economy in 1958, the average 
price for a standard tractor was 9,000 yuan, and for a farm 
tool about 3,000 yuan (323, p. 41; 324, p. 41). 13aus the 
minimum requirements for procuring tractors and farm tools 
were 7.5 billion yuan. In addition, there were costs for 
fuel, maintenance and repairs of these implements. The costs 
of mechanized irrigation would far surpass the requirements 
for faim machinery. As mentioned in Chapter IX, irrigating 
one mou of farm land with the relatively capital-intensive 
water-control projects costs the central government each 
year from 17 to 32 yuan. The total cost for irrigating 2,359 
million mou of sown area thus amounted to 40-75 billion yuan. 
The sum is larger than the total national investment 
during the 1953-1957 period, which averaged only 11 billion 
yuan each year. In addition, to complete agricultural mod­
ernization would require a large amount of insecticides, in­
secticide sprayers, power generating equipment, mechanized 
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storehouses and transport facilities. 
The foregoing estimates are but the lower bound of costs 
in agricultural mechanization. Other estimates indicate 
that annual requirements of chemical fertilizers would amount 
to 15 million instead of 10 million tons. Furthermore, the 
required tractors might well top 740 thousand standard units, 
if the area cultivated by an average tractor in the tractor 
stations in 1957 (323» P« 41) is used as an indication. 
According to the estimate of Liao Lu-yen, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Communist China will require 1.2-1.5 million 
standard tractors to cultivate her arable land, with an 
annual rate of replacement at 120,000 to 150,000 units (135» 
p. 263)# As domestic capital was scarce and few foreign 
resources were available after 1957» agricultural moderni­
zation in the early stage of national development would 
not only retard the rapid development of heavy industry, 
but might result in the total breakdown of the economy. 
There was not adequate capital for agricultural moderniza­
tion and the agricultural sector would be continuously under 
the sway of random factors. Some random factors might cause 
a large-scale agricultural failure, which through its impact 
on other sectors would paralyze the whole economy. 
Even if there were adequate capital funds for completing 
agricultural modernization, which then would eliminate any 
agricultural failure of a significant scale, economic calcu­
lation might still favor a delay of completing agricultural 
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modernization at this stage of China's economic development. 
Suppose the worst natural calamity in the century and other 
factors will result in a decline of grain output by some 2$% 
as happened in I96O (cf. Table 40) and 80^ of the variation 
in output is due to the change in technology and climate 
factors (cf. p. 235). An efficient utilization of adequate 
capital funds in agricultural modernization might cut down 
the rate of output decrease from ZS% to 5%^» Since the 
natural disaster on this scale occurs only once a century, 
the expected loss of not completing agricultural modernization 
was a decline in grain output of only 0.2# each year . Even 
when natural disasters of various magnitudes with a different 
frequency of occurrence are taken into account, the total 
expected loss of not completing agricultural modernization 
is still very small. Compared with this expected loss, the 
expected gain from investing these funds in the industrial 
sector would be much greater. In addition, output in industry 
is more controllable. However, the worst natural calamity in 
a century did not occur 100 years or decades after commun!za-
tion, but in i960. The whole society was soon caught in a 
serious crisis. Ihis instance clearly reveals the deficiency 
of the probability-oriented economic analysis or game theory 
in actual decision-making. 
Nevertheless, before the agricultural failure of i960 
It is because x 80^ = 20^. 
^20# X = 0.2#. 
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the regime had stuck with its policy of priority development' 
of a strategy industry, i.e., heavy industry. The same stra­
tegy has been strongly advocated in the West by Hirschman (ll6). 
b. Pattern of resource allocation Data published by 
the State Statistical Bureau show that the portion of total 
investment allocation to agriculture was in 1958 
sind 7.1# in 1959 as compared with 7.6# during the 1953-57 
period (40, p. 59)• According to Hollister's estimate, only 
26.6# of total fixed investment in 1959 was allocated to 
agriculture as compared with 44.3# to heavy industry (121, 
pp. 42 and 45). The share of agriculture in investment was 
very low in relation to the proportion of gross national out­
put contributed by the agricultural sector. Although agri­
culture was given priority since the spring of I960, up to 
1961 a large share of national investment was still deployed 
to heavy industry. In the i960 budget of the Central gov­
ernment, only 12# of state budgetary investment was allocated 
to agriculture as compared with 58.3# to industry (156, p. 11; 
157, p. 32). The main difference in shifting the priority 
from heavy industry to agriculture is that the formulation 
of economic policy for other sectors thereafter was made 
on the basis of agricultural production. Farming is still 
done mainly with human labor, draft animals and organic 
manure. 
Not only did the lopsided investment in industry prevail 
in 1958-1960, the drive for surpassing Britain in 10 to 15 
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years In major industrial products had diverted a high percen­
tage of the rural labor force from farming to indigenous 
production of iron and steel and to basic construction. Table 
15 shows that only 50^ of the labor force in rural communes 
was deployed for farming in 1959 as compared with 78^ in 228 
APCs in 1957. The proportion of the labor force allocated 
to farming in 1958 would be lower than that in 1959» because 
the year of 1958 was the high-tide of "backyard furnace" 
endeavour. As a result, not merely was the pig iron produced 
by indigenous method unsuitable for making steel, the oppor­
tunity cost of diverting the labor force from farming was high. 
Irrigation works and weeding were neglected in some places; 
grain reaping, threshing, gathering and storing in the 
1958 autumn harvest were done in a hasty manner (88, p. 3; 
63, p. 18). Much grain was thus lost in harvesting. In the 
spring of 1959» the program to produce steel by the Indigenous 
method was no longer included in the state plan, but left to 
the option of local authorities (88, pp. 3 and 12; 64, p. 29). 
However a high percentage of the labor force in the 
spring of i960, comparable with that in 1959» was still al­
located to rural industries and basic construction. A 
severe shortage of labor in farming certainly aided in the 
development of the agricultural crisis in the last half of 
i960. Many provinces therefore started to prescribe the 
upper limit of labor to be used in rural industries and basic 
construction (Table 15; 32, p. 46). 
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0. Difficulties of economic planning In agriculture 
The above sections showed that the policy of priority develop­
ment of heavy Industry was a cause, but not a dominant cause, 
of agricultural failures In I96O-I962. There has been simply 
not enough capital for agricultural modernization In China. 
Another cause for agricultural failures is the difficulty of 
economic planning for agricultural activities. 
In his strategy of unbalanced growth, Hlrschman estab­
lishes the concept of linkage effect. A new economic acti­
vity in any industry, he asserted in his linkage effect, will 
induce attempts to supply through domestic production the in­
puts needed in that activity and it will also promote attempts 
to utilize its output as input in other industries (116, p. 
100). In order to promote economic development, development 
strategy should, so implied in the concept of the linkage ef­
fect, launch or encourage Investment which would emsuaate- the 
highest total linkage effect attainable in various Industries. 
The index of total linkage effect of investment in an indus­
try could be computed from the input-output table (116, pp. 
104-107). The industry with the highest total effect, ac­
cording to the statistics of Italy, Japan and the United 
States, is iron and steel, followed by other heavy industries 
(116, p. 106). 
No statistics concerning the linkage effect are avail­
able for mainland China. The Chinese communists* insistence 
on the policy of priority development of heavy industry. 
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especially iron and steel, seemed to imply that up to I960, 
the linkage effect of these industries had been very high. 
Nevertheless, the linkage effects of various industries might 
not remain the same over time. The agricultural failure and 
its tremendous impact on the whole economy during the I96O-
1962 period seems to suggest that the linkage effects of the 
agricultural sector during this period were mighty. The in­
dustrial sector has since been directed to manufacture an in­
creasing number of capital equipment in supporting agricul­
tural modernization. 
Hirschman also seems to assume that there will be excess 
productive capacity or unused capital available in the nation 
for starting new enterprises which in turn will satisfy the 
demand for inputs created by any new investment or which will 
absorb the products of that investment. However, scarcity 
of capital is the rule for most underdeveloped countries and 
for rural China. But, he appears to propose his strategy 
of unbalanced growth to the non-communist countries wherein 
the price mechanism, thou^ exists, is not an effective de­
vice to bring the economies from disequilibrium to equili­
brium. The nonmarket forces such as administrative action 
are suggested by Hirschman as more realistic measures to help 
restore equilibrium (II6, pp. 62-65). 
In contrast to Hirschman, some economists such as Lange, 
Taylor and Barone have demonstrated that through the process 
of trial and error, a socialist economy theoretically can 
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reach its optimum allocation of resources regardless of the 
initial state of economy (1^3, p. 42-54 and 59-90). By a 
socialist economy they mean a society wherein production is 
controlled by the government but consumption left with the 
free choice of the population. With the help of social costs 
or accounting prices, they argue, the process of trial and 
error or successive adjustments in price, demand and supply 
will bring the whole economy to an optimum point. However, 
both production and consumption in China since its communi-
zation have been virtually controlled by the state or the party 
representatives at local levels. If the commune members can 
freely express their preferences in the congress of the com­
mune, and thus effect the determination of the consumption 
plan in the commune, the above trial and error process might 
as well bring about an optimum allocation of resources (cf. 
143> pp. 90-95). It must be noted that the so-called con­
sumers* preference scales are actually very elusive and can 
be greatly influenced by the state policy and educational 
programs. i 
Granted that resource allocation can theoretically be 
optimized in rural China, there were still practical diffi­
culties in resource allocation during the great leap forward. 
Not only was the price mechanism or useful accounting prices 
unavailable in rural China, but there was simply no ef­
ficient signalling device which could transmit to the central 
planning agency the information concerning supply and demand 
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in rural China. The successive adjustments are thus not 
feasible. During this period, the party apparatus actually 
controlled mass media all over Mainland China. However, the 
distorted reports of production figures by the local cadres 
and total statistical "fiasco" during the 1958-59 period 
failed to signal the bottlenecks or pressures, which were to 
be remedied by some proper adjustments or trial and error 
process. Besides no adequate data about available resources 
and technical possibility of production were collected. 
Nonetheless, Hirschman appears to think that the achieve­
ment of equilibrium or optimum allocation, at least in the 
short run, is not necessarily helpful to economic development. 
Disequilibriums, disproportions and tensions, argues Hirsch­
man, are the necessary conditions for economic development 
(116, pp. 66-67). This idea is very close to the basic con­
cept of the Chinese communists on economic development. The 
fundamental economic relations about which the Chinese planners 
express concern are those: (1) between production of producer 
goods and consumer goods, and its paralleled relation, (2) 
between the growth rates of heavy industry, light industry 
and agriculture. According to understanding and judgement of 
the Chinese communists, the above relations tend to follow 
the dialectic process of "balance-inbalance-balance". Any 
balance or unity of opposites is considered to be conditional, 
temporary, transitory and so relative. Economic inbalance 
instead is Inevitable, that is to say, non-optimization of 
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resource allocation is the rule. No matter whether the policy 
of "balanced" or "unbalanced" growth is pursued, the ultimate 
result is bound to be inbalance (l68, pp. 21 and 26; 73, pp. 
45-46). In the development process, there will be new tech­
nical innovations, new factories, new forms of organization, 
reallocation of industrial location, and/or change in farm 
output due to change in climate factors which will upset the 
initial balance. 
The essential thing to communist leaders is therefore 
to seek an economic strategy which will keep the economy 
moving ahead under the constraint of relative balance, in 
other words, without causing the total disruption of the 
economy. For this purpose, the Chinese communists have 
developed the concept of proportional development of various 
sectors. However, the exact connotation of "proportion" has 
not been given nor quantified. 
Check the actual experiences of the Chinese economy be­
fore i960. During the first Five-Year Plan, 1953-1957» the 
average growth rate in agriculture was per year, as 
compared with 18.3# in industry, 12.8^ in light industry and 
25.4# in heavy industry (Table 37). Would the relative bal­
ance of the economy be maintained if this same pattern of 
growth rates was planned in the ensuing years? The answer is 
negative. At the end of the first plan, there already ex­
isted a shortage of some raw materials for light industry 
and excess capacity in some heavy industries. The agri­
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cultural growth during 1958-1959 was actually accelerated at 
the rate much faster than that of light and heavy industry, 
I 
as shown in the last column of Table 37. The editorial of 
I 
the official newspaper, People's Daily, was quite right in 
pointing out that the growth paces of different sectors 
should not be fixed, but changed constantly in accordance 
with their demand (262). In the spring of 19^0, the central 
government planned already to increase investment in agri­
culture and water conservation by 62.9# over the 1959 level 
(156, p. 15). However, the agricultural failure became ap­
parent in the last half of i960 and the whole economy was 
soon thrown into a severe crisis. If a large proportion of 
capital had been allocated to the agricultural sector during 
1953-1959» the scale of agricultural failure in 196O might 
have been contained considerable, but not eliminated. 
It appears that if the farm output remains very sensi­
tive to random factors, such as climatic factors, any adjust­
ments in investment pattern would not immediately bring about 
the desired results. Thus the critical point is whether farm 
output could be controlled by human technology and effort. 
Here reveals the weakest point of economic planning in the 
underdeveloped countries where agriculture is the predominant 
sector in the economy and the agricultural production is un­
controllable. If climatic factors account for a main part 
of change in farm output, the short-run policy model built on 
labor, capital and/or capital output ratio will not be of 
258 
much help to policy makers. For a longer run, climatic factors 
might be considered averaged out in the policy model. Never­
theless, the country for the security purpose still needs to 
put aside large amounts of its food grains and raw materials 
as buffer stocks to meet the yearly changes in farm outputs. 
Table 37, Average annual rates of growth in various indus­
tries* I 
1953-57 1950-58 1953-59 1958-60 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gross output of 
agriculture 4,5 9.8 9.2 20,9^ 4,64 
Gross output of 
industry 18,3 29.2 28,2 52.8 J 2,88 
Heavy industry 25.4 40,0 39.0 73.2% 2,88 
Light industry 12,8 20.2 18,8 33.8 2,64 
Steel®- 31.7 54,7 39.3 51.5 1,62 
Pig iron* 25.2 49,7 43.1 69.9 1,19 
Coal 14,4 28,8 29.6 50.1+ 3.48 
Electric power 21,6 22,9 28,7 39.0+ 1,80 
Crude petroleum 27.3 38,5 36,4 55.7 2,04 
Chemical fertilizer 28,4 46,0 33.5 42.7 1,50 
Metal-cutting 
machine tools 22,0 46,7 32.7 49.3 2,24 
Cement 19.1 34,2 23.3 32.6 1,71 
Paper 17.8 24,4 18,1 24.8^ 1.39 
Cotton yam 5.2 14,5 13.2 33.2% 6,38 
Edible vegetable 
oil 2.3 12,2 6,0 15.2, 6,61 
Pood grains 3.7 10,2 8,8 21.6% 5.84 
Ginned cotton 6,5 21,2 10,7 21.4% 3.29 
*8ource; Table 4-5 and 46; 4o, pp, 88-89 and 95-102; 
Table 39; 254; 348, p, 6, 
^Excluding those produced by the indigenous method, 
bpor 1958-59. 
In order to reduce the tremendous burden in building a 
large food reserve, China might benefit by bringing the inter­
national elements into its policy model. If the funds divert­
ed to the industrial sector can produce goods for exports and 
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the revenue of the exports is larger than the cost of import­
ing food and raw materials which otherwise would be produced 
domestically, there is no reason why China should not do so. 
The outcome of this policy depends on (1) the possibility of 
selling Industrial goods to neighboring Asian and African 
countries, (2) the possibility of importing desired food 
grains and raw materials from other countries, and (3) favor­
able terms of trade (with adequate allowances for transpor­
tation costs, etc.) for exported industrial goods. To bring 
these international elements into the policy model, it might 
be useful to consider Chenery's suggestion for using in 
economic planning the linear programming model, which can 
easily add the export and import activities to the domestic 
economic activities (31, pp. 31-39). However, it still will 
be difficult to obtain useful input-output coefficients for 
Chinese agriculture, as its agricultural production has been 
greatly affected by random factors and its statistical facil­
ities for the agricultural sector as a whole has not been 
adequate. 
Since the i960 agricultural failure, an increasing pro­
portion of national investment has been allocated to the 
agricultural sector, though the industrial sector still main­
tains its major share in national investment. Development 
policy, at least up to the present time, tends to move in the 
direction similar to Nurkse's balanced growth. The investment 
and growth paces of both industry and agriculture are designed 
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In such a way that output in both sectors is dictated by 
their relative demand at various income levels, in other words, 
output is each sector is geared to its income elasticity of 
demand. The scale of industrial development is also suggest­
ed to correspond with the volume of marketable grains and in­
dustrial crops made available by agriculture (cf. 69, p. 4l). 
4. "Dizzy with success** 
The process of trial and error will run a lesser risk 
if it proceeds gradually. However, the golden mean, the old 
teaching of Confucius, was no longer a virtue in the great 
leap movement. The nation has been impatient in building 
herself into a great power. Time has been taught to be the 
grand enemy of China's socialist construction. 
The growth pace of production, accumulation and com-
munization was actually at an unprecedented level. The 1957 
rectification campaign certainly had taught the party cadres 
the blessings of being progressive and the miseries of being 
labelled rightists. Social pressure or demonstration effect 
in the period of great leap forward was so immense that local 
cadres lost no time to "keeping up with the Jones". Intoxi­
cated by the success in the early period of communization, 
or become "dizzy with success" in terms of Stalin, some cadres 
overestimated the ability of the communes and rural popula­
tion and undertook unrealistic adventures. All these 
forces interacted to carry the commune movement to an excess. 
As a result, not merely were the potential advantages of the 
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commune not fully realized, dislocation and waste were evoked 
in many communes. At the same time, like many developed 
countries at the heyday of their industrialization, social 
tension! in China was acute and the population was in the 
throes of "great leap forward". 
First, the communization was excessive. A majority of the 
rural population had less than two years of experience in ad­
vanced APCs when the communes were initiated. Then within 
three months, virtually all rural inhabitants were living in 
these new organizations. Not all changes are good to all 
peasants. When the collective form of production had not 
been consolidated, a quickfire transition to the commune and 
initiation of collective consumption would only increase dif­
ficulties and risks of socialization, as the traditional 
pattern of life was abruptly upset. There might be a popular 
support and enthusiasm among the rural population in the 
early period of communization, but physical conditions in 
some areas might not be favorable to this new form of insti­
tution. Still, many communes were extended so far to cover 
two or three hsiangs that they were beyond the capacity of 
local leadership to manage. A hasty and universal imposition 
of the communes would only create some communes on paper. If 
the principle of "to each according to his needs" was prac­
tised in the communes regardless of their low revenue and 
material bases, the principle itself could not be realized. The 
practice will further create adverse effects and retard the 
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cause of communlzation. An excessive communization is in 
fact defiant of Mao's principle on the guerrilla warfare; 
"Fight no battle that is not well prepared, no battle whose 
outcome is uncertain." (cf. 170, p. 12). 
In the initiating period of the commune, the well-to-do 
middle peasants were already discontented with turning their 
livestock and private plots over to the commune. To eat at 
mess halls further made them lose motivation. Nurseries, 
kindergartens and mess halls might be considered by many as 
the first move toward the family destruction, which is a 
great shock to the traditional value system. Many parents 
hesitated to send their children.to nurseries. Some communes, 
ir order to obtain quick result, took forcible measures 
against peasants, thus increasing the number of the con-com­
mune group. 
The establishment of rural communes purported to achieve 
a great leap forward in production. However, the growth rate 
implied in the great leap, e.g., 15% increase in agricultural 
production, was irrational, as this target had not been reach­
ed during the first Five-Year Plan. To reach this target, 
the peasants had to overwork. If the growth rate in agricul­
ture and industry were to be maintained at a high level for 
a long period, a substantial portion of their annual output 
had to be set aside for capital accumulation. In 1958 many 
communes, in addition to paying agricultural taxes, were re­
quired to save 50 to 70% of their gross output. If their 
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gross incomes were not doubled in 1958, the foregoing rates 
of savings meant a decline of consumption. Table 8 shows 
that the average rate of savings of 228 APCs was less than 
10% of their gross income in 1957. Excessive work with a low 
level of consumption would harm the health and reduce the pro­
ductive power of the commune members. Poor health begets a 
pessimistic view of life, which is a grave hazard to the 
great leap. Like physical capital, the humsin body needs 
adequate maintenance and depreciation policies. The overt 
negligence of this principle will lead to the tragedy of 
"killing the goose that lays the golden eggs". 
In an attempt to guarantee the great leap forward the 
production quotas of each household and commune were raised. 
For example, each household in the countryside was required 
to raise an average of one and a half to two pigs by 1962 and 
and average of two and a half to three pigs by 196? (448; 184, 
p. 12; 346, pp. 14-21). Feed grains had to increase corre­
spondingly, thus competing with food grains for meager land. 
In the production of food grains, the peasants in Hopei were 
asked in September, 1958 to emulate the experimental plots 
by achieving a per mou yield of 2,000 to 3,000 catties for 
grain in three years and 400 to 500 catties for ginned cotton 
(70, p. 472). The national average in 1957 was 204 catties 
per mou for grain and 38 catties for ginned cotton (Table 
47). To lift output per mou on an incredible scale, the two-
year experiences in some experimental plots were popularized 
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Indiscriminately, At the same time, the total acreage for 
grain production was reduced. The reduction of sown area for 
grain production in some communes contributed partly to their 
agricultural failure in the spring of 1959» 
To facilitate the accomplishment of great leap forward 
I 
in agriculture, urban dwellers have been dispatched to the 
communes since 1958. The most deplorable fact to the defected 
Russian scientist Klochko was that starting from 1958, every 
member of academic establishments in China and every intel­
lectual under 50 years of age had to do a month of farm work 
each year, plus one whole year on the land every five years. 
Their professional jobs were thus overlooked, a great waste 
of their skill (139» pp. 66-78). The large-scale migration 
to the countryside was intensified in i960 when the country 
was hit by the worst agricultural failure. 
Excessive effort and sacrifice will engender disillusion 
and lethargy, especially among the young revolutionary idea­
lists, when the anticipated results have not turned out. 
The unprecedented agricultural crisis in i960 soon threw the 
country into an abyss of despair. Orleans comments: Were it 
not for the excesses of the "great leap forward*, it might 
be possible to argue that China has been on the right track 
in her method of utilizing surplus manpower since 1958 (205, 
p. 67). His comment is shared by many social scientists in 
the West (cf. 204). 
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5. Lack of Incentive 
As mentioned before, the excessive communization and ac­
cumulation during 1958-1959 period affected the motivation 
of the commune members toward work, enterprise and innovation. 
The importance of incentive problem rests on the presumption 
that a satisfaction of material and/or psychic wants will 
stimulate a person to increase his work efforts, productivity 
and efficiency in production. A person generally derives his 
material incentives from a higher income and material comforts, 
and psychic incentives from good work conditions, a great 
sensitivity to the opinion of other people, respect and love 
of his reference group. The possible existence of backward-
bending labor supply curve might limit the validity of this 
presumption. Nevertheless the backward-bending curve has 
not much practical significance in communist China as peasants' 
income is generally low. 
a. Limitation of psychic incentives For many rea­
sons, the Chinese communists stressed psychic incentives as 
a means to encourage production in its early phase of the 
communization. The country is poor and there is a great 
desire to accomplish industrialization in a shortest possible 
time. In order to maximize capital accumulation over time, 
the stimulus to work has to be sustained as much as possible 
by satisfaction of psychic wants rather than material ones. 
A sudden increase of income on a substantial scale does not 
necessarily provoke a greater output to the same extent. 
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Furthermore, the communist leadership genuinely believes that 
human values and attitudes can be changed into the direction 
they desire, 
A fierce education and indoctrination movement was thus 
launched side by side with the swift communization. This 
was discussed before. After psychic, wants were evoked by 
indoctrination programs, they were set in motion to drive the 
peasants to engage in a series of emulation campaigns and 
mass movements. The winners were rewarded with a "red flag", 
title of hero or model worker, admission to the communist 
party, and/or selection to meet Mao Tse-tung, In 1958 alone, 
millions of people were honored. 
Effects of the psychic incentives depend upon the social, 
economic and political background of a country and upon the 
manner the psychic incentives are put into operation. In a 
country which has suffered from foreign invasion and civil 
strife, the psychic incentives might be a very powerful im­
petus to a rapid national development. Exploitation of na­
tionalism to promote economic development has been common 
among underdeveloped countries. However, the psychic in­
centives have to be handled properly. The appeal to love 
and benefits for the community might elicit peasants to en­
gage in water control projects, but an uneven recruitment of 
labor force from different communes would cause friction and 
resentment. The system of forced labor might be effective in 
some manual work, but not in mental work, as the manual works 
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are easier to be supervised. 
The effects of indoctrination on changing human attitudes 
perhaps would depend upon the length and intensity of "brain­
washing", upon the quality of the person in charge of indoc­
trination programs, and upon the extent to which material 
wants were satisfied, A prolonged indoctrination of a person 
from his childhood might produce a greater outcome than would 
a short period of "brainwashing" applied to the adult. Dur­
ing the first ten years of communist control over the Chinese 
mainland, the old generation with traditional wisdoms was 
the majority among the population. The preceeding indoctri­
nation and training programs by the Chinese communists could 
not prepare people adequately for a rapid transition to the 
commune system, even if the idea of "plasticity" and "perfec-
tivity" of human nature was granted. A person might follow 
the party line when it was to his advantage, and discard it 
when it was not. The psychic incentive of a person can hard­
ly remain constant in various circumstances. The following 
instances will illustrate this point. 
The party cadres are supported to have a strong social­
ist consciousness and dare to act for the cause of communism. 
They are to set examples for the masses and to create more 
"communist men". However, many cadres who were sent to the 
countryside were disgusted with the "backward" conditions 
of peasants and rural areas, and were disinterested in field 
production (413, p. 5; 326). Of course, the dispatch to the 
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countryside also means a loss of opportunity for promotion 
and of jobs of their own taste. On the other hand, some 
party cadres and peasants In rural communes became Indulged 
In their self-conceit and lost their momentum to work harder, 
when they had accomplished what others failed (cf, 435» PP. 
100-101). When they encountered unexpected difficulties, 
"rightist* sentiments and pessimism emerged, as did in late 
1959 and i960. As a result, the conflict between the central 
authority and local communes was brought on. It therefore 
appears that psychic incentives are conditioned, and should 
be reinforced, by material incentives. Since late 1959, 
material incentives have been stressed by the regime. At the 
same time, political and ideological education has been 
strengthened. The 1959 rectification campaign and the I962 
socialist education movement all aimed at invoking psychic 
incentives, 
b. Dilution of material incentives The spur of mate­
rial incentives is the function of absolute income level, in­
come differentials and private ownership. In the period of 
great leap forward, the above three incentive forces were not 
so stressed by the regime as were psychic incentives. This 
is the fact which has been considered by many economists in 
the West as the main cause of recent agricultural failure. 
It was already mentioned that a large portion of the 
commune output had gone into the commune savings, agricul­
tural taxes, or state purchase at a relatively low price. 
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The depression of consumption in many communes had no doubt 
dampened the motivation of those effected. It was reported 
in mid-August, i960 that more than 48 million mou of culti­
vated area in Shangtung were over-run by weeds as a result of 
I 
the continuous rain during the last two months. A great num­
ber of farm implements were reported being scattered in the 
open air and destroyed by rains and winds in i960. Lack of 
material incentives certainly contributed its part in 
these situations. The dulled material incentives will 
also affect plowing, harrowing, planting, irrigating, 
fertilizing and other agricultural activities. It also could 
be expected that payment of relatively low wages to the com­
mune herdsmen would weaken their concerns about the commune-
owned livestock (cf. 435, pp. 276-291). The economic con­
ditions in rural areas have been inferior to those in the 
cities. When the regime decided to send urban dwellers to 
the countryside in 1962, a massive exodus of refugees to Hong 
Kong resulted. 
The free supply plus wage system implemented in the 
early phase of communization did guarantee a provision of 
the same basic needs to the weak and aged. However, there is 
also a need for income differentials among different individ­
uals. It is especially so when the scarcity of resources 
and skilled labor prevailed. A large portion of free supplies 
practiced in the early phase of the commune system obscured 
the relation between productivity and compensation. Conse­
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quently the strong and able were discouraged to exert their 
utmost. Many communes in 1958 introduced multi-graded wage 
system to sharpen individual incentives. Its impact might 
not be very powerful, as wages accounted for less than 50% of 
the allocated postion, which in turn was a small proportion 
of the commune*s gross income. 
The importance of individuality and income differentials 
in stimulating material incentives is stressed by Li and 
Walker in their studies of the relation between the private 
sector and agricultural production (I63, pp. 294-299; 82; 
447). Li argues that the communization was the cause of re­
cent agricultural failure and that the "radical revision" of 
the commune system beginning in the spring of 196I ajid the 
"virtual abandonment" of it in the first half of I962 brought 
about the recovery of agricultural production in early Sep­
tember of 1962. The private plots, says he, took the lead in 
this agricultural recovery 063, pp. 296-299; 82, p. 34). How­
ever, his contention cannot explain the bumper harvest recorded 
in 1958 and 1959» the years the communization was at its height. 
Still, when most communes in China encountered agricultural 
failure in I96O, some communes had registered an increase of 
farm output on a significant scale. The Tsa-jen Commune of 
Su-Cheng Hsien, Anhwei, for example, registered a 28$ increase 
in wheat output and 34^ in output of early rice in i960 (269; 
cf. 271; 59J p. 19). The 1,200 mess halls in Su-Cheng Hsien, 
it was claimed, were assured of food provision until the 
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early summer of I96I (281; of, 50, pp. 10-12). 
The so-called "private plots" had never been owned pri­
vately by the commune members since 1958. The "private plots" 
granted in early 1959 therefore will not spur the "private 
ownership incentive" of the commune members. The private 
ownership of means of production was perhaps not an important 
factor in the incentive function for China, Before the i960 
agricultural failure, the industrial production had not been 
affected by its socialization which started long before the 
1958 communization, Although state farms allowed no private 
ownership and paid their farm workers according to labor done, 
farm output in state farms was very high. In 1956, yield per 
mou in state farms was 27^ higher than the national average 
for wheat, 15^ higher for paddy rice and 54^ higher for cot­
ton (320, p. 23; cf. 135» p. 266). The main reason could be 
their relative advance in mechanization. The grain produc­
tion in Shin-nun commune, Pai-chuan Hsien, Heilungkiang . 
increased substantially in both 1958 and 1959. This increase 
in grain production was attributed mainly to its advancement 
in agricultural mechanization. Its number of tractors, for 
example, increased from 2 standard units in 1957 to 15 stan­
dard units in 1958 and 53 standard units in 1959 (352, pp. 
23-24). The significance of "private plots" lies in the fact 
that the members own the fruits they produce on these small 
plots, such as vegetables, fodder, oil-bearing crops and live­
stock. Therefore the members spent most of their available 
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time on the private plots. In April 1959» the peasants were 
allowed to cultivate privately the small garden plots. How­
ever, the grant of private plots did not prevent the Chinese 
agriculture from a sharp decline in farm output in i960 and 
1961. 
After estimating the volume of food "obtainable* from 
the private plot and examining changes in policy relating to 
the private sector for the period from 1956 to I962, Walker 
concludes that the private sector, composed mainly of private 
plots, is a necessary auxiliary to the socialist agricultural 
economy (44?, pp. 24-93)• This view has been expressed by 
Communist party leaders since the spring of 1959, if not in 
1958 (cf. 88; 366, pp. 5-8). However, it must be noted that 
statistics used in Walker's estimation of food output obtain­
able from the private plot might not be representative of the 
whole rural China. He did not discuss or prove whether the 
abolition of private sector in 1958 was a dominant cause for 
the recent agricultural crisis. The importance of private 
sector perhaps grew with the deepening of the agricultural 
crisis as most people would pay an increasing attention to 
their own interests in the time of disasters. But there has 
been no adequate evidence to prove that the private sector 
dominated change in farm output. In 1959, the private plot 
which accounted for some 5^ of the total land in the communes 
produced only 4.5^ of the total revenue for the commune mem­
bers (133, p. 11). 
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If the commun!zation and excessive accumulation are the 
dominant cause for China's agricultural crisis, then a country 
that does not enforce the commune system should not have agri­
cultural failure on the same scale. But this is not the case. 
Indian agriculture has not been organized under the commune 
system nor does it have the kind of incentive problems as exist 
in communist China, because the former functions primarily under 
the private system. When India was struck in 1964 by its worst 
floods since her independence, she had to import grains from 
the United States alone at a rate of more than 20,000 tons 
a day during July, 1964 to mid-February, 1965 (176; 94, p. 
504). In total, India imported 6,686,700 tons of grain in 
1964, of which 6,650,000 tons were from the United States 
(432, pp. 21 and 26; cf. 329, p. 229). When "the worst drought 
of the century" hit India in 1965, she hoped to import be­
tween 10 million and l4 million tons of food grains in 1966 
to meet the food deficit (11, p. 2). Communist China in 1961 
purchased 6.57 million tons of food grains, to be delivered 
in 1961-1963 (l4, pp. 20-21), and continued to buy in the fol­
lowing years, but at a smaller scale (cf. 150, p. 10). It 
must be noted that India's population is only two-thirds of 
China's. 
This chapter has elaborated various forces which affect­
ed agricultural production and rural development in the period 
beginning from the great leap forward. The extent to which 
state investment policy, climatic factors, and the forces in-
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herent in the commune system have influenced farm output 
should be better measured empirically. Economic models for 
this purpose will be provided in Chapter XIII, 
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XI, ADJUSTMENTS OP POLICIES AND THE COMMUNE 
SYSTEM IN ITS SECOND PHASE 
Communist China starting with the last half of 1959 has 
undergone a series of "adjustment, consolidation, reinforce­
ment and raising standards" in its policy, output targets and 
strategy. These adjustments have taken place despite the 
fact that the communist leadership has continuously upheld 
the "three red flags" (368; 370, pp. 1-5). In contrast to 
the previous years, the period of adjustment is characterized 
by a concurrent endeavour of the regime in consolidating the 
collective economy of the people's commune and accelerating 
technical reform in agriculture in hopes of building China 
into a strong socialist country with modern science, industry 
and national defense. This chapter is devoted to these ad­
justment processes. In order to facilitate comparison, the 
order of discussion generally follows that of Chapter IX, 
A. Moderation of Policies and Targets 
Since the abandonment of the great leap forward in agri­
cultural production in 1959» Communist China has not rein­
stated the targets of the great leap forward in its economic 
plan. The I96O economic plan anticipated a 12^ increase in 
the gross value of agricultural output, about a 10^ increase 
in the output of both grain and cotton, and a 35^ increase 
in the number of pigs produced (156, p. 14). Except for hog 
production the i960 targets for the agricultural sector were 
276 
not fulfilled. The targets for the following years are not 
available for appraisal. When the agricultural production was 
restored to the 1957 level in 1964, the 1965 target for agri­
cultural production was set at S% over the 1964 level (69, p. 
4l). These relatively moderate targets were accompanied by 
caution in government activities and an increasing emphasis 
on the agricultural sector in over-all economic development. 
It was said that the idea of taking "agriculture as a 
foundation" for developing the national economy was originated 
by Mao Tse-tung in the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth 
CCP Central Committee in August, 1959 (356, p. 1; 268). He 
also called for all-out support of agriculture by other sec­
tors. In the spring of i960, the Chairman of the State Plann­
ing Commission, Li Pu-chun, reiterated the same point (346, p. 
5) and the policy was endorsed by the Second Session of the 
Second National People's Congress in April, I96O. It simply 
meant that agriculture was for the first time recognized as 
the startling point for economic development. The expansion 
of industry was planned to some extent on a scale correspond­
ing to the amounts of foodstuffs, raw materials and capital 
funds which agriculture could provide and was consistent with 
the amount of industrial goods which the rural market could 
absorb. In the first half of 196O, the People's Liberation 
Army contributed 25 million labor days to agricultural devel­
opment (265). In late i960, the communist leadership con­
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tinuously instructed the rural communes to allocate some 80^ 
of their manpower to agriculture, especially to the production 
of food grains. More rational use of available manpower was 
also stressed (cf. Table 15). However in the allocation of 
capital funds, the policy of preferential development of heavy 
industry was maintained in i960. 
The policy of the preferential development of heavy in­
dustry later changed into, in the words of the Communist Party, 
"taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the lead­
ing factor" and endorsed by the Ninth Plenary Session of the 
Eighth Central Committee in January, I96I (156; 155» pp. I6 
and 20; 355» p. 1). In this framework, industry, especially 
heavy industry, was directed to consider the supporting of 
agricultural modernization as its foremost task. The increase 
in agricultural production is expected in turn to guarantee 
the expansion of industry and the whole economy. In the "Ten 
Tasks for the Adjustment of the National Economy in I962", 
the National People's Congress finally articulated in April, 
1962 the following order of development priority: agriculture, 
light industry and heavy industry (327» p. 122). Since the 
promulgation of this new policy, growing amounts of manpower, 
raw materials and capital funds have been gradually alloted 
to the agricultural sector. 
B. De-emphasis of the General Line 
In the 1956 Draft National Programme for Agricultural 
Development, the regime for the first time expressed its 
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interest in the technical reform of agriculture, which up to 
late 1959 had not been pressed vigorously. In August, 1959» 
the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery Industry was insti­
tuted. At the same time, the CCP Central committee further 
decided to promote systematically agricultural mechanization, 
electrification, widespread use of chemical fertilizers and 
other chemicals, and extensive building of water control pro­
jects in hopes of raising agricultural productivity. At this 
point agricultural collectivization had been accomplished and 
there was need to raise the level of agricultural management 
and technology to promote a stable and high level of grain 
production. 
In i960, Li Pu-chun stressed that the fundamental solu­
tion of China's agricultural problem lay in the promotion of 
its technical transformation. Accordingly, a large increase 
in farm machinery was planned (156, p. 14; 155, p. 22). The 
nation thus planned to complete modernization of small agri­
cultural implements within four years starting with 1959» 
that of medium-sized implements within seven years, and full 
mechanization and use of large machines in ten years (277). 
The policy of agricultural modernization has been re-emphasized 
in the following years. Rural industries have been asked 
to produce small and improved farm implements to help accom­
plish semi-mechanization. In I96I, 40 to 50^ of commodities 
produced by rural industries was for supporting this semi-
mechanization (363» p. 21). However the expansion of rural 
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industries based on traditional methods was no longer encour­
aged in the spring of I96I (435, pp. 201-203; 360) as it was 
in i960 (155» p. 25). Chou En-lai noted in the spring of 
1962 that modernization of China's science and technology is 
the key to a modernization of agriculture and industry (219, 
p. 3)« In the summer of 1963» the party advocated the devel­
opment of "three revolutionary movements": class struggle, 
struggle for production, suid scientific experimentation. The 
emphasis on scientific experimentation and technical trans­
formation is a marked variance from the original tone prevail­
ing in the period of the great leap forward. 
To raise the level of technology and management in agri­
culture, "intellectuals" and scientists in the urban areas 
frequently have been sent to the communes to take part in 
agricultural production and research. This is partly due to 
the recognition that the experiences of veteran peasants will 
not have broad applicability unless they are organized, tested 
and generalized by scientists. This "going-to-the-country­
side" movement was intensified in March 1962. But scientists 
and professional specialists, starting with the spring of 
1961, were not required to spend much time on politics and 
manual labor. 
By February, 1964, young intellectuals dispatched to 
rural areas already accounted for some 20^ of the total labor 
force in some hsiens and about 50^ in some communes (299). 
It was reported that in 1964 thousands of agricultural scien-
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tlsts, both young and old, went to the fields in the country­
side to conduct research (305). In 1964, more than 320 thou­
sand "intellectuals" who have grown up in towns and cities 
were sent to take part in various kinds of "rural construction 
work" (311). With their better education, scientific know­
ledge and production techniques, they may help change the pic­
ture of rural China. 
In addition, the state investment in water conservation, 
agriculture and forestry has increased in both absolute 
and relative terms. This would increase labor productivity. 
For example, the central government planned in i960 to in­
crease its supply of modern means of production to agriculture 
by 35^ over 1959 level (156, p. 19). Up to the end of Septem­
ber, i960, the central government had already during the year 
invested in the rural communes 1.5 billion yuan, a target set 
for the whole of i960 (272), It also stepped up the amount of 
steel allocated for manufacturing agricultural machinery and 
implements from 156 thousand tons in 1958 (3^2, p. 5) to 550 
thousand tons in 1959 and to 1,100 tons in 1961 (257; 206, 
pp. 10-11). As a result, farm machinery increased rapidly 
between 1959 and 1964. The standard units of tractors used 
in agriculture increased from 45,330 in 1958 to 100,000 in 
1962 (Table 38). In 1963» agricultural machinery further in­
creased by more than 20^ (295). To increase the applicability 
of farm machinery, the manufacturing plants sent their re­
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presentatives to check with the rural population on the types 
of implements which the latter needed. 
Table 38. Agricultural mechanization, 1956-1964* 
% of the cultivated 
Standard units®" land mechanized 
of tractors 
1956 19, 367 -
1957 24, 629 -
1958 45, 330 2 
1959 59, 000 5 
i960 79, 000 20 
1961 99, 000 -
1962 
0
 
0
 000 -
1963 -
1964 0
 
0
 
000 — 
*Source: 33, P. 97; 4o, p. 135; 42, p. 9; 141, p. 137; 
257; 272; 293. 
standard unit refers to 15 h.p. 
The domestic production of chemical fertilizer as shown 
in Table 21 also grew at a high rate. In I963 the growth rate 
was 39^ (295; 451, p. 167). An increasing number of agree­
ments had been signed in I962-I963 with Japan, Britain, Prance, 
Netherlands, Italy and West Germany for importing ammonium 
sulphate and urea, and also whole manufacturing plants. The 
power irrigation and drainage systems also increased substan­
tially their use of electricity at a preferential rate of 
charge, about 30% less than that paid by urban industry (217, 
p. 16). The gross capacity of electric pumping stations in­
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creased from 50,000 KW to 1 million KW in I96I (21?, p. 13). 
During 1963, the use of electricity in rural areas was said 
to have increased 30^ (295)* In his 1964 Report on Govern­
ment Work, Chou claimed that from 1957 to 1964, the number of 
tractors had grown by 4 times,the horsepower of irrigation 
and drainage equipment by more than 12 times, electricity 
consumption in rural areas by 22 times, and the supply of 
chemical fertilizer and chemicals had more than doubled (303). 
During this era of agricultural modernization, the cen­
tralized leadership of the central government and Communist 
Party was restored and strengthened. The central government 
retrieved some of the authority delegated to the communes in 
the period of the great leap forward. 
C. Changes in the Commune System 
It was mentioned in Chapter IX that the exact pattern of 
the commune system to be fashioned in rural China was delin­
eated by the CCP Central Committee in August, 1959. Perhaps 
the party leadership was convinced that the commune system 
would promote a rapid economic development. In April i960 a 
large-scale creation of the same system was called upon for 
five big cities in China: Peking, Shanghai, Tientsien, Wu­
han and Canton (256). At the end of June, i960, there were 
1,027 urban communes in China, with a total membership of 
more than 52 million people (155, p. 8). When agricultural 
failure became certain in late i960, the Central Committee 
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at the end of that year issued twelve regulations governing 
the adjustments and operation of the commune. A radical re­
vision of the commune system was undertaken in the spring of 
1961 when the Central Committee issued sixty articles re­
lating to the regulations of the work in the rural people's 
communes. Changes in the commune system since August, 1959 
are discussed in the following section. 
1. Size 
One of the most conspicuous retreats in the commune 
system is a sharp contraction in the size of the average com­
mune. After the commune was ordered to scale down in May, 
1961 (435, pp. 197-208), the number of households in an aver­
age commune, as shown in Tables 24 and 25, declined from 
5,000 in early i960 to 1,800 at the end of I962. The latter 
approximates the size recommended by the Central committee 
in 1958. Accordingly, the total number of the rural communes 
increased from 24,000 in early i960 to 74,000 in the summer 
of 1963 (Table 32). Reduction of the size of the commune to 
the scale of a traditional hsiang was purported to make the 
commune more suitable to available capital facilities, man­
agement and technological capacity, and economic and topo­
graphic conditions in rural areas. It was thus hoped to in­
crease administrative and economic efficiency in the commune. 
2. Organization and ownership 
The diminishing of the role of the commune management 
committee has been accelerated since August 1959 when a three-
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level framework of ownership and management authority was es­
tablished. The commune then underwent a gradual transfer of 
the administrative authority from the management committee to 
the production brigade and to the production team. 
During the period from August 1959 to October I96I, the 
ownership of the principal means of production in the communes 
was generally vested with the production brigade, which con­
currently served as a basic unit of resource allocation and 
income distribution (435, pp. 200-203; 367, p. 6), The com­
mune management committee retained the ownership of only a 
small portion of the communal properties and rural industries, 
but it was still in charge of military, cultural and political 
activities. Therefore, it differed from the collective farm 
in character. The ownership of the production brigades was 
protected from infringement by the management committee. 
Among the brigades, commodities were to be exchanged on a 
voluntary basis, with adequate compensation. However, it 
must be noted that a few management committees were still 
highly active during this period. The production team owned 
a minor part of the communal wealth, which was composed of 
orchards, small farm tools and the retained surplus over pro­
duction quotas. 
In this new framework of three-level ownership, the pro­
duction brigade assigned a fixed amount of labor, land, draft 
animals and farm implements to the production teams under it, 
but was not permitted to withdraw them from the teams. In 
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late i960, some 95% of labor in the commune was directed to 
be allocated to the production teams (285). The production 
teams pledged to the brigade the accomplishment of the output 
I 
targets assigned by the latter, with a fixed labor consumption 
and cost. The production teams received rewards when they 
had fulfilled or overfulfilled their production quotas, and 
retained more than 70% of the excess output. 
The importance of the production brigade in this period 
can be understood from the following information. Some 8o% 
of the members* revenue in i960 came from the collective econ­
omy of the production brigade (286), The number of house­
holds in each production brigade as shown in Table 25 in­
creased from some 170 at the end of 1958 to 240 in August 1959. 
The size of an average production brigade during this period 
appeared to be larger than the average collective farm which 
existed before the spring of 1958 (Table 24). The number of 
households in each brigade dropped to I76 at the end of I96I 
when the basic ownership in the commune shifted to the pro­
duction teams. The number of participating households in­
creased to 200 at the end of I962. 
In late 1959 and during most of i960, communist leaders 
expressed the desire to shift the basic ownership from the 
brigade back to the commune management committee. The shift -
ing will be taking place if agricultural modernization is 
carried out and the income level of the commune population is 
raised from the prevailing 85 yuan to 150-200 yuan per capita 
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(429, pp. 184-85; 33» P» 92; 254). The exact time of this 
transition, according to the Minister of Agriculture, Liao 
Lu-Yen, can only be decided in I965 or after (357» p. 6), At 
the same time, the role of the brigade and teams in promoting 
agricultural production was increasingly emphasized. When it 
was discovered that agricultural failures were not arrested 
in 1961, the basic ownership and management powers of some 
brigades were transferred to the production teams in late 
November I96I (369» pp. 36-38; cf. 290). It can be assumed 
that economic condi'tions of these brigades were relatively 
bad. It is however difficult to establish the exact date 
when this shifting took place. 
In March 1962, the majority of the people's communes 
vested with the production teams their basic ownership of 
the means of production, authority in planning agricultural 
production, resource management, and income distribution. 
Many communes vested this authority in the production brigades, 
and a few commîmes, in the commune management committees 1 
(388, p. 31). Veteran party cadres were sent to the produc­
tion teams to direct production activities. The regular pro­
cedure for electing officers in the teams and communes was 
thus negated to a considerable extent. The teams also usurped 
the function of the brigades; party cadres at the brigade 
level were then only responsible for propaganda and political 
activities. Furthermore, the size of each production team 
declined and the number of production teams in each brigade 
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increased (Table 25). The links among economic, political 
and cultural activities in the commune have further disinte­
grated, At this point Joan Robinson remarked that the pro­
duction team is small enough to bring economic incentives into 
play while the commune is large enough to exhibit the visible 
benefits of collective organization (373» p. 295). 
3. Education and "rectification** drives 
During this period, misconduct and mistakes flourished 
among the demoralized party cadres, especially those who were 
sent to the lower levels or deprived of their powers because 
of the continuous decentralization of the commune authority 
to the production teams. In order to rehabilitate the commune 
members, a "rectification* campaign was again launched in late 
i960 to correct the "working methods" of party cadres. Accord­
ing to Lewis, between 1958 and I96I at least eight secreta­
ries at the provincial level who were concurrently members of 
the Central Committee were "purged" and demoted for alleged 
failures in their provinces. Similar fates befell some hsien 
and special district cadres (147, pp. 31-32). The central­
ized authority of the Party first secretary in the commune 
was also curtailed and equal status was given to each party 
member in the party committee to ensure collective leadership. 
The party cadres were also forbidden to give directives with­
out taking into account local actual conditions. The cadres 
were also forbidden to use force and violence. To fulfill the 
foregoing requirements, party cadres were directed to "eat to­
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gether, live together, work together, and consult together" 
with the commune members. All production brigade and team 
cadres were to be paid on a basis similar to ordinary commune 
members. 
In addition to the above "forced" measures, re-education 
programs were intensified in hopes of improving the ideologi­
cal and political consciousness of the cadres and masses so as 
to guarantee the policy of "politics in command" and "party in 
command". In the autumn of 1962, the Central Committee re­
circulated the revised edition of Lin Shao-Chi*s speech given 
in 1939Î How a Good Communist. The campaign to learn 
from Lei Peng, regarded as a model communist, and from the 
People's Liberation Army were also launched in 19^3 and 1964. 
At the same time, the regime promoted a movement of comparing, 
learning, keeping up, and helping one another in 1964. How­
ever the educational and ideological campaigns in this period 
supposedly were conducted so as not to hinder production work. 
4. Enlargement of the private sector 
In an attempt to revitalize the peasants' enthusiasm, 
material incentives have been strengthened since 1959 up to 
the present writing. The commune members have been given more 
leisure time to engage in private subsidiary production and 
to cultivate their private plots. In the fall of 1961, col­
lective raising of pigs gave way to private production as the 
main source of pork. It was observed in July, 1965 that income 
from subsidiary production made up over 60^ of farmers* net 
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income from agriculture (335» p. 202). 
Starting with the first half of 1959» rural trade fairs 
were also allowed to reopen to facilitate commodity exchange 
among the communes, brigades, other collective units and in­
dividual consumers and among urban and rural areas. Self-
I 
sufficiency is no longer a strict rule for the rural communes. 
They are allowed to grow crops which are adapted to their 
area and trade among themselves to obtain a certain degree of 
the "comparative advantages" of inter-regional trade. On 
September 23» 1959» the State Council promulgated Regulations 
Governing the Organization of Rural Trade Pairs, wherein com­
modities permissible for trade in rural fairs were specified 
(315» p. 380). Rural trade fairs have flourished. In Sep­
tember, 1961» there were in rural China 40,000 rural trade 
fairs, in which about 25% of the total commodity flow in the 
nation took place (36?, p. 16). The amounts of commodities 
which were exchanged by the individual commune members ac­
counted for some 70^ of the total commodity exchange in rural 
fairs in April, I962 (86, p. 12). 
These activities in the private sector are recognized 
by Communist leaders as a necessary appendage at this stage 
of the socialist economy bacause they provide private incentive 
to Increase output of sideline products, handicrafts and farm 
products. In i960, state trade boards and supply and market­
ing cooperatives were instructed to take part in rural trade 
fairs and to stabilize farm prices through adequate adjustment 
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of market supply and demand. To provide more incentives to 
counterbalance the decline of farm output, prices of farm out­
put were adjusted slightly upward in I96I, During the late 
1961 and summer of 1962, there had been public discussions 
on whether "price" and "profit" mechanism should be used in 
planning and management to advance economic efficiency (444, 
pp. 1-4 and 9-18). Finally the National Commodity-Price Com­
mission was instituted in September I963» supposedly to take 
into consideration the effects of prices on production and 
market supply (150, p. 36). 
5. Income distribution 
Additional material incentives were provided by the al­
location of an increasing proportion of the commune output 
to the members (435» pp. 200-205) with a larger portion in 
the form of money income. In early I96I, the portion alloca­
ted to the members was instructed to be 65^ of the commune 
output (360, p. 25); as compared with 30-40# in 1958 (Table 
30). Of the total allocated portion, the free supply" to 
the members accounted for 30 to 40| in the summer of 1959 
(242) as compared with 50 to 7Q% in 1958. The ratio of free 
supply to the total allocated portion was reduced to less 
than 30^ in late 1959 and in i960 and the communes were in­
structed to adhere to this ratio (246; 285; 283). In the 
spring of I962, the wage policy in the communes became flex­
ible, Each commune was given freedom to formulate its own 
wage system to suit local conditions and satisfy its members 
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(292). 
With the grant of private plots and the reduction of 
"free supply", the collective consumption was no longer com­
pulsory in the majority of the communes in the latter half of 
1959. It was stressed continuously by party leaders that 
the principle of voluntary participation in mess halls should 
be rigidly adhered to and that mess halls, if any, should be 
properly run. In the first half of i960, the mess halls were 
still operated in the majority of the communes. For example, 
more than 99^ of rural householders in Kweichou were reported 
to have participated in more than 101,900 mess halls (35^» 
p. 18). For the nation as a whole, more than 80^ of the 
rural population participated in mess halls (353» p. 43). 
After i960 the mess halls operated only during the busy sea­
sons. 
The adjustments in economic policies, development strategy 
and the commune system mentioned above clearly signal a re­
treat from the great leap movement. Considering the past ex­
periences of the Chinese Communist Party, a retreat is often 
followed by advance. It remains to be seen whether Communist 
China will return to the policies which characterized the 
great leap forward. 
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XII. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, 1958 AMD 
YEARS FOLLOWING 
Advantages of the commune seemed to outweigh its disad­
vantages and difficulties in the first two years of the com-
munization , i.e., 1958 and 1959. Both agricultural and in­
dustrial sectors registered a large growth during these two 
years. But, the wheel turned in the reverse direction in 
the following years. The Chinese economy then suffered three 
bad years. It will be illuminative to describe economic per­
formances since the initiation of the rural commune. The ef­
fect of the commune on agricultural development will be dis­
cussed and evaluated the next chapter. 
A. Great Leap Forward in 1958-1959 
According to the preliminary report, farm and industrial 
output in 1958-1959 was incredibly high. Later it was offi­
cially admitted that statistics had been inflated and the 
statisticians were berated. The production figures were sub­
stantially scaled down. The final version of the 1958 out­
put was 500 billion catties for grain and 4,2 billion catties 
for cotton, respectively 35,^ and 28^ over the 1957 level. 
The gross value of agricultural output recorded an increase 
of 2S% over the 1957 level (Tables 44, 45 and 46), Many 
counties and municipalities in the country already reached 
the per mou yield targets laid down for grain and cotton in 
the 12-year National programme for Agricultural Development 
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(40, p. 116). 
It was officially reported that Increasing construction 
of small Industry, modern and indigenous, resulted in a sharp 
advance of industrial production in 1958, about 66% over the 
1957 level (Table 46), For example, in the first five-year 
plan, the increment of pig iron produced by local industry 
accounted for 7*5% of the aggregate production of pig iron in 
the nation (4l8, pp. 26-28). In 1958, the local indigenous 
industry alone produced 4.16 million tons of pig iron, about 
30^ of total output (Table 39). However, this pig iron was of 
low quality and not suitable for making steel. The gross out­
put of local small industry in 1958 was estimated to be 60% 
over that in 1957 (239). The combined gross output of agricul­
ture and industry in 1958 was claimed to be 48^ over the 1957 
level, no doubt a great leap forward (Table 46). The over­
whelming attention given to iron, grain and cotton neverthe­
less resulted in neglect of subsidiary occupations and a 
relative shortage in their supply. 
The momentum of "great leap forward" carried into 1959* 
It was reported that 286.8 million mou of land growing food 
grains in 504 counties reached the 1967 production targets 
set in the National Programme. The 286.8 million mou account­
ed for 24^ of the total area for growing grains and the 504 
counties, 28^ of the total number of the grain-growing coun­
ties in the nation. Those counties which reached their 1967 
production targets for cotton numbered 204 and had 36.5 mil­
lion mou of cotton-growing land, 20^ of cotton-producing 
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Table 39. Economic achievements in 1957-60 
Item Unit 1952 1957 targets 195? 
set in 1st 
plan 
Pig iron million tons 4.6? 
factory- M 1.93 4.6l 5.94 
indigenous H 0.06 
Steel M 
factory- It 1.35 4.12 5.35 
indigenous II 
Coal It 66.49 113.00 130.73 
factory- M 123.23 
indigenous II 7.50 
Electric power billion k.w.h. 7.26 15.90 19.34 
Crude petroleum million tons 0.44 2.01 1.46 
Aluminum ingots thousand tons 
Cement million tons 2.86 6.00 6.86 
Timber million eu. m. 11.20 20.00 27.87 
Chemical fertilizers^  million tons 0.18 0.58 0.63 
Metal-cutting 
machine tools thousand units 13.73 12.7 28.00 
Power generating 
equipment million k.w. 0.23 0.20 
Metallurgical equip. thousand tons 
Cotton yarn million baies 3.62 5.00 4.65 
Cotton cloth billion meters 3.83 5.05 
Machine-made paper million tons 0.54 . 66 1.22 
Edible vegetable oil million tons 0.98 1.79 1.10 
Sugar M 0.45 0.69 0.86 
Salt H 4.94 5.93 8.28 
Grain billion catties 308.8 363.2 370.0 
Cotton II 2.6l 3.27 3.28 
targets 1957 1958 1959 i960 1962 targets 
in 1st set in 2nd 
plan plan 
4.67 13.69 
4.61 
0.06 
5.94 9.53 
4.16 
20.50 27.50 
4.12 5.35 
11.08 
8.00 
3.08 
13.35 18.45 10.5-12.0 
3.00 130.73 
123.23 
7.50 
270 
218 
51 
347.8 400-450 190-210 
5.90 19.34 27.53 41.50 51.5-58.0 40.0-43.0 
1—
I 
0
 
CM 
1.46 2.26 3.70 
70.4 
5.50 5.0-6.0 
100-120 
6.00 6.86 9.30 12.27 16.00 12.5-14.5 
0.00 27.87 35.00 41.2 47 31-34 
0.58 0.63 0.81 1.33 1.80 3.0-3.2 
2.7 28.00 50.00 70.0 90.5 60^ 65 
0.23 0.20 0.80 2.15 
205 
3.3 
220 
1.4-1.5 
30-40 
5.00 4.65 6.10 8.25 8-9 
5.05 5.70 7.50 7.6 7.29-8.06 
. 66 1.22 1.63 1.7 2.32 1.5-1.6 
1.79 1.10 1.25 1.46 3.10-3.20 
3.69 0.86 0.90 1.13 1.30 2.40-2.50 
5.93 8.28 10.40 11.04 14.3 10-11 
3.2 370.0 500.0 540.1 500.0 
3.27 3.28 4.20 4.82 4.80 
• « 
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Table 39. (Continued) 
Item Unit 1952 1957 targetsl957 
set in 1st 
plan 
Soybeans billion catties 19.0 22.4 20. 
Pigs million head 89.8 138.3 145. 
Cattle II 56.6 65. 
Horse II 6.1 7. 
Sheep and goat li 61.8 98. 
*Source; 40, pp. 95-100; 48; 152, pp. 44-45 and 50; 153» P. 10 
pp. 3-5; 359, pp. 1-5; Tables 44 and 48. 
D^o not include ammonium nitrate. 
getsl957 
1st 
1958 1959 i960 1962 targets 
set in 2nd 
plan 
20.1 21.0 23.0 25.0 
145.9 160.0 180 143.0 250 
65.9 64.6 65.4 90 
7.5 7.5 7.6 10 
98.6 108.9 112.5 170 
3, p. 100; 156, pp. 2-3, 11-12 and 15; 206, pp. 32-33; 328, 
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counties and kZ% of cotton-growing area in the nation, re­
spectively, Other data show that there were 2? million mou 
of wheat-producing land with yield per mou higher than 300 
catties, more than 20 million mou of rice-growing land with 
per mou yield over 800 catties, and more than 10 million mou 
of cotton-growing land with per mou yield over 100 catties. 
The average yield of food grain per mou was 330 catties, 20# 
over the 1958 level (3^7). 
The total output of food grain, cotton and the whole 
agricultural sector in 1959 registered an increase of 8, 14.8 
and l6.7# respectively over the 1958 level (Tables 45 and 46), 
Thus Communist China claimed a doubling of the per capita farm 
output in ten years (429, p. 177). The final revision of the 
1959 food grain output, as shown in Table 44, has aroused 
suspicion among students of the Chinese economy in the West. 
Table 5 shows that the area affected by natural calamities in 
1959 was much wider than in 1958 and it is inconceivable that 
output of farm products in 1959 was substantially larger than 
the previous year. It is virtually impossible to deny or 
validate this suspicion. Agricultural statistics in Communist 
China have become unreliable since the great leap forward in 
1958. The accuracy of preliminary data and final revision 
on production is hard to assess. The only explanation for 
the official claims of 1959 output might be the possibility 
that natural disasters mainly attacked the area where the pro­
ductivity was low in normal years and they attacked with 
29? 
less severtiy in the non-crucial farming season. There was 
no evidence to support this explanation, however. 
The policy of the great leap forward was more nearly 
accomplished in the industrial than in the agricultural sector. 
It was claimed that in 1959 the country already fulfilled 13 of 
24 production targets set for 19^2 in the Second Five-Year 
Plan and two products approached those preset targets. Those 
unfulfilled were mainly in the agricultural sector (Table 39)» 
The gross value of the commune industrial output in 1959 
was reported to be 70% over the 1958 level (24?). As the re­
sult of increased output in both farming and manufacturing, the 
average Income of the commune member in 1959 was 10% and 20% 
higher than the 1958 and 1957 level respectively (24?; 3^8, p. 
7). The per capita income of farm population in 1959 approxi­
mated 85 yuan, which was higher than the average income of 80 
yuan per capita earned by the middle peasant family before the 
collectivization (254). A large proportion of "poor" produc­
tion brigades in 1959 was promoted to the status of "rich" 
ones. That proportion was 23*8% in Honan; 33^ in Kiangsu, 
Ninghsia and Kwangtung; 50% in Kwangsi, Hopei, Kansu and Inner 
Mongolia; and 67% in Kirin, Shansi, Liaoning and Shanghai (344 
pp. 14-21; 234; 24?; 245). However, the discrepancy between 
rich and poor brigades in collective revenues was still substan­
tial. According to a survey in Szechwan, the discrepancy was 
about 20 to 30% within the communes with some 10,000 population, 
but 50 to 60% within those with less than 10,000 households 
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(344, p. 22). In 1958, the discrepancy was 84^ among brigades 
in four communes in Hainan Island (24?). 
The supply of consumer goods in rural areas also increased 
substantially. For example, the supply of woolen yam in the 
first half of 1959» as compared with the same period in 1958, 
increased by 92.6^; cotton cloth, 35.4^» and rubber shoes, 
54.6# (429, p. 187). Commodity prices remained almost con­
stant. 
B. Three Bad Years 
The pace of agricultural growth has slowed down since the 
spring of 1959. But its downturn started in the next fall, 
probably sparked by natural calamities. Then all negative 
factors of the economy re-inforced each other to bring about 
three bitter years of national development. 
When a series of natural disasters, the worst in the 100 
years, attacked the country in 196O, its farm output declined 
sharply. No official statistics about farm output for i960 
and ensuing years were published. The exact amount of farm 
production has become the continuous guess work of economists 
in the West. The results of their efforts are shown in 
Table 40. The writer is not in the position to judge the rel­
ative accuracy of different estimates, nor is he competent to 
make an estimate. Depending upon the location of areas af­
fected and their severity, the total effect of disasters on 
farm output would vary considerably, as the productivity in 
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different regions differs as much as two-fold. It is there­
fore impossible to make a good estimate on the basis of the 
official statements of what percentage of land was affected 
and how severely each land area was affected. Nor is it 
proper to take the average of different estimates to repre­
sent the i960 output, as was frequently done by Liu and Yeh 
in their estimation of the 1933 output of different goods 
(cf. 161). This is because these estimates could not be con­
sidered as samples from the same universe, and sometimes the 
underlying assumptions of various estimates are extremely un­
tenable. The estimates in Table 40 show that grain output 
in i960 ranged from 19^ lower to a little higher than the 
1957 level. Compared with the 1959 farm output, these esti­
mates imply a "great leap backward", or at least a "leap 
backward" in i960. 
Food rations became tight in i960. China's export to 
the Soviet Union, which was mainly in the form of farm products, 
also declined more than 50^ during i960 and 196I (118, pp. 98-
100). The ideological dispute between two countries certainly 
had its effect on the reduction of their trade. But, it is 
surprising to know that Communist China still shipped 10,000 
tons of food grains to Cuba in late i960. In total, China 
exported 1.2 million tons of rice in I960 as compared with 
1.7 million tons exported in 1959» To export food grains in 
the time of food shortage appears to be irrational. The pos­
sible explanation is that politics is the main concern of the 
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Table 40, Pood grain production: 1957-62* 
(million metric tons) 
Source 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 
Official 
Snow's estimate 
185 250 270 185-
250 
152 
Montgomery 150 160 
Jones and Poleman^ 185 210 192 185 185 
U.S. Agricultural 
attache in Hong 
KongO 185 213 168 159 166 181 
Robertson 185 166-
167 
180 
185 
Schwartz 200 about 
200 
Asagawa 162 172 189 
*Source: 10, p. 92; 66, p. 149; 83, p. 662; 133, p. 4; 
372, p. 254; 387, PP. 623-624; Table 44. 
^Based on the assumption that grain output per capita re­
duced by 10^ during 1957-1961, with the growth rate of 
population at 2.4#. 
^Derived with the 1957 output equal to 185 million tons. 
regime. Still, the communist leaders might not have a clear 
knowledge about food storages in the country before they com­
mitted their government to export food grains. In the fall 
of i960, the party cadres at higher echelons were sent to the 
communes to check the harvest (282). 
As the result of agricultural failures, agricultural 
taxes paid by the communes Tepresenied only 5*9% of total 
budgetary revenue of the state, as compared with 6.1% in 1959 
and 7.8# in 1958 (109, p. 126; 443, p. 10). 
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Agricultural failures affected greatly the activities of 
those light industries which used agricultural products as 
raw materials, but heavy industry still developed at a rapid 
rate. Production of steel, pig iron, coal, electric power, 
petroleum, and metal-cutting machine tools fulfilled the newly 
set targets for the year (Table 39; 362, p. 9), The party 
leaders still appeared to possess an optimistic view about 
future economic growth. In his interview with Japanese 
journalists on November 21, i960, the Foreign Minister Chen 
Yi maintained that after consolidation in 196I, there would 
be a great leap forward in industrial production in 1962 and 
1963. As for agricultural production, he said, it depended 
equally on human efforts and weather conditions (4^2, pp. 38-
39). 
Quantity and quality of food declined during the last 
quarter of i960 and early I961. There were scattered reports 
of diseases due to malnutrition in November i960 (35, pp. 1-4). 
Draught animals lost their strength because of overwork and 
scarce fodder. Some drau^t animals were slau^tered to fill 
human stomaches (273; 289). Some incidences of sabotage and 
disturbance took place in Kwangtung. The effect of food 
shortages was at its worst in early 196I, then it was relieved 
by the import of foreign grains and a slightly better harvest 
in 1961. 
Two indicators have been suggested to appraise the recent 
agricultural failures and food shortages. These two are food 
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Intake and grain import. According to Alsop and Sir Cyril, 
the average Chinese lived on a diet of 600-900 calories of 
food intake a day during December i960 and September 1961. 
It is not known how these figures were obtained. Alsop 
further reported that a person on this level of diet is ex­
pected to lose about 20 pounds each month. Thus the Chinese 
population would have disappeared in the spring of 196I if 
available food grains were equally distributed. There would 
have been mass starvation in the sense of massive death because 
of hunger if grains were unequally distributed (387, pp. 6l4-
617). There was no evidence to prove the disappearance of 
Chinese population from the Chinese mainland nor the occur­
rence of massive starvation (cf. 110, pp. 99-108). According 
to the estimation of William Kaye, the diet per capita in i960 
was about 1,850 to 1,900 calories (137» p. 125; cf. 66, p. 149; 
82, pp. 21 and 43). 
Perhaps on the basis of food imports in late 1961, Alsop 
gave the average food intake of the Chinese population in 
the spring of 1962 at "near starvation" level of 1,300 to 
1,600 calories a day (4, p. 24). He also claimed that these 
data were derived from a great number of refugee interrogations 
and collected and analyzed with extreme care. This statement 
was sharply criticized by Walker, who participated directly 
in refugee interrogations (82, pp. 45-46). The British Colon­
ial Secretary reported to the House of Commons that "there was 
little evidence that the Chinese refugees attempting to enter 
Hong Kong were suffering from malnutrition" (387, pp. 498 and 
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620; cf. 110, pp. 184-186). This could be true, because the 
nutrition standard was raised after the food importation. 
The unusually large number of refugees in May, 1962, were from 
one section of Kwangtung province, which could not be repre­
sentative of the whole nation. It was argued that the massive 
exodus of refugees resulted from the government decision to 
force back to rural areas those people who migrated to urban 
areas in the course of communization and who had become ac­
customed to city life (110, p. 94; 327, p. 122). 
Another indicator is foreign trade. Not only did 
China reduce its export substantially in I96O-61, she started 
a large-scale import of food grains in 196I. Reduction of ex­
port was mainly due to its inability to maintain agricultural 
exports at the previous levels. In 1958, farm products and 
their processed products accounted for 72,5% of total export 
(40, p. 176). 
According to data compiled by Barry, Communist China in 
1961 purchased 6.47 million long tons (6.57 million metric 
tons) of food grains, to be delivered in I96I-I963, from Aus­
tralia, Canada, U.S.S.R., West Germany, France, Argentina, 
and the United Kingdom (l4, pp. 20-21; cf. 117, PP. 289-291). 
This raised the proportion of grain import from less than 
of China's total import in 1959 to about 40^ in I96I (82, p. 
20). It cost the country approximately U.S. $367 million, or 
U.S. $360 million if the barter arrangement is excluded. It 
was reported that $230 million was to be paid in I96I and 
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$130 million in 1962 (l4, p. 22; of. 451, p. l6). This pay­
ment drained the country's foreign exchange reserves accumu­
lated during 1950-1960. During this period, China realized 
export surpluses from non-communist countries equal to about 
U.S. $1,022.6 million and a trade deficit of U.S. $496.2 mil­
lion from the Communist bloc (423, pp. 114-115). If all inter­
national payment accounts are calculated, China had at the end 
of i960 about U.S. I330 million foreign exchange holdings 
(423, p. 117). In addition to the above statistics, China im­
ported from the Soviet Union 300,000 tons of wheat, rye and 
flour in 196I (118, p. 101). Thousands of tons of grains 
were also sent by overseas Chinese to mainland China through 
Hong Kong. But it was said that not all purchased grains were 
consumed. Some were used to improve grain reserves, which 
were used up in late 1961 (110, p. 326; 387, p. 624). A small 
proportion of grain imports was shipped to Ceylon, Albania, and 
East Germany. Therefore, food imports in 196I-I963 might 
not be a good indicator of the degree of agricultural failure 
and food shortage. Imports of machinery and raw materials 
however were largely curtailed. Large scale import of food 
grains took place in England during her period of rapid indus­
trialization. However, in contrast to China, England was able 
to import a large amount of cotton for manufacturing. 
The output of cotton and other industrial crops also re­
gistered a continuous decline in I96O-I96I (215). On top 
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of this, the massive withdrawal of Russian advisers and tech­
nicians, taking with them half-finished blue prints of indus­
trial construction, dealt a heavy blow to the Chinese economy. 
Thus Chinese industry entered a period of relative stagnation 
in 1961, compared with the previous great leap forward. Cap­
ital formation in 196I-I962 also dropped considerably. The 
rate of accumulation in the rural commune fell from 15-20^ 
of the commune output in 1959 to 5% in 196I (197, p. 34). 
Morale of local cadres and peasants was low. 
C. Economic Recovery Since Late 1962 
The situation has improved since the autumn of 1962, 
partly due to better weather and partly to the adjustment in 
the commune system and the policy of agricultural priority 
initiated in early 1962. In September 1962, Miss Strong re­
ported that the last two calamity-affected provinces had pas­
sed through their period of hardships (409, PP. 5-6). Agri­
cultural calamities seemed to end in the fall of 1962. 
The year of I963 also witnessed a better harvest in food 
grain and an economic recovery. Economic crops registered a 
substantial increase. The rural subsidiary occupations, es­
pecially those operated individually by the commune members, 
showed a quick upturn. 
When Joan Robinson revisited China in the summer of I963, 
the situation In the communes was said to be improved greatly. 
The output of grain and cotton in 1964 was reported to be 
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above the 1957 level. Twenty counties In Chekiang surpassed 
the grain yield per mou of 800 catties, whereas in Kiangsi, 
there were 1,568 production brigades, 104 communes and four 
counties surpassing the same targets. As compared with I963, 
output of rapeseed in 1964 increased by 7Z%% groundnut, 26^; 
cotton, 37^; cured tobacco, 4?^; and sugar beets, 70^ (303; 
308). Output of rice, wheat, maize. Kaoliang and millet were 
also higher than I963 level (45, p. 2). The government pur­
chase of food grains, cotton and other industrial crops was 
also reported to have overfulfilled the state purchase targets 
by 2 to 30^ (302; 306). Supply of pork, lamb meat and veget­
ables increased 30^ over the 1957 level (303). Compared with 
the 1963 level, the gross revenue of production brigades and 
commune members increased by some 15^ (302). 
Industry revived speedily. Output of steel, petroleum, 
cement, motor vehicles, cotton fiber, sugar and tobacco raised 
more than 20^ over the 1963 level. The growth pace of modern 
means of production for agriculture was much higher, for ex­
ample, a 50^ increase was reached for chemical fertilizer (45, 
p. 3)« Increase in steel output enabled China to supply dom­
estically over 95% of her steel consumption in 1964 as compared 
with 75% in 1957 and almost none before 1949. In the machinery 
industry, domestic supply accounted for over 90^ of the total 
supply in 1964 in contrast to 55% in 1957 and almost none prior 
to 1949 (45, p. 3). The gross value of industrial output in 
1964 was expected to be more than 15^ over the 1963 level (303). 
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Because of the economic recovery, China was able to pay off 
her debts to Russia one year ahead of the agreed deadline. 
The deadline for debt repayment was originally set at the end 
of 1965. The economic recovery during the 1963-I965 period 
also kindled the communist leaders to set the year of I966 
as the beginning year of their third Five-Year Plan. They 
originally had scheduled the start of the third plan in I963, 
but the agricultural failures in 196O-I962 forced them to 
postpone it. 
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XIII. ANALYSIS OP THREE FUNDAMENTAL 
ASPECTS OP THE COMMUNIZATION 
Three fundamental hypotheses are considered to be under­
lying the great leap forward, the general line for socialist 
construction and the commune system, which are discussed in 
Chapter IX. These three hypotheses are a non-diminishing 
I 
rate of economic growth, a high substitutability of relatively 
abundant factors for relatively scarce factors, and a positive 
effect of institutional change on farm output and overall 
economic development. As the rationality of the great leap 
movement and communization presumably would depend greatly on 
the validity of these hypotheses, this chapter will analyze 
these three points in order. 
A. Non-diminishing Rate of Economic Growth 
As mentioned in Chapter IX, one objective of the great 
leap movement and communization is to overtake Britain^ pro­
duction of major industrial products within 15 years. The 
communist leadership seemed to believe that China could achieve 
this goal. It leads some economists to think that the Chinese 
communists attempt to negate the diminishing rate of economic 
growth or to demonstrate a non-diminishing rate of growth (452, 
p. 6l). 
The Chinese leadership's belief in the possibility of 
overtaking Britain is based on the comparison of unexplored 
resources available in both countries and the growth rates of 
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their major industrial products in the past. Po I-Po, the 
Chairman of State Economic Commission, demonstrates that if 
the growth rates of major British industries in I9M-I956 as 
shown in Table 41 are projected into the future, their Chinese 
counterparts, in order to overtake Britain within 15 years, 
will have to develop at the rates indicated in Column (6). If 
the growth rates of British industries in 1953-57 and 1950-58 
are used as the norms for their growth in the next 15 years, 
the required growth rates of Chinese industries are shown 
respectively in Column (?) and (8). These required growth 
rates are computed on the basis of the following formula; 
* ^ b^ ^c 
where = aggregate output of a British industry in 1957. 
Y = aggregate output of the Chinese counterpart 
in 19.57. 
r^ = average annual rate of growth of the British 
industry in the past. 
r = required annual rate of growth of the Chinese 
industry during 1958-1972. 
t  = 1 5  y e a r s .  
The growth rates of the Chinese key industries for vari­
ous periods in the past, as shown in Table 37» are all greater 
than the rates computed above (cf. 24, p. 29). Communist 
China therefore will surpass Britain in the output of major 
industrial products if the trends of these industries during 
the next fifteen years remain as during the immediate past in 
the two countries. 
Table 41, Industrial output in Britain and China* 
• 
Average annual 
of growth in 
Britain (#) 
rate 
Output in 
(million 
1957 
tons) 
Requireigrowth rate 
of China's industries 
for overtaking 
Britain's in 1972, 
based on growth rates 
of Britain's 
industries in: (#) 
1941-
1956* 
(1) 
1953-
1957 
(2) 
1930 
1958 
(3) 
Britain 
(4) 
China 
(5) 
1941-
1956* 
(6) 
1953-
1957* 
(7) 
1950-
1958* 
(8) 
Industrial 
output 2.0^ 4.1 2.9 
Steel 3.5 5.7 2.6 22.09 5.35 14.0 16.2 14.0" 
Pig iron 3.9 5.9 3.5 14.53 5.94 10.8 12.5 10.8-
Coal 0.5 decline 0.03 227.10 130.00 -5.3 5.3- 5.3" 
Electric power 6.5 . 7.8 7.9 101.46® 19.34° 18.2 10.5" 20.5 
Cement 3.8 12.15 6.86 8.5 
Sulphuric acid 4.3 0.63 14.4 
Aluminum 1.3 3.2 
- • — 
Source : 40, pp. 95-96 and 107; 202 , pp. 16, 20, 26 and 29-31 ; 413, p. 11. 
^Given by Po I-Po. 
tpor 1937-1956. 
°In billion KWH. 
^Superscription " stands for "less than". 
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According to the historical study of Rostow on economic 
growth, Britain went through her stage of "take-off# during 
1783-1802 and entered into economic maturity in 1850 (374, 
pp. 38-40 and 59-60). By economic maturity he means the con­
dition in which an economy has applied the range of existing 
modem technology to the bulk of its resources (374, p. 59)• 
The growth rates of Britain, by definition, started to de­
cline in 1850. Since her domestic resources have been well 
exploited, Britain has had to rely mainly on importation for 
the supply of her industrial inputs. In 1956, the proportion 
of imported materials in total industrial inputs were; 60^ 
for iron ore, 99^ for chrome, manganese and nickel, and 97$ 
for petroleum (202, p. 9). The recent upsurge in decoloni­
zation and the increasing establishment of industry in under­
developed countries will tend to curtail the British imports 
of these raw materials. 
A gradual decline of growth rates in the course of in­
dustrial development has not been peculiar to Britain or other 
developed countries of the West, Projection of the Economic 
Commission of Europe indicates that the average growth rates 
of the Russian key industrial sectors, such as steel, pig 
iron, coal, electric power and cement, will decelerate sharply 
during the 1957-1972 period (374, p. 102). The following 
table suggests a gradual decline in the growth rate of the 
Russian industry as a whole (cf. 423^ p.8^ 452, p. l4; 24, pp. 292-
293). The average annual rates of growth of Russian industry 
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dropped froin 19.4 in 1929-32 to 10.3 in 1956-58 and to 9.6 in 
1960-61, The Russian economy reached its maturity in 1950, 
according to Hostow's estimate (37^1 P. 59). 
Table 42. Average annual rates of growth of the U.S.S.R. 
industry* (percentage) , 
First Plan (1929-32) 19.4 
Second Plan (1933-37) 17.1 
Third Plan (1938-40) 13.2 
Fourth Plan (1946-50) 13.5 
Fifth Plan (1951-55) 13.1 
Sixth Plan (1956-58) 10.3 
1959 11,4 
i960 9 . 6  
1961 9.6 
*8ource; 206, pp. 25-26. 
Tables 37 and 46 show that annual rates of growth of key 
Chinese industries and those of the Chinese industry as a 
whole have been erratic. There is a high possibility that 
the growth rates of China's industry will decline considerably 
after it reaches a certain stage of its growth, say, economic 
maturity, Rostow's study of several developed countries in­
dicate that it generally took more than 60 years after the 
take-off began to attain economic maturity (374, pp, 9-10, 
38-40 and 59-60). Again, Rostow speculates that China started 
its take-off stage around 1952 (374, p. 38). And the 1957 
level of China's steel and other industrial products as shown 
in Table 4l was only equivalent to the British level at the 
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end of 19th century (202, p. 28). China's industry also lagged 
well behind that of Russia. Table 4-3 shows that the 1957 out­
put of China's key industries, except for coal and cement, ap? 
proximated the Russian level of the early 1930*8 (cf. 15» 84). 
Table 43. Comparison of industrial output in U.S.S.R. and 
Communist China 
TT ^ s "R China 
Czarist u.b.b.K. pre-1949 
Unit Russia 1929 1933 1938 peak* 1957 
Steel Million 
tons 4.2 4.9 6.9 18.0 0.9 5.4 
Pig iron H 4.2 4.0 7.1 14.6 1.8 5.9 
Coal H 29.1 40.1 76.3 132.6 61.9 130.0 
Electric 
power 
Billion 
kwh 1.9 6.2 16.4 39.6 5.9 19.3 ^ 
Cement Million 
tons 1.5 2.2 2.7 5.7 2.3 6.9 
Source: 26, p. 103; 40, pp. 95-96; 93, p. 189; 135, 
p. 37. 
^The output of electric power in this column refers to 
1941; coal and cement to 1942, and steel and pig iron 
to 1943. 
There are large amounts of mineral deposits unexplored in 
China. Therefore, Communist China hardly can drive her econ­
omy to maturity within 15 years beginning from 1958, regard­
less of whether the most advanced technology is available to 
her and an unprecedented effort given by her population to 
economic development. Still the growth rates of the Russian in­
dustry as shown in Table 42 have been high even during a period 
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after it reached economic "maturity" in 1950. It is therefore 
possible that within the 1958-1972 period, the growth rates 
of China's industry, if well managed, can be maintained at the 
high level required for surpassing Britain. However, the 
spirit of great leap forward and surpassing Britain in major 
industrial production within 15 years has nothing to do with 
the question of whether Communist China has been trying to 
deny the principle of diminishing rate of growth. The dimin­
ishing rate of growth is mainly relevant to the economy that 
has reached its maturity in development. 
Nevertheless, a swift development of the industrial sector 
needs consistent support from agriculture. The enormous impact 
of agriculturalproduction on the general economic development " 
was forcefully displayed to communist leaders in I96O-I962. 
It has been widely recognized that especially in underdeveloped 
countries, industrial development relies on agriculture for 
the provision of food grains, raw materials, capital funds 
and foreign exchange, and for the absorption of industrial 
products. The Chinese leadership believes that Chinese agri­
culture as well as the rest of the economy can "continuously" 
develop at the pace of the great leap forward over a long 
period of time providing the strategy of "general line" and 
"walking on two legs" is resolutely carried out (156; 168; 
262; 267). The analysis of the principle underlying the 
general line and "walking on two legs" follows. 
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B. High Elasticity of Factor Substitution 
and "Walking on Two-legs" 
As mentioned in Chapter IX, the keynote of general line 
and "walking on two legs" is to correctly handle "contradic­
tions" among different sectors and groups of people and to 
channel all positive factors into production. Since relative­
ly abundant factors of production in China are manpower and 
traditional techniques of production, in the period of great 
leap forward the Chinese communists had to bring these factors 
into full play. To some economists, the policies followed 
during this period suggest that Communist China in its great 
leap period was trying to negate the law of diminishing mar­
ginal productivity and was assuming perfect substitutability 
of production factors. Many Chinese communist leaders appear 
to support such views (cf. 238). These views however fail to 
grasp the fundamental idea of "walking on two legs". 
The law of diminishing marginal productivity assumes all 
factors of production except one fixed and that production 
factors which substitute perfectly for each other can be con­
sidered as a single factor of production. The strategy of 
"walking on two legs" or capitalization on the structural 
duality, however, does not imply a fixedness of all factors 
of production but one. The strategy is in fact an endeavor 
to use simultaneously a variety of production techniques so 
as to bring into play fully all available resources. Theore­
tically, application of various factors of production will in­
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crease at the same time, but at different rates. Therefore, 
the conditions of "walking on two legs" differ from the basic 
assumption of the law of diminishing marginal productivity. 
But the strategy of "walking on two legs" does not deny the 
possibility of diminishing marginal productivity in the actual 
implementation of the strategy if the condition of the law of 
diminishing productivity does occur due to improper applica­
tion of the strategy. Neither does the strategy of "walking 
on two legs" imply a constsint return to scale nor constant 
elasticity of factor substitution, which implies use of a 
single production technique and function in an economic re­
gion such as a commune (cf, 6; 134). 
The strategy of "walking on two legs" also implies ex­
istence of marketing outlets for differing qualities of pro­
ducts which are turned out by various methods of production. 
Prom the viewpoint of long-run economic development, the 
strategy is purported to achieve the objective of transforming 
manpower into capital equipment and indigenous methods of 
production into modern ones, through the process of a hi^i 
rate of production growth, a higher rate of capital accumu­
lation, and labor education and training. The idea is in line 
with the dialectic process which implies that accumulation of 
quantity to a certain point begets quality change. The cen­
tral theme of "walking on two legs" in the short-run, however, 
is to utilize all available factors of production up to the 
point where their expected marginal products per dollar of 
factor cost in different production processes are equal. Be­
cause labor is considered to be redundant in China, it will be 
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added to production until its marginal product in different 
processes approaches to zero. The accounting prices of un­
employed, "redundant" factors of production are generally 
assumed to be zero. The "expected product? is used here as a 
criterion to decide whether or not labor input should be added 
to the production process. The actual marginal product of the 
input may be less than zero. This idea of using expected out­
put as a criterion corresponds to the criterion of "expected 
profit g 0" (not "actual profit =0"), which has been used 
by a private firm in the market economy to decide the op­
timum intensity of adding inputs. The difference in two 
criteria is the emphasis placed on output in Communist China 
and on profit in the market economy. 
It has already been mentioned that capital funds and mo­
dern production techniques are scanty in Communist China. The 
communist leadership also has been unwilling to sacrifice in­
dustrial growth for agricultural development. The conviction 
that elasticity of factor substitution^ is higher in agricul­
ture than in industry further contributes to the immense stress 
put on "walking on two legs" in agricultural production. 
Elasticity of factor substitution indicates the relative ease 
of substituting one factor for another without substantially 
changing the marginal product of each factor or the marginal 
rate of substitution. The larger is the absolute value of 
the elasticity, the easier is the substitution between factors 
IWill be defined on p. 321. 
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of production (3, pp. 341-43). 
A relatively high elasticity of substitution in agricul­
ture is due to its relative non-homogeniety of production 
factors in producing a farm product. Take grain production 
for example. So-called labor is actually a set of human ser­
vices in; (1) planting, weeding and harvesting (will be re­
ferred to as (2) irrigation and drainage (L2)» (3) col­
lection and application of organic fertilizer (L3), (4) soil 
reclamation and improvement (Lif.), and (5) operating farm ma­
chinery (L5), etc. A given farm worker will have different 
marginal products in various agricultural activities, because 
of his aptitude for and attitude toward a certain activity and 
different complementary factors of production available to him 
in each activity. The capital set is composed of: (1) hand im­
plements (K^), (2) draft animals and animal-drawn equipment 
(K2), (3) improved seeds and chemical fertilizers (K3), (4) 
small field tractors and equipment (including pump machines) 
(K4) and (5) large-scale tractor and equipment (K^), etc. If 
all elements of labor are measured by a common unit such as 
a labor day, and capital is measured by 100 sruan, then a set 
of isoquants for grain production can be constructed. Figure 
3 shows various combinations of elements of capital and labor 
which produce the same level of output. Suppose the curve 
y° marks the technically most efficient application of vari­
ous production possibilities in grain production^ then any in-
lln the actual situation, the most efficient levels of 
output for various production techniques will not be the 
same. It is only for illustrative convenience to assume 
that they are. 
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crease of either capital or labor, or both, beyond the levels 
denoted by the isoquant y° will not result in an increase of 
grain output. This is because factors other than capital and 
labor are fixed. Since many technical possibilities of grain 
production are available to a large community as a whole, its 
isoquant curves are almost continuous. The elasticity of 
capital-labor substitution can be measured from the y° iso­
quant . 
If an isoquant y is continuous and y = f(K,L), then 
dy = U dK + dL = 0. So, 
aK SL 
3f 
^ SK 
dK Sf ' 
dL 
Here K stands for capital and L for labor. Let stand for 
Èf and Y-, for then 
SK 1 ^ 
-Y 
dL = ^ (1) 
die Y 
1 
-Y 
k is the marginal rate of substitution of the factor 
Y 
1 
L for the factor K. 
The elasticity of substitution is the elasticity of fac­
tor input ratio with respect to the marginal rate of substitu­
tion. The elasticity measures percentage change in one vari­
able associated with percentage change in another variable. 
Thus the elasticity of capital-labor substitution in agricul­
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ture (e) can be defined as follows (cf. 3, PP» 340-341): 
g ^ d loR (I) = 1 ^ ( 1 )  
d log /Y,.\ % r^\ (II 
K /KdL - LdK) 
L 
I 
dL dK 
I - L K 
^1 ^^ k ^^ 1 
Yk i ^1 
If the relevant isoquant curve is downward sloping, then 
e < 0. In case the isoquant is discrete, the elasticity of 
factor substitution can be measured by 
àL AK 
L K 
A^ l" 
In resource allocation, a private firm in the market 
economy will under the constraint of its resources choose a 
combination of capital and labor on the highest possible iso­
quant in accordance with their price ratio. In the framework 
of "walking on two legs", the commune employs a different ap­
proach in resource allocation. Theoretically, the commune 
will first locate the most efficient combinations of capital 
and labor for various production techniques, as those on the 
isoquant y° in Figure 3* Based on the availability of its 
tractors and equipment, draft animals and animal-drawn im­
plements, and various kinds of labor, etc., it selects several 
factor combinations on the y° curve. Suppose points A to G 
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on the curve y° are chosen in order and outputs represented by 
these points are added together, a curve indicating output ex­
pansion through the adoption of multiple processes in the com­
mune is constructed as the curve PQR in Figure 4. On the PQR 
curve in Figure 4, capital and labor increase simultaneously, 
but with different rates, while labor substitutes for capital 
on the yo curve in Figure 3« 
The commune theoretically will not choose H combination 
in Figure 3 because the marginal product of labor input at 
thfe point is zero. This is true because dK = 0 and dL>0 
at this point, and from equation (1), Y^dL = Y^^dK = 0. Y^ = 0. 
Yi is the marginal product of labor already defined above. In 
the actual performance, many communes in the period of the 
great leap forward did operate up to, or beyond, H point. As 
a result, the community production curve could be the PQS 
instead of the PQR in Figure 4. Thus additional labor forces 
have been used to produce the same output. 
Besides capital and labor, there are various sets of for­
ces which will affect grain production, such as management and 
technical personnel, political cadres and scientists, material 
and psychic incentives, and institutional change and technical 
reform of agriculture. Their actual effects on farm output 
in the period of communization can only be decided by empiri­
cal analysis. These forces are qualitative suid their rela­
tions are so complicated that a direct empirical evaluation 
of their effects is impossible. A way to get out of this di­
lemma is the statistical testing of the third hypothesis or 
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contention held by Chinese Communists, which actually is cru­
cial in the communlza11on. Still the solution of the third 
hypothesis will indirectly answer the validity of the second 
one as the commune is an institution Implementing the strategy 
of "walking on two legs", 
C. Institutional Change and Agricultural Development 
The third hypothesis, which is the main concern of this 
study, can be stated as follows: Institutional changes will 
have positive effects on agricultural development and growth. 
The relevant institutional changes in rural China include 
land reform, mutual-aid movement, cooperativization, collect­
ivization and communization. These institutional changes af­
fect agricultural production Indirectly through their effects 
on income distribution, incentive, labor force participation 
in production, capital accumulation, technological Innovation 
and management capacity. These points have been discussed in 
previous chapters. The purpose of this section is to elabor­
ate the above-mentioned hypothesis theoretically and provide 
possible methods for statistical estimation and testings, 
1, Three basic types of agricultural economies 
By agricultural growth is meant increase in farm output 
regardless of its causes. Agricultural development refers 
only to that increase in farm output which is due to a con­
scious and consistent human effort in production. To relate 
development with a conscious human effort is but an extension 
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of the idea that both civilization and savagery are man-made. 
As the level of capital equipment, technology and management 
capacity is low in developing or underdeveloped countries, it 
is more useful to define agricultural development as increase 
in farm output due to advancement in capital equipment, tech­
nology and management capacity. These factors of production 
will be referred to as development factors. Based on this 
definition, three basic types or models of agricultural econ­
omies can be established. 
The first type is a developing agriculture which is 
characterized by an increasing yield response to development 
factors over time, as denoted by DD in Figure 5. The DD line 
is not necessarily linear. It is assumed to be so for il­
lustrative convenience. The x axis in Figure 5 denotes time 
and the y axis catties per mou of grain production. The yield 
per unit of sown area instead of the total grain output of 
an economic unit is used here because it can exclude effects 
of change in sown area on grain output and clearly reflect ef­
fects of development factors on grain production. The ob­
served yields per mou of grain production over time are de­
noted by dots. The discrepancies between the DD line and 
dots resulted from changes in random factors such as weather 
and unconscious actions of peasants. The second type signi­
fied by 88 in Figure 5 is called a stagnant agriculture in 
which development factors have no effects on grain output at 
all. Changes in grain output per mou are totally due to 
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randon factors. In the third type of agriculture, the long-
term trend of yield per mou of grain production is delining, 
as indicated by PP in Figure 5. 
The DD, SS and FP lines therefore represent three basic 
types of agricultural economies with random factors at play 
on each type. If y is used to stand for a series of output 
per mou of grain production of various agricultural economies, 
then the slope of DD = 4? > 0» the slope of SS = ^  = 0 and 
dt dt 
the slope of FF < 0. In reality, the long-run development 
trends of the agricultural sector in a country may be of the 
combination of the above three types. For example, an agri­
cultural economy may first show a trend of increasing output 
per mou in its early stage, then stagnate and finally decline, 
or vice versa. Since development and random factors can have 
various combinations, the same time series of grain output 
per mou as indicated by dots in Figure 5 can be interpreted 
as a developing, stagnant or declining agriculture. Whether 
an agricultural economy is developing, stagnant or declining 
can only be decided by empirical estimation of Generally 
yield per mou of grain production will increase substantially 
in a developing economy if weather is relatively good, for 
both development and weather factors interact to bring the 
output up. Its output per mou of grain production may not 
drop below the level of the previous year even when weather 
and random factors are relatively bad, because the negative 
effects of weather may be offset by development factors. The 
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situation in a declining agriculture is just the reverse. 
Grain output per mou may drop substantially below the pre­
vious level when relatively bad weather attacks, but may 
not rise above the previous level when good weather occurs. 
Before the question of whether climatic factors are influen­
tial in affecting farm output in Chinese agriculture can be 
answered, it is therefore necessary to identify first what 
type of agriculture characterizes the country. This will be 
explored more fully later. 
The foregoing analyses assume non-existence of institu­
tional changes as defined before. It is the conviction of the 
Communist leadership that institutional changes will shift up 
the lines representing development factors. Since a series 
of changes in rural institutions reflect a conscious effort 
attempting to enhance organizational and management capacity 
of agricultural production, institutional changes can be con­
sidered as a development factor. Suppose a rural community 
went through the period of land redistribution in 19^9-1951» 
mutual aid movement in 1952-1953» organization of elementary 
agricultural producers* cooperatives in 1954-1955, develop­
ment of advanced APCs in 1956-1957 and the adaption of the 
commune system in 1958-1965. According to the contention of 
the Chinese communists, the long-run development trends of 
grain output per mou for the community will shift up from the 
level represented by solid lines to the level represented by 
broken lines in Figures 6, 7 and 8. On the contrary, those 
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who oppose institutional changes argue that a series of in­
stitutional changes will press down the development trends of 
grain output from the level represented by solid lines to the 
level represented by dotted lines. Many economists may hold 
a position that some rural institutions will boost up the 
development trends but others pull them down. The validity 
of these contentions will better be evaluated by empirical 
analyses. 
2. Short-run regression model for statistical analysis 
In discussing the effects of the rural commune on agri­
cultural yields, Schran (378) sets up eight simultaneous 
equations with the following eight variables: consumption of 
human energy, "laboring", "studying", means of consumption, 
states of technological awareness, ideological awareness, 
means of production, and total output in a given production 
period. However, it is impossible to judge whether functional 
relations of these eight variables as specified in the Schran 
model are proper forms representing the actual performance of 
Chinese agriculture. Since some of these variables are dif­
ficult to quantify, usefulness of the Schran Model in statis­
tical analysis is thus limited. Considering the poor state 
of statistical facilities in Communist China, there certainly 
will be errors of measurement in those quantifiable variables, 
which make statistical analyses of his model much more compli­
cated. It is not known whether the Schran Model is of the 
short-run or long-run. Any short-run model of agricultural 
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production or income will lose much of its significance if 
climatic factors are not taken into consideration. Thus this 
model is not useful in resolving recent controversies about 
Chinese agriculture. In order to provide a scheme for direct 
statistical analysis of the relations between farm output and 
technical modernization, institutional changes and weather, 
a single-equation complete model is provided here. The model 
is one in which there is only one non-lagged endogenous vari­
able and in which there is no correlation between the distur­
bances and the independent or predetermined variables (99, 
p. 3^). This uni-equational complete model is relatively 
crude, but will serve the purpose of testing the significant 
hypotheses involved in this study. 
As an illustration, first assume that a relatively homo-
genuous community grows only a single crop on a constant acre­
age of land over time. Homogeniety here refers to soil, wea­
ther, time and extent of institutional changes and the dif­
fusion of state investment. In China a community with these 
homogeniety qualities can be as large as a commune, a hsien, 
or even a province. Generally, the time and pace of agri­
cultural socialization or institutional changes were the same 
in a province as the first secretary of the Communist Party 
in each province is the decisive figure of the socialization 
movement in his province. However, soil and weather conditions 
differ greatly in China and the whole nation cannot be con­
sidered as a homogeneous area. It is quite possible that in 
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the same month there are droughts in North China and floods 
in the South. The national aggregation and average of both 
extremes become misleading indicators of weather conditions 
for grain production. The national average of both extremes 
(when the components are not indicated) may be judged as a 
favorable condition for grain production, but grain output of 
the nation drops sharply because of droughts and floods. 
Therefore, a single equation model developed in this section 
can only be applied to a region smaller than a province. 
The major forces which are believed responsible for the 
change in farm output in Chinese agriculture, for the purpose 
of this study, can be grouped into four categories: state 
investment in agriculture, institutional changes, income re­
ceived by the rural population and climatic factors in the 
critical period of crop growth. These forces can be consider­
ed exogenous or predetermined factors affecting farm output. 
Assume that there is no interaction among these forces, a 
linear additive function for grain output per mou (y) can be 
formulated as follows: 
y = ao + a^^x^^ + ^ -^2 + ®17^17 ^ **• (2) 
where x^ stands for annual state investment on one mou of 
farm land which the central government spends in each region 
to better production techniques, farm implements and water 
control facilities. In order to isolate the effects of in­
stitutional changes on crop production, the community invest­
ment in agriculture by APCs and the communes, etc. is excluded 
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from The appropriate time series for might not be 
available for the researchers outside Communist China; the 
national average of state investment on each mou of farm land 
as shown in Table 21 can be used instead. The coefficient aj^, 
which is to be estimated from equation (2), decides the type 
of agricultural economy to which a community belongs^. An 
' agricultural economy is of a developing type if its a^ is sig­
nificantly larger than zero. It is of the stagnant type if 
a^ = 0 and of declining agriculture if a2<0 (cf. Figure 5). 
A set of institutional variables includes that for land 
redistribution (X2), mutual-aid team (xj), elementary APC 
(24); advanced APC (x^), the rural commune of the first phase 
(X5) and the rural commune of the second phase (xy). "Hie co­
efficients of institutional variables reflect the indirect 
effects of rural institutions on farm output through their in­
fluences on farm management and coordination, farming methods 
and techniques, labor utilization in irrigation and soil im­
provement, ownership and distribution systems, and psychic 
incentives. As institutional changes are qualitative and in­
volve many factors which could not be properly quantified, 
they are better represented by dummy variables. Suppose a 
community went through the period of land redistribution in 
1950-1951j mutual-aid teams in 1952-1953» elementary APC*s in 
1954-1955, advanced APC*s in 1956-1957» the commune system of 
^See 115» pp. 108-120 for estimation of and other re­
gression coefficients in equation (2). 
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the early phase in 1958-1959 and the commune system of the 
second phase in I96O-I965, then 
^2 1 in 1950 and 1951 
0 in 1946-1949, 1952 and after. 
==3 1 in 1952 and 1953 
= 0 in 1946-1951 and 1954-1965 
H 1 in 1954 and 1955 
0 in 1946-1953 and 1956-1965 
^5 
1 in 1956-1957 
= 0 in 1946-1955 and 195^-1965 
1 in 1958 and 1959 
= 0 in 1946-1957 and 1960-1965 
^7 
= 1 in 1960-1965 
0 in 1959 and before 
If statistical estimation results in a^ > 0 where i = 2, 
3> ...» 7, it can be inferred that all rural institutions have 
positive effects on farm output. If a^ = 0 where i = 2, 3, 
..., 7» rural institutions can be considered neutral in farm 
output. If a^ < 0 where i = 2, 3» ...» 7» rural institutions 
can be considered having negative effects on farm output. It 
is quite possible that some of these coefficients are positive, 
some negative and some equal to zero. The main contention of 
Chinese communists however is a^^^a^ > a^> a^ > ag > 0. This 
contention cannot be validated nor repudiated before appro­
priate data of all related factors are available. Special 
care should be taken in drawing conclusions and inferences 
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from the coefficients of institutional variables. The fact 
that some communes turn out positive a^ does not imply that 
other communes will do so. Nor do negative a^ in some com­
munes deny the possibility that other communes have positive 
ay coefficients. The effects of rural institutions on farm 
output hinge greatly on their respective leadership and msui-
agement capacity. 
Income variable (xg) represents per capita income re-
I 
ceived by the rural population in forms of cash and goods, 
from both private and public sources. This is net of collec­
tive savings, agricultural taxes and compulsory purchases of 
grains at fixed prices by the government and so reflects the 
change in living standards of the rural population and their 
material incentives. The income variables here incorporates 
changes in farm prices, if any. The statistical data in this 
regard are available in many localities (cf. Tables 8, 26, 
29, and 30). 
x^, x-j^Q, x^y respectively stand for the monthly 
rainfall and temperature in the period of crop growth, say, 
from May to August. Agricultural journals published in Com­
munist China indicate that time series of rainfall and 
temperature are also available in many provinces (cf. 52; 53» 
54; 56; 57; 58; 62). However, the monthly averages or totals 
of rainfall and temperature are not good indicators of weather 
conditions for crop growth because rainfall and temperature 
may change extremely in a month. The weekly averages, if 
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available, should be used. If agricultural experiments suid 
research are well developed in some regions, the "weather 
indexes'* can be constructed to replace the foregoing monthly 
rainfall ànd temperature. Weather indexes were developed 
recently by the United States Department of Agriculture on the 
basis of data obtained from experimental stations in the United 
States (cf. 383, pp. 225-228; 209). The weather indexes have 
the advantage of combining all weather factors into a single 
variable while reflecting closely actual weather conditions. 
An approach similar to weather indexes is used by Laing, 
who develops indexes to characterize the effects of environ­
mental water deficiencies on plant photosynthesis and crop 
yield. (142). 
The disturbance term u represents stochastic factors 
other than rainfall and temperature in the growth period of 
the plant. This is assumed to be normally distributed and 
has no correlation with x^, X2, ..., x^y. 
The y in equation (2) represents yield per mou of s 
single crop. Usually many crops are grown in a community and 
their sown areas also change in the process of agricultrral 
socialization. In order to reflect these factors, y in equa-
n 
tion (2) should be changed into ZL where j stands for j=0 J J 
various kinds of grains in a community and Yj stands for the 
total output of each crop in the same community, Pj is the 
market price of the grain "j" or the relative weight of that 
grain evaluated by the government. 
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Equation (2) also assumes no interaction among independent 
variables. However, it is highly possible that there exist 
interactions between institutional and income variables and 
between rainfall and temperature in the critical period of 
crop growth (cf. 431, pp. 10-11). Adequate adjustments such 
I 
as use of second order or third order models should be made 
to reflect these interactions. Another suitable way to take 
care of the multiplicative, instead of additive, property of 
these independent variables is to change equation (2) into 
the following form; 
Log y = log a^ + a^log + aglog Xg + ... + a^^log x^^ 
+ log u. 
In this function, log x^ instead of x equals to 1 or 0, for 
i = 2, 3» ..7. When some independent variables do not af­
fect farm output instantaneously, appropriate lagged variables 
should be used. 
As the complete set of appropriate data needed for ap­
plying this regression model to any region is not available 
to people outside Communist China, empirical analysis of the 
validity of the communist contention will have to wait pro­
bably until the Sino-American relation is normalized. 
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XIV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Depending upon the difference in collected materials 
and the viewpoint from which the problems are exaimed, the 
conclusions concerning institutional changes vary consider-
, ably. This thesis examines rural reorganization from the 
standpoint of agricultural and overall economic development. 
For this purpose, efforts have been made to collect and 
assemble the communist official materials concerning agri­
cultural collectivization, communization, labor utilization, 
Income distribution and production. These materials will be 
useful for future studies on Chinese agriculture. 
Before I960, the Chinese Communists had consciously and 
i 
systematically intensified the socialist elements in their 
rural institutions. The process was designed to gradually 
eliminate the groups alien to the Communist regime, to pro­
mote capital accumulation in rural areas, and finally to ac­
celerate rural modernization and industrialization. As for 
the exact pace of the socialist movement from one stage to 
another, the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party was 
flexible. The policy goals, results of political campaigns 
and the leadership's perception of rural conditions were de­
cisive in this matter. 
The process of socialist movement culminated in the peo­
ple's commune in 1958, However, the Communist Party's en­
dorsement of the people's commune received a direct impetus 
from the Party's desire to achieve the "great leap" in produc­
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tion and the Party's full conviction that the "general line" 
for socialist construction can help accomplish this goal on the 
self-reliance basis. The commune system is the institution de­
signed to carry out the strategy of "general line" as well as 
"walking on two legs" to attain the goal of "great leap forward". 
In the early phase of the communization, the people's 
commune evolved into a rural development region with all 
rural activities virtually under a single command. Because 
the Chinese Communist leadership anticipated the advantages 
of this well Integrated system in facilitating control, plan­
ning, labor utilization, capital accumulation, and rural 
modernization, it encouraged the proliferation of this new 
system. However, it appears that the local cadres carried out 
the program to excess. As the commune system was propagated 
all over the nation without going through a long period of ex­
perimentation, it was vulnerable to uncertainties. Consecutive 
agricultural failures, large-scale demoralization and the needs 
to consolidate the commune system soon drove the regime to ad­
just the commune structure, national policy targets, develop­
mental strategy and the relations between agriculture and 
industry. It is highly probable that the Chinese Communists 
might continue their program of socialist transformation and 
revive the commune system when the agricultural conditions 
greatly improve. 
In the last analysis, the commune system failed to ac­
complish the ambitious target of the "great leap". Neither 
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did It succeed In curing the old Chinese misery of food short­
age, There is however no evidence to conclude that communi-
zation was the main cause of the recent agricultural failure, 
extending from late 1959 to mid 1962, Collectivization might 
have created some adverse effects. IVhether agricultural pro­
duction will increase or decrease in the process of collecti­
vization depends upon balance and counter-balance of all 
forces involved. To measure the net effect of various rural 
organizations on farm output is the task of statistical analy­
sis, A short-run regression model for this purpose is pro­
vided in this study. No data are available to apply this 
analytical method. However, the model can serve as a step­
ping stone of future studies on China's agricultural problems. 
Further, the theoretical framework provided in this study to 
examine the effects of institutional changes on farm output 
appears to be a useful tool in understanding the nature of 
various types of agricultural economies. As for the long-run 
effects of the commune system on the Chinese society, they are 
too complicated to be assessed. 
Since the people's commune is a new, revolutionary sys­
tem, it may be too risky to propagate it indiscrimately. But 
the existing people's commune can be improved to serve the pur­
pose of promoting farm production and rural modernization. 
Advancement of leadership and management skill, increased 
supply of capital goods, and the readjustments of size and 
distribution system of the people's commune will be helpful. 
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although capital investment in agriculture should increase 
gradually, it is not advisable to allocate a large share of 
national funds to agriculture. Agricultural modernization is 
a slow process and farm output will remain sensitive to random 
factors until the agricultural sector is largely modernized. 
Non-economic factors are also responsible for the develop­
ment of the people's commune and other drastic programs. The 
Chinese esperiences in the past 100 years and the present in­
ternational situation certainly have contributed a great deal 
to China's adoption of extreme measures. However, it is not 
the purpose of this thesis to ponder over these matters. 
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Table 44. Output of agricultural crops* (in million catties) 
Pre—1949 
peak 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 19: 
Food grains 277,400 216,200 249,400 270,100 308,800 313,800 320,900 349, 
Rice 
(unhusked) 114,700 97,300 110,200 121,100 136,900 142,500 141,700 156, 
Wheat 46,600 27,600 29,000 34,500 36,200 36,600 46,700 45, 
Coarse grains 103,400 71,600 85,400 86,500 103,000 101,400 98,500 109, 
Potatoes®- 12,700 19,700 24,800 28,000 32,700 33,300 34,000 37, 
Soybeans 22,600 10,200 14,900 17,200 19,000 19,900 18,200 18, 
Ginned cotton 1,698 889 1,385 2,061 2,607 2,349 2,130 3, 
Groundnuts 6,342 2,536 3,477 4,190 4,632 4,254 5,534 5, 
Cured tobacco 357 86 113 484 443 4l6 464 
Jute and hemp 217 74 158 501 610 276 274 
Hapeseed 3,814 1,468 1,365 1,555 1,864 1,758 1,756 1, 
Sugar cane 11,300 5,284 6,267 9,256 14,232 I4,4l8 17,184 16, 
Sugar beets 658 381 490 720 957 1,010 1,978 3, 
Tea - 82 130 157 165 169 184 
Cocoons of cultivated 
silk 62 67 94 124 119 130 
Tussah cocoons - 24 50 53 122 25 51 
S^ource: 4o, pp. 119 and 124-125; 135, p. 288; 397, PP. 9-11; 156; 7 pr 
I^n computing output of food, grains, potatoes are converted into grain-
to one. 
Planned 
952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 for 1957 1958 1959 
1,800 313,800 320,900 349,600 365,000 370,000 363,180 50OPOO 540P00 
',900 142,500 141,700 156,000 164,900 173,600 163,540 22%400 -
',200 36,600 46,700 45,900 49,600 47,300 47,450 52900 -
1,000 101,400 98,500 109,900 106,800 105,300 109,590 123900 -
^700 33,300 34,000 37,800 43,700 43,800 42,600 90^ 00 -
»,000 19,900 18,200 18,200 20,500 20,100 22,440 21pOO 23P00 
!,607 2,349 2,130 3,037 2,890 3,280 3,270 4^ 00 4,820 
»,632 4,254 5,534 5,352 6,672 5,142 - 5^ 00 6,114 
443 4l6 464 596 598 512 780 760 836 
610 276 274 514 516 626 730 640 -
L,864 1,758 1,756 1,938 1,846 1,775 - 2200 3,200 
t,232 I4,4l8 17,184 16,220 17,310 20,785 26,350 27P50 -
957 1,010 1,978 3,192 3,292 3,002 4,270 5^00 -
165 169 184 216 241 223 - 280 302 
124 119 130 134 145 136 - 169 -
122 25 51 128 124 89 114 
; 397, pp. 9-11; 156; 7 PP. i4-15. 
are converted into grain-equivalent at the ratio of four catties 
371 
Table 45. Output of food 
(Index number) 
grains and cotton* 
1 
Food 
1952 
= 100 
grains 
Preceding 
year = 100 
Rice 
( 
Wheat 
Preceding 
Coarse 
grains 
year = 100 
1949 70.0 - - - -
1950 80.8 115.4 113.2 105.1 119.3 
1951 87.5 108.3 109.9 119.0 101.3 
1952 100.0 114.3 113.0 104.9 119.1 
1953 101.6 101.6 104.1 101.1 98.4 
1954 103.9 102.3 99.4 127.6 97.1 
1955 113.2 108.9 110.1 98.3 111.6 
1956 118.2 104.4 105.7 108.1 97.2 
1957 119.8 101.4 105.3 95.4 98.6 
1958 161.9 135.1 131.0 122.4 117.7 
1959 174.9 108.0 - - • -
Average annual 
rates of growth: 
1950-1952 12.7 12.0 9.7 13.2 
1953-1957 3.7 4.9 6.1 0.6 
1950-1958 10.2 H
 
0
 
9.1 6.7 
1953-1959 8.8 9.3a 8.8* 3.4* 
*Source: Table 44. 
^Refers to 1953-1958. 
Wheat 
receding 
Coarse 
grains 
year = 100 
Potatoes 
) 
Ginned 
1952 
= 100 
cotton 
Preceding 
year ~ 100 
-
-
- 34.1 -
105.1 119.3 125.9 53.1 155.8 
119.0 101.3 112.9 79.0 148.8 
104.9 119.1 116.8 100.0 126.5 
101.1 98.4 101.8 90.1 90.1 
127.6 97.1 102.1 81.7 90.7 
98.3 111.6 111.2 116.5 142.6 
108.1 97.2 115.6 110.8 95.2 
95.4 98.6 100.2 125.8 113.5 
122.4 117.7 207.3 l6l.l 128.0 
-
• - - 184.9 114.8 
9.7 13.2 18.5 43.7 
6.1 0.6 • 6.2 6.5 
9.1 6.7 21.5 21.2 
8.8* 3.4* 6.4* 10,7 
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Table 46. Gross Output Value of Agriculture and Industry* 
Combined gross 1 
Agriculture and 
Dutput of 
Industry 
Agricultural Output 
Millions 
of 1952 
Yuan 
1952 
= 100 
Preceeding Millions 
Year of 1952 
= 100 Yuan 
1952 Preceeding 
= 100 Year 
= 100 
Sha: 
Com' 
Out' 
1949 46j 610 - 32,590 - 6-
1950 57,480 123.3 38,360 117.7 61 
1951 68,320 118.8 41,970 109.4 6; 
1952 82,720 100.0 121.1 48,390 100.0 115.3 5! 
1953 94,610 114.4 114.4 49,910 103.1 103.1 5: 
1954 103,540 125.2 109.4 51,570 106.6 103.3 4< 
1955 110,410 133.5 106.6 55,540 114.8 107.7 5( 
1956 128,650 155.5 116.5 58,290 120.4 104.9 4j 
1957 138,740 167.7 107.8 60,350 124.7 103.5 4: 
1958 205,690 248.6 148.2 75,410 155.8 125.0 3( 
1959 269,480 325.8 131.0 88,000 181.8 116.7 3: 
Average annual 
rate of increase 
1950-1958 17.9 9.8 
1953-1957 10.9 4.5 
1953-1959 19.1 9.2 
*Source; 4o, pp. 16-18 and 118; 348, p. 6 
al Output Industrial Output 
Preceeding 
Year 
= 100 
Share in 
Combined 
Output % 
Million 
of 1952 
Yuan 
1952 
= 100 
Preceeding 
Year 
= 100 
Share in 
Combined 
Output % 
- 69.9 14,020 - 30.1 
117.7 66.7 19,120 136.4 33.3 
109.4 61.4 26,350 137.8 38.6 
115.3 58.5 34,330 100.0 130.3 41.5 
103.1 52.8 44,700 130.2 130.2 47.2 
103.3 49.8 51,970 151.4 116.3 50.2 
107.7 50.3 54,870 159.8 105.6 49.7 
104.9 45.3 70,360 205.0 128.2 54.7 
103.5 43.5 78,390 228.3 111.4 56.5 
125.0 36.6 130,280 379.5 166.2 63.3 
116.7 32.6 181,480 528.6 139.3 67.3 
9.8 29.2 
4.5 18.3 
9.2 28.2 
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Table 4?. Per mou yield of agricultural products* 
(catties per sown, area) 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Food grains 142 168 183 183 184 197 
Rice 252 281 300 321 336 329 357 
Wheat 86 85 100 98 95 115 115 
Coarse grains 101 118 118 136 132 129 l40 
Potatoes 187 215 225 251 246 231 251 
Soybeans 81 - - 109 107 96 107 
Ginned cotton 22 24 25 31 30 26 35 
Groundnuts 135 - - 171 160 176 172 
Cured tobacco 93 - - 159 149 l4l 157 
Jute and hemp 176 - - 257 233 253 295 
Rapeseed 64 - - 67 71 68 55 
Sugar cane 3,261 - - 5,213 5,007 5,231 5,300 
^Source: 40, p. 121; 135, pp. 28? and 289; 10, p. 78; 3^7, p. 17. 
184 
329 
115 
129 
231 
96 
26 
176 
141 
253 
68 
231 
347 
Planned 
1955 1956 1957 targets 1958 1959 
for 1957 
197 196 204 211 275 330 
357 330 359 371 463 -
115 121 114 119 145 -
l4o 135 139 149 181 -
251 265 278 289 372 -
107 115 106 117 - -
35 31 38 35 49 -
172 172 143 - - -
157 137 - 187 - -
295 249 297 352 — -
55 57 56 - - -
5,300 5,221 5,333 6,500 - — 
p. 17. 
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Table 48. Livestock population 
(thousand head) 
Pre-war 
peak 
1 9 4 9  1952 1953 1 9 5 4  1 9 5 5  
Big draught animals 7 1 , 5 0 6  60,020 7 6 , 4 5 8  8 0 , 7 5 6  8 5 , 2 9 9  8 7 , 7 4  
Cattle 4 8 , 2 6 8  4 3 , 9 3 6  56,600 60,083 63,623 6 5 , 9 5 :  
Horses 6,485 4 , 8 7 5  6,130 6,512 6 , 9 3 9  7 , 3 1  
Mules 4,602 1,471 1,637 1 , 6 4 5  1 , 7 1 7  1,72 
Donkeys 12,151 9 , 4 9 4  11,806 12,215 12,700 12,40 
Camels - 2 4 4  2 8 5  301 320 3 5  
Sheep and goats 62,520 4 2 , 3 4 7  6 1 , 7 7 9  72,023 8 1 , 3 0 4  8 4 , 2 1 ,  
Pigs 7 8 , 5 3 0  5 7 , 7 5 2  8 9 , 7 6 5  96,131 101,718 87,921 
*Source: 397, p. 9; 40, p. 132; 135, P. 311; 132, p. 221; l4l, td. 1' 
350, p. 
3 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 
,756 85,299 87,745 87,744 -
,083 63,623 65,951 66,601 65, 860 
,512 6,939 7,312 7,372 7, 510 
,645 1,717 1,723 1,711 1 ,  
0
 
0
0
 
,215 12,700 12,402 11,686 10, 900 
301 320 357 374 
,023 81,304 84,218 92,130 98, 580 
,131 101,718 87,920 97,800 145, 
0
 
0
 
O
N
 
85,o6o 85,400 
64,592 65,400 
7,512 7,600 
1,624 
12,400 
10,601 
731 
108,860 112,530 
160,000 180,000 243,000 
32, p. 221; l4l, p. 146; 247; 248; 136, p. 74; 328, pp. 3-5; 
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Table 49. Individual estimates of industrial output of Communist Chin; 
Production of factories and handicrafts 
Liu-Yeh* s estimate Chao 's estimate Liu-Yeh 
Billions of 
1952 Yuan 
Index Annual in­
crease rate 
Index Annual in­
crease rate 
Billions of: 
1952 Yuan 
1952 13.0 100.0 - 100.0 26.5 8.3 
1953 15.0 115.4 15.4 123.3 23.3 10.2 
1954 16.8 129.2 12.0 139.5 13.1 11.8 
1955 18.3 140.8 8.9 141.8 1.6 13.2 
1956' 22.8 175.4 24.6 172.0 21.4 17.5 
1957 25.2 193.8 10.5 185.9 8.1 19.8 
1958 30.0 230.8 19.0 242.3 30.3 24.0 
1959 37.0 284.6 23.3 318.5 31.5 31.0 
^Source: 162, p. 4^0; 24, p. 290. 
^•Liu-Yeh's estimate of factory production includes those of manuf 
omraunlst China, 1952-1959* 
Production of factories only 
a |e Liu-Yeh * s estimate" Chao's estimate 
I- Billions oflndex Annual in- Index Annual in-
ite 1952 Yuan crease rate crease rate 
8.3 100.0 - 100.0 29.8 
10.2 122.9 22.9 124.7 24.7 
11.8 142.2 15.7 141.6 13.5 
13.2 159.0 11.9 146.9 3.7 
17.5 210.8 32.6 182.2 24.0 
19.8 238.6 13.1 195.9 7.5 
24.0 289.2 21.2 272.6 39.2 
31.0 373.5 29.2 371.4 36.3 
chose of manufacturing factories, mining and utilities. 
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Table 50. National income of Communist China*»^ 
Annual rate Billions of 
of growth the 1952 Yuan 
1949 1 36. 02^ 
1950 18.6 42. 72^ 
1951 17.0 49. 98^ ' 
1952 22.3 61. 13 
1953 14.0 70. 04 
1954 5.7 73. 88 
1955 6.5 78. 80 
1956 14.0 88. 75 
1957 4.6 
r 
92. 83° 
1958 34.0 124. 39° 
1959 21.6 151. 25° 
^Source; 40, p. 20; 156, pp. 1-2; 213b» P* 7 
national income is meant the value added to the 
country's material output by productive activities in 
industry, agriculture, construction, transport, 
communications and trade. According to the United 
Nations, the absolute level of official national income 
of Communist China has to be marked up 20 percent in 
order to make it comparable with income figures of 
non-communist countries, provided that the official 
data are accurate. 
^Estimated with national income in 1952 as a base, 
"^Estimated with national income in 1956 as a base. 
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Table 51* National income of China, 1931-1936* 
Year National income 
Billions 
of Yuan 
Annual 
growth rate 
1931 
= 100 
1931 24.8 100.0 
1932 23.0 - 7.3 92.7 
1933 20.4 -11.3 82.2 
1934 19.2 - 5.9 77.4 
1935 20.8 8.3 83.9 
1936 25.7 23.6 103.6 
^Source: cited in 437» pp. 45-47. 
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Table 52. Various estimates of the population of Mainland China, 195^ 
(population in millions) 
Medium Medium mortaility trend 
mortality trend 
Medium High Low 
Year fertility trend fertility trend fertility trer 
I. Assuming 1953 birth rate of ; 
1953 583 583 583 
1958 636 636 636 
1963 693 704 688 
1968 748 785 722 
1973 798 882 745 
1978 842 998 770 
1983 876 1,137 800 
II. Assuming: 1953 birth rate of 4 
1953 583 583 583 
1958 648 648 648 
1963 720 733 716 
1968 792 837 763 
1973 858 961 796 
1978 919 1,113 835 
1983 970 1,287 879 
* 
Source: 439, PP. 25 and 93-97» 
^Por birth rates and death rates implied in different mortality t 
projection of Chinese population see 439, pp. 37-89 and 91. 
*- a iland China, 1953-1983 ' 
allity trend Medium fertility trend 
Low Low High 
fertility trend mortality trend mortality trend 
) birth rate of 37.0 per 1,000 
583 583 583 
636 636 629 
688 693 675 
722 753 719 
745 814 757 
770 868 789 
800 912 812 
i birth rate of 41.6 per 1,000 
583 583 583 
648 648 642 
716 720 701 
763 796 759 
796 875 813 
835 949 860 
879 1,011 897 
rent mortality trends and fertility trends for the 
-89 and 91. 
